Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

501.BB/11–2446

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[Washington,] November 24, 1946.

Subject: Question of Disclosure of Disposition of Troops

After learning from Mr. E. N. Thompson that Mr. Acheson talked to the Secretary in the afternoon, November 23, on the above subject, I called Mr. Ross in New York and told him of Mr. Acheson’s talk with the Secretary.¹¹ I said that I understood that the Secretary would be getting in touch with Senator Connally about this subject and would urge the Senator to be sure that any resolution that was adopted did not require us to report on our naval attaches, military attachés and other smaller missions of less than 100. I said that Mr. Acheson would prefer to have an express statement to this effect in the resolution but I understood that he was more interested in substance than in the form by which our objective would be accomplished. Mr. Ross said he felt confident that the result would be accomplished. He pointed out that neither the British nor the Soviets would presumably want to have to report on their naval and military attaché missions. He added that if, however, despite a statement of our understanding of the resolution, a majority of the delegations were to ask for a report on naval and military missions, we would not be able to accomplish our objective. (I talked Sunday morning, November 24, with Colonel Bonesteel who said that G–2¹² had no objections in principle to reporting on our attachés in small missions; they merely felt that such a report was silly and not really in keeping with the objectives of the proposed resolution.)

I also said that Mr. Acheson was particularly anxious to avoid any confusion over the issue of safeguards and inspection with respect to disarmament. He had understood from the Secretary that the Delegation would be drafting a resolution on the troop question which would have some references to disarmament. The Secretary felt confident on the basis of his discussions with the Delegation that the references to disarmament would fully protect our position with respect to safeguards. Mr. Acheson would like to see a copy of the resolution before it is introduced. Mr. Ross told me that it seemed very unlikely that the Delegation would introduce a resolution in the near future and that no drafting of a resolution would at present be undertaken.

In connection with Mr. Acheson’s desire to avoid confusion as to the disarmament question, I said it was my understanding that the Secretary in talking to the Delegation had said that we should take the position that information as to troops should in any event be made available within thirty days after the adoption of a resolution calling for such information by the General Assembly. In other words we should make it plain that any reference to the connection between the troop question and disarmament is not to result in delaying the publication. Mr. Ross said that the Delegation understood this clearly.

I said I understood that the Secretary had quite emphatically stated that there should be no unilateral disclosure by us of our troop dispositions. Mr. Ross said that this was clearly understood by the Delegation.

On Sunday afternoon, November 24, Mr. Ross called me and read a copy of a draft resolution which had just been received from the British Delegation and which the British would introduce on Monday, November 25, if opportunity afforded. (See New York’s telegram 849, November 24,¹³ which sets forth this resolution.) Mr. Ross said that the Delegation would consider the British draft resolution at its meeting on Monday, November 25 at 9:00 a.m.¹⁴

I then called Mr. Acheson and read the text of the British draft resolution to him. On the basis of his comments I subsequently told Mr. Ross that Mr. Acheson thought the Delegation should make a strenuous attempt to persuade the British not to confuse disarmament and the troop question. He thought we should point out to the British that this would tend to confuse the whole question of disarmament and particularly the question of safeguards. He thought that the phrase in the second paragraph of the British draft resolution “as a first step in a study of this question”, i.e., regulation of armaments, was objectionable as tending to give impetus to a drive for consideration of technical details of a disarmament program rather than clearing up at the outset the vital question of safeguards. Mr. Acheson also felt that the final clause of the British draft resolution, namely, that the troop information “should be immediately subjected, on the spot, to an effective United Nations system of verification”, was most unfortunate. Mr. Acheson said that this latter provision seemed to him really inconsistent with the Secretary’s decision that we should oppose any delay in making the figures as to troop dispositions promptly available after adoption of the resolution. He thought that the British argument that the verification provision would permit prompt publication of figures was disingenuous as obviously there would be prolonged discussion in the committee of the verification provision. Its effect would really be to delay and sidetrack the troop census proposal. In addition, Mr. Acheson thought that it was impractical and most unwise as tending to jeopardize the much more important question of safeguards for disarmament. He thought that if we could not persuade the British to eliminate this provision we should tell them that we would support its elimination on the foregoing grounds.

Mr. Acheson agreed that in view of the fact that the British themselves were now suggesting specification of the particular points where troops are located we could not oppose such a provision. He thought we might still interpret such provision as calling for a listing of the points where troops are located but with simply an over-all figure as to our troops within any particular country. He also felt that we could not as a practical matter argue against specification of air and naval bases and their garrisons.

11. For an account of the Byrnes-Acheson conversation under reference, see Mr. Thompson’s memorandum of November 23, supra.
12. War Department General Staff, Intelligence.
13. Not printed. For a description of the British draft resolution, see US/A/C.1/72(Rev.a), the text actually submitted in the First Committee, and footnote 17 thereto, p. 1050.
14. For a summary of the decisions taken by the Delegation at its meeting on the morning of November 25, see telegram 851, November 25, from New York, infra.