Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Notes of a Luncheon Meeting Between Members of the United States and Soviet Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, November 20, 1946
| Present: | Prof. Alexandrov | Mr. Hancock |
| Dr. Mescheryakov | Mr. Burton | |
| Mr. Vavilov | Mr. Lindsay | |
| Mr. Kondratiev | Dr. Fine | |
| Mr. Chase |
In a general discussion at the start of the luncheon, Mr. Hancock observed that the problem of atomic energy is unique in his experience [Page 1022] in that it seems to have no limits. Prof. Alexandrov stated that this was quite understandable since the problem concerns every aspect of humanity.
However, we must, in our work, put the problem within certain limits based on what we know. Otherwise, we can’t arrive at any solution. Dr. Mescheryakov remarked that in the field of research, distant limits or no limits at all are desirable and, for that reason, confessed to a certain pessimism. Prof. Alexandrov replied that we are now talking of controls, and that he felt optimistic about the possibilities of setting certain limits and also of getting agreement within this area. The problem is almost one of what to exclude rather than what to include.
Mr. Hancock stated that he too was of an optimistic nature and felt that an agreement not only must, but could be reached. Prof. Alexandrov added that we must confine ourselves to the area of what is known, or certain. No one can foresee the full possibilities of atomic energy now, just as no one could foresee the possibilities of electricity when that form of energy was discovered. He felt that it would be better to centralize all development in this field for the present. The French suggestion of decentralizing this work throughout the universities is quite premature. That is for the future. We should so work that only those activities that are fully understood become decentralized or “democratized.” We cannot foresee all such developments, and for this reason, we must not tie ourselves too firmly to any particular line. Dr. Mescheryakov added that students the world over are a wild lot and they should not be permitted to fool around with atomic energy. They might start making bombs.
Prof. Alexandrov prefaced his answer to this question by remarking that he was a scientist, engineer and pedagog and not a political man. However, it seemed to him that we should look for progress in the field of atomic energy to our superiors. Mr. Molotov had suggested (a) general reduction in armaments and (b) in this connection, the banning of atomic energy for military purposes. Mr. Stalin had also stated that a strong international control is necessary in the field of atomic energy. If Mr. Molotov could meet with a corresponding individual from the United States to agree on the general principles or policy of control, the Atomic Energy Commission could move forward very rapidly. At present, the members of the Atomic Energy Commission are working in the general background of this problem. They are handicapped by the fact that there is no agreement in principle on the part of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It is surprising that we have been able to progress as far as we are now in view of this lack of agreement.
Mr. Hancock stated that he agreed that agreement in principle or in [Page 1023] policy must be achieved but feared that tying the problem of control of atomic energy to the general problem of disarmament might submerge this important problem in the overall debate and discussion.
Prof. Alexandrov replied that he did not think that this was possible, that he has felt all along that it was unfortunate that the problem of atomic energy has always been so isolated from the other problems affecting the entire world. If our Ministers of State, or other individuals empowered to deal with such problems could be persuaded to take up the problem of atomic energy while they are discussing problems of, let us say Trieste, Germany, the Far East and general disarmament, an agreement in principle might be reached in the field of atomic energy which would fit this problem into the general pattern of world problems and would permit the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed rapidly in the working out of the details. Prof. Alexandrov asked Mr. Hancock’s permission to bring up this subject with his superiors with the view of persuading them to take up this problem with corresponding U.S. officials.
Mr. Hancock gave Prof. Alexandrov blanket authority to report everything that was being said during the luncheon and added that he had no objection to such a proposed line of action. He stated that such added problems are not within his competence but that he understood that the U.S. was preparing to deal with this problem at the level suggested by Prof. Alexandrov. Mr. Hancock further added that the Moscow Declaration and the General Assembly Resolution had given a clear mandate to the Atomic Energy Commission on how to proceed with this problem. Prof. Alexandrov agreed but added that in the light of the Moscow Declaration and the G.A. Resolution the U.S. had proposed the plan known as the Baruch Plan and the Soviets had proposed a plan put forth by Mr. Gromyko. These plans are not in agreement, and Prof. Alexandrov felt that we have gone about as far as we can under these directives. He felt that a further agreement on policy was necessary before any appreciable progress could be made in the Atomic Energy Commission. When such an agreement is reached, and after the G.A., he felt that more frequent meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission would be possible in order to expedite our work. He again asked Mr. Hancock for permission to report the result of this conversation to his superiors with a view of having appropriate action taken. He also asked Mr. Hancock what his opinion was on this course of action.
Mr. Hancock repeated that this was outside his competence but that he understood that the United States was awaiting a further clarification of the Soviet position prior to taking any action. Mr. Hancock said that it was felt that the Soviet position was unclear, that recent statements by Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov were not entirely consistent [Page 1024] with statements made earlier in the proceedings of the Atomic Energy Commission. The United States felt hesitant about pressing the U.S.S.R. representatives for a clarification, feeling that Mr. Molotov would give this clarification in the general debate on disarmament before the General Assembly.
Prof. Alexandrov asked whether he could look upon this present meeting as a gesture of friendship on the part of the United States representative and as an indication of a genuine desire on the part of the U.S. to come to an agreement as soon as possible. He further asked whether the United States would like to receive advance notice of Mr. Molotov’s clarification of what was meant by a strong international control mentioned by Mr. Stalin. He added that every nation is entitled to its own guess as to what was meant by a strong international control, and that it seemed to him, speaking as an individual, that this statement meant, a strong control that was international, and shared in by all nations, beginning with raw materials and going through the entire process of atomic energy development. Discussions to date had indicated that a technical or scientific control was feasible, except for some blank areas in the final stages in atomic energy development. He hoped that physicists and scientists could eventually solve these technical problems. A policing method of control also seemed to be indicated. He repeated that the agreement on a higher level on general policy or principle in this problem was necessary. This agreement should cover the fields of (a) general disarmament, (b) the banning of atomic weapons in connection with general disarmament, and (c) some form of control. He added that with an incorrect solution on overall problems, agreement on atomic energy would be of little value. He added that if international inspection were established he hoped he might be the inspector in the United States and Mr. Hancock in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Hancock laughingly agreed.
Mr. Hancock assured Prof. Alexandrov that the present luncheon was more than a gesture of friendship and that the United States was sincerely and genuinely interested in solving the problems as soon as possible. He favored many more such meetings. Mr. Hancock added that he feared we might slow down the tempo of our work after the first of the year because of the necessity of educating three new members in the complexities of our problem.
Prof. Alexandrov thanked Mr. Hancock for this gesture of friendship and added that he himself had thought of approaching the United States representatives in a similar way, but had refrained because of a general atmosphere of suspicion and a possible misunderstanding of his motives. Such meetings would expedite our work as no agreements are ever possible without such frequent contacts.
Prof. Alexandrov agreed readily when it was suggested to him that [Page 1025] it might be a good idea to make a breakdown of the various problems in the general field of atomic energy control so that areas of agreement and disagreement would be clearly delineated. Such a breakdown would greatly aid our superiors in their considerations of the entire problem.
After the luncheon, Prof. Alexandrov, enroute to the elevators, asked Mr. Chase whether he would be at the meeting on Thursday.85 Upon receiving an affirmative answer, he stated that he might be able to give some advance information of the Soviet clarification of their present position at that time. He added that he would probably be a member of the U.S.S.R. Delegation for some time and looked forward to working for an agreement. After the luncheon Prof. Alexandrov stated that he expected Prof. Skobeltsyn86 to return to the United States.