USUN Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Senator Austin

top secret

I called on Secretary Byrnes by appointment at ten o’clock this morning and told him my purpose was to discuss, if he chose to do so, the draft relating to regulation of armaments and disarmament which we left with him last Thursday.22 He replied that he had not been able to study that, that he had been so tied up by his duties in reference to the treaties that he had been obliged to postpone the consideration of it. Thereupon, I told him that I felt time was of importance in this matter and that we are getting pressures from many sides to make our position clear. He said that he had not noticed pressures from other delegations, and I referred to papers that had been circulated showing that the Australians intended to make a proposition unless we did and wanted to know whether we were going to make one, and that the French likewise had indicated a similar position.

He then turned to the subject of troops and stated, in effect, that he had already told Mr. Bevin that the Delegation yesterday voted to oppose that part of the British proposal relating to troop disclosures which called for verification and that Mr. Bevin was coming to see him and might be there before I left, and that he intended to state our firm position on that matter in opposition to verification.

By way of bringing up to date the situation respecting regulation of armaments and disarmament I handed him the worksheet which I had made dealing with the possible speech to be made by me on this subject,23 and I said that I was particularly anxious to call his attention to the last three pages containing a reference to his statement publicly; then I read those three pages and asked him if I had correctly set forth the position he took and he said no, that he had never said he would have a proposal to make, that he did not make that statement at the Foreign Press Association Meeting, but that the substance of his remarks were a reply to Mr. Molotov’s speech made that night,24 that we would have a further statement which, “I intend making”. He remarked that this is a government matter. “First,” he said, “we will get to the atomic thing and have a showdown on that.”

This is not a complete statement but is my recollection of features of his statement which is to the effect that during the past six months [Page 1054] he had been so engaged that he could not consider this subject. “Whether we are ready now to sponsor a proposal,” he said, “has not been decided. When the plenary session is held on December 6 I am going to discuss the atomic resolution, the troop business and our position on disarmament. This is a matter of highest policy and must be studied by the President and the Joint Chiefs. I will turn it over to the President to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs and give you a prompt answer.”

Then I said that this, in effect, answered some questions that I had not yet asked but intended to ask, namely, to what extent I should go in getting views, and that I had in mind asking him whether it was wise to get the views of Mr. Acheson and the War and Navy Departments, say on tomorrow when they meet. He replied no, that this is not in the scope of their meeting, that they meet on other subjects and not on a high policy like this, that this could only be handled by the President and the Joint Chiefs. Then I said I had wanted to ask him about taking the matter up with Senators Connally and Vandenberg and perhaps other members of our Delegation but that I had not yet turned over to them any copy of this draft and what he said warned me, put me on notice. He said, “You are right. This ought not to go to them now.” I said, “Perhaps I have stubbed my toe in one respect. I have turned it over to Mr. Baruch.” He said, “Well, if you want to avoid the press getting access to this you couldn’t have done worse than turn it over to Mr. Baruch. He has with him Mr. Swope who has access to the papers and there is danger of its going out through him.” He said, “I will get in touch with Mr. Baruch promptly and caution him that this draft must be kept secret until after he hears from me further.”

“Now,” he said, “I will take the draft you handed to me the other day and get copies made. I will send them to the President with a view to having him submit it to the Joint Chiefs.” I said, “We have clone a little work on that draft since then and I think it would be wiser to let me give you the latest draft for that use,” and he said, “Do that; get it ready and send it right up here.”25

So the matter stands like this. At the next plenary session he will make an address covering this subject as well as the other two. The question whether a definite proposal shall be made by us has not yet been decided but will be decided promptly and we will be informed. In the meantime the draft is to be kept secret except as above stated.

  1. Reference is to a draft, presumably the 3rd draft dated November 21 (Thursday), of a disarmament proposal prepared in Senator Austin’s office; for text of the 4th draft, November 26, see p. 1061.
  2. Not found in Department of State files.
  3. Both Byrnes and Molotov addressed the Foreign Press Association in New York on the evening of November 11.
  4. The following notation by Austin appears on the bottom of the last page of the source text: “Nov. 29—Sec. phoned he had sent to the Pres. two copies (one for Gen’l Eisenhower). Pres. expressed objection to hurrying.”