Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay
Subject: Notes on Conversation Held on Friday, November 8, between George F. Kennan of State Department, and Messrs. Hancock and Lindsay.
Mr. Hancock opened the discussion by referring to the University of Chicago meeting in December to discuss alternate atomic energy proposals. Kennan stated that he thought he would not be able to attend the meeting.
We outlined briefly our current status and our plan for bringing the political issues to the fore again before the end of the year. He agreed in general with this proposal, but felt that it should not be regarded in any way as a final step but rather as an interim step in long and drawn-out negotiations. He thought when the question of atomic energy came before the Politburo, the question was undoubtedly asked, “What will the Americans do if we don’t sign up?” At the present time the Soviets probably answered that question by assuming that we will do nothing. Under such circumstances they would undoubtedly reason that it was not necessary for them to take any action now. Kennan believes that we should begin a series of moves designed to convince the Russians of our serious intent and of the consequences if they chose to continue their present course. Such a series of steps might, for example, include Military Staff conversations between ourselves, the British and the Canadians or the construction of a new bombproof General Staff headquarters in a remote region. He firmly believes we must keep a constant and firm pressure on the Russians. We must show no sign of weakening whatever in the position which we have taken. Despite his realistic and rather pessimistic attitude, he feels that ultimately it may be possible to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Russians.
He believed that there was a slight possibility that Stalin and the Politburo really did not understand our proposals in the spirit in which they have been put forward. He considers that a direct appeal, therefore, to Stalin would be very desirable. This appeal should be made quietly and without publicity and should be made by Ambassador Smith and one or more qualified men from the United States. He also thinks that either he or Chip Bohlen should go along to interpret because of the personal confidence that Stalin has developed through long association with them.