Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

[New York,] November 21, 1946.

I want to marshal all the arguments relating to the suggestion that we stop making bombs.

This argument takes these obvious forms with all sorts of permutations of them.

1. Truman should have offered to stop making bombs at the time of the Moscow Declaration.

2. The United States should now offer to stop making bombs.

3. When the advocates of #2 realize the futility of that argument, then they propose that the United States should stop making fissionable materials.

4. Beyond this, the first step in the appeasement process is to dispose of the present fissionable material.

5. The next step in the appeasement process is to offer the world the right to inspect to be sure that we are keeping our word.

6. The United States should turn over its atomic energy plants to an international trusteeship.

The various forms in which this argument appears make it very difficult to grab hold of the whole concept.

There seem to be two general ideas rolling around in the back of the minds of those who approach our difficulties by urging any one of the six suggestions above. One argument takes the form of urging that it would create a better attitude on the part of the other nations, particularly Russia, and that this better attitude would be of some tangible benefit in the negotiations. The difficulty I find is that at best the idea is only a gesture, which would be utterly ineffective unless it went the whole way, and if it should go the whole way it would be very dangerous because it would be the first step in the start of a general policy of appeasement, and the making of the first step would only lead to further demands.

The second argument in the minds of the advocates seems to be that it would be desirable to equalize the bargaining position of the nations. I don’t see any benefit in equalizing the bargaining positions if we expect thereby to get an effective treaty. The equalizing of the bargaining positions would be a fair guarantee there would be no effective treaty. If we start out with the theme that we are going to equalize the bargaining position, the first question is whether we mean to equalize it in (a) the atomic energy field, or (b) in the general disarmament field. If we talk of equalizing it in the atomic energy field, I don’t see any limit to which the demand would go. Certainly we couldn’t equalize it unless we gave up all the information, destroyed all our plants, killed the scientists, destroyed the know-how of production and the plants in which such know-how could be applied. It obviously would do no good for us to destroy all these things and leave the rest of the world free to go as far as it could in arriving at our present position.

As to the proposition that we stop making bombs, the advocates of that idea forget that we would have to stop making fissionable material, or the promise to stop making bombs would have no meaning. The production of fissionable material would put us in a position to make a bomb in a very short time. This fact shows the unsubstantial nature of the gesture to stop making bombs. If we go the whole way of stopping the production of fissionable material, we would interfere seriously with the research work and with the entire peaceful industrial program.

No one would assert that any one of these forms would not be a friendly gesture. The only answer is that the making of the gesture would be utterly ineffective.

So far as I am aware, no nation has asked us to do this, and quite surely no delegate has made the suggestion, but Dr. Auger did make the suggestion last July.

Some small nations have expressed opposition to the idea and have urged us not to accept the suggestion. It seems logical that some small nations would feel safer with a bomb in our possession in the present condition of troublesome world affairs.

The suggestion has been made that we stop making the bombs for a specified time, disregarding for the moment the lack of clarity as to what we should stop making, and whether the request was limited to bomb manufacture alone or not. It would seem clear that any such offer would have to be conditioned in either of two ways: (a) for a specified time, or (b) under certain conditions. As to the first suggestion regarding the time limit, it seems obvious that at the expiration of the time there would be a heavy responsibility on this country if it were to decide to resume manufacture. It would be quite a terrifying notice to the rest of the world that an arms race really was starting and that war was imminent. The resumption of manufacturing would add to the terrors of the world in a very marked degree. Our stopping of the making of bombs would be regarded as an act in aiding the peace. Quite obviously, the resumption of manufacturing would be regarded as a threat to the peace.

As to the alternate suggestion it would be difficult to outline the conditions under which we would no longer be bound to stop production at this time, but if they were outlined, quite obviously we would face the alternative of having the decision as to compliance with the conditions rest with ourselves alone or with some other body. If we left it to our sole discretion, we would have the problem to meet that we met in the Wallace argument regarding the matter of stages. No one in that case, however, proposed that this matter should be handled at our sole discretion, but, still, we were accused of having that view. As to the bodies to decide whether conditions were met, I don’t want now to advocate any such decision except as a part of a treaty.

The argument seems to me to boil down to about this—that the advocates of these various ideas want us to do now what we are proposing to do under our plan in the treaty by well-defined stages, with some organization set up in the treaty to decide that the stages have been obtained. I don’t know at this time what that body should be, and, yet, I am sure that if we pursue the arguments for appeasement, we will be in that position very promptly.

Underlying this whole argument is a lot of confusion of mind about the duty and responsibility of this Government. It seems to me clear that this Government has a responsibility to its own people to protect them as a nation. Under our plan we are proposing that we surrender this responsibility in the field of atomic energy provided that no other nation is in a position to achieve what we are giving up.

People seem to forget that the atomic bomb is only one weapon involved in the disarmament program. If other nations could get us to give up the bomb unconditionally or by the mere exchange of promises, my guess is that disarmament in the broad pattern would be doomed.

Take the specific case of Russia and her views of the atomic bomb and the treaty to deal with it. It seems clear to me that if Russia will not agree to inspection in that field where she gives up no weapon, she certainly will not agree to an effective disarmament in other fields where she will have to give up weapons. What she is after now is unilateral disarmament in the field where she has nothing to surrender. All we ask is that she surrender the chance to make bombs at some future date without our knowing that she has started to make bombs. Until the time arrives when Russia is able to make bombs, she gives up not even the opportunity to use them. Our own theme is that we will not lessen the security of any nation by any plan to which we will agree in connection with the atomic bomb.

One great difficulty with the suggestions is that they overlap each other, and whatever might be done in this matter would not create a uniform frame of mind on the part of those considering our action or attempting to interpret it. Any move by us should be calculated to have one certain logical effect, but that seems impossible in this particular case.

The Russian position regarding the surrender of sovereignty in the field of atomic energy seems to show a strange concern for their sovereignty with very little regard either for our sovereignty or for the sovereignty of the rest of the world, and still less regard for our national security.

On the one hand Russia has rejected the United States Proposals because it is an undue interference with national sovereignty. On the other hand the Russian proposal, made by Gromyko during the opening sessions of the Atomic Energy Commission, provided a very material infringement on United States sovereignty. In addition, the proposed Russian treaty would force an infringement on the national sovereignty of all nations who might not ratify the treaty, provided only 51% of the nations did ratify it.

It is very strange that some people think that Mr. Molotov has really scored a victory in referring to disarmament before the General Assembly at this time when the fact is that it was discussed at San Francisco almost two years ago that the Russians are the only ones up to now who have delayed action in this field insofar as the Military Staff Committee is concerned. There isn’t anything new in their suggestions. The real fact is that the discussions started so long ago that people have forgotten about these discussions of almost two years ago.