IO Files
Minutes of the Twenty-second Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 19, 1946, 9 a.m.
[Here follow list of names of persons present (31) and discussion of other questions.]
The Report on Location of Troops Question
Mr. Sanders75 noted that Committee I was going to postpone further discussion on the veto for a few days and turn to the question of the location of troops in ex-enemy territories. This item had been placed on the agenda by the Soviet Union. However, no Russian resolution had yet been submitted, although doubtless there would be one. He noted that the Russian intention was to have troops withdrawn throughout the whole world. Particularly in the long run this applied to the United Kingdom. He noted that Mr. Molotov in his opening speech had said, that the purpose of the Russian motion was to allow the Security Council to proceed under Article 43 of the Charter on forces. However, in the Security Council when this question had been discussed, the Russians had refused to agree that there was any connection between the two items. They had then claimed that the presence of troops in other countries was a source of uneasiness.
Mr. Sandifer76 then read the recommendations from position paper US/A/C.1/54 (Rev. b)77 as follows:
a. Substantive
1. We should immediately take steps to broaden the inquiry so as to include all mobilized troops at home and abroad, including those in ex-enemy territories.
Senator Connally pointed out that Secretary Byrnes had suggested the word “mobilized” in order that there might be included the large mobilized reserves. The Secretary’s thought was that a report should be made on all troops wherever they might be. Senator Austin noted that this might refer to the United States troops since we were quite likely to have a large reserve and a small active force.
Senator Vandenberg inquired about the meaning of the word “mobilized”. Did it mean prepared and ready to shoot? He thought it [Page 1014] connoted readiness for war. Senator Connally said that this was the case.
Mr. Dulles said he wanted to question the desirability of including a report on troops at home. He thought the reason for the Soviet proposal was clearly that it was a propaganda effort to show that the United States had troops in China and the United Kingdom had them in Greece. Now the United States was coming back to say that it would not tell about its troops in China unless the Russians told about their troops in Russia. He thought that most people felt that the home forces were properly a matter of secret military information, just as we thought was the case with the atomic bomb. He thought that the proposal as put forward, was too wide to be on sound ground, and that we were over-playing our hand. He pointed out that the United States was not willing to disclose information regarding the atomic bomb which was our principal weapon. We would put forward our information regarding our subsidiary weapon while asking the U.S.S.R. to disclose information regarding its primary weapon.
Senator Austin pointed out that this was in line with United States views on disarmament. He said his own choice was to put the whole matter together and to consider this item as a matter of military intelligence with inspection accompanied by a disarmament proposal on a well arranged and organized plan. Disarmament obviously could not be accomplished in a day. The question is how to handle the report on troops—whether it could be taken up now or in connection with the general disarmament.
Senator Connally said that some of the advisers were insisting on combining the whole proposition into one. He did not agree, for he thought it lost the entire character of the proposal. He thought the Russians would not want the proposal if it was changed in this way. He did not expect that we would get far with disarmament at this session of the General Assembly. He said he was for disarmament but with a good many “ifs” and “whens”. He did not want disarmament when someone else had a bead on us. Senator Austin said that this was exactly right, that Senator Connally had never spoken truer words. He said that the United States had no idea of reducing its military posture until security was acquired through the United Nations Peace Force.
Mr. Cohen reported that the Secretary’s suggestion on mobilized troops came as a result of a talk with Mr. Bevin. Mr. Bevin’s view was that if there were any resolution it should cover all mobilized forces. Mr. Cohen thought that feeling arose from the fact that the Soviet Union had large troops close to other territories and that this was relevant to the maintenance of security. He supposed that “mobilized” [Page 1015] meant troops in a position to be ordered out of the country for combat. At Senator Vandenberg’s request, Colonel Bonesteel replied that mobilized troops meant troops under military discipline and control as opposed to inactive or reserve status. Senator Connally noted that when press reports spoke of mobilization [it] meant a call to the colors putting soldiers on active duty. Senator Austin noted that the United States system gave a less specific meaning to the word mobilized. Senator Vandenberg thought that the word had a belligerent atmosphere. Mr. Cohen said that he was sure that the phrase was used in a lay sense and he thought that the advisors might consider whether there was a more appropriate phrase.
Senator Connally reported that the Secretary had told him that he wanted the resolution to cover all troops everywhere. This was on the theory that the information was necessary when there was talk on disarmament. He did not think that the military and naval people wanted the clause regarding inspection to check on the information submitted. He thought that some of our military units were not strong enough to stand inspection.
Mr. Cohen said that he did not know whether the word “mobilized” was necessary. Mr. Ross suggested that the term “on active service” or “on active duty” might better be used.
Mrs. Roosevelt said that she believed with Mr. Dulles that we were making a mistake to expect the Russians to say what forces they had within their borders. We had a perfect right to ask what troops there were outside. She thought that to ask what troops there were at home, unless the request was implemented with an inspection provision, was not going to produce information of much value. It was asking a good deal of others. She said she was not sure this government would be perfectly glad to let the world know about our military situation. Senator Connally remarked that the world knows how many troops we have.
Mr. Dulles said that everyone wanted to keep the United States strong militarily as long as it was under the guns of a threatening power. He thought that the Soviet plan was a subtle one to disarm the United States unilaterally. If the American people were led to believe that the United States was militaristic, then we will disarm. He thought that the Soviet proposal regarding the presence of troops abroad and their attitude on the Japanese mandated islands question78 were being used to the same propaganda end. He thought that the United States had to play a propaganda game as skillfully as the Russians. We would be over-playing our hand, from a propaganda [Page 1016] viewpoint, to demand the number of troops at home in return for giving the figures on those abroad for this would be considered an unreasonable condition.
Mr. Cohen said that it was not suggested that the information should not be disclosed unless the proposal were broadened. He noted that the United States position paper did not say that the United States would not join in disclosing all troops. He thought there should be no distinction between disclosing the troops abroad whether or not the Russians went along with disclosing the troops at home. There was no suggestion that in pressing for a broadened resolution, that the United States was unwilling to disclose its troops abroad.
[There follows further discussion of the subject. The formal Record of Decisions of this meeting indicates that the Delegation agreed to the substance of the recommendations contained in US/A/C.1/54 (Rev.b). The Record concludes as follows: “It was agreed to give Senator Connally discretion in handling this matter in Committee I, particularly with reference to the degree to which the U.S. should press to have the resolution cover the reporting on troops at home.” (IO Files)]
- William Sanders, Associate Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs; Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
- Durward V. Sandifer, Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs; Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
- The recommendations under reference are printed in telegram 822, November 18, from New York, supra.↩
- For documentation on United States policy with respect to the Japanese mandated islands question, see pp. 544 ff.↩