501.BC Armaments/11–546
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Memorandum for Secretary Byrnes
Subject: Analysis of Molotov’s Resolution on Disarmament64 and Recommendations as to Method of Dealing With it.64a
On its face, the Molotov proposal appears to be a forward step in achieving United Nations objectives. Actually it will have an opposite effect. For the result of the proposal is to divert attention from the untenable position in which the Russians find themselves in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
American policy should be aimed at making this vital fact explicitly clear and should seek to focus attention on the real elements of any disarmament program. Otherwise we are likely to be forced into the dangerous position of discussing in detail the technical problem of reduction and elimination of various types of armaments, while the Russians will avoid (as they have so far succeeded in doing in the Atomic Energy Commission) any genuine collaboration in the working out of the international safeguards which are the heart of any effective disarmament program.
It is believed that these conclusions as to the Molotov proposal and the dangers for us in joining in it, are borne out by the events that have occurred in the United Nations since last January.
Molotov now proposes that the General Assembly resolve: first, that a general reduction in armaments is necessary; second, that “a primary objective” in such a program should be “the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes”; and third, that the Security Council should see to it that these two objectives, that is, [Page 1002] general reduction of armaments and the banning of atomic weapons, are achieved.
The Molotov proposal has been made to appear as a new and far-reaching approach to the problem of disarmament. This is a quite erroneous impression. Nearly a year ago the General Assembly took action which, in its main features, represented a much more hopeful approach to the problem. In the popular stir created by the current Molotov proposal, many observers have lost sight of this significant circumstance.
The resolution of the General Assembly adopted on January 18, 1946 not only recorded the desire of that body to bring about the elimination of the most important weapons of war, but also provided specifically for practical machinery through which this immense task could be undertaken.65 That resolution set up a Commission directed, among other things, to “proceed with the utmost dispatch” and “make specific proposals … for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”
The resolution clearly recognized that the heart of the disarmament measures must be the establishment of safeguards to cope with the hazards of secret violations of the terms of a treaty. To give effect to this view, the General Assembly further directed the Commission to make “specific proposals” “for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.”
The Commission, thus established by the General Assembly on January 18, has been in session for the past five months. During these months the Russians have repeatedly professed approval of international measures to eliminate atomic weapons. But at every stage in the proceedings, they have stubbornly refused to consider or discuss any measures of genuine international control. It has become plain that what the Russians mean by international control is a mere paper agreement to ban atomic weapons. The only teeth they would countenance in such an agreement would be a provision that “the government signing the convention would, by national legislation, take steps to insure that the convention is applied and would in particular provide for the most severe punishment.” In short, each nation would have to take the word of every other nation that the treaty was being observed.
The only other “safeguard” advanced by the Russians is contained in the vague suggestion that “the Security Council would guarantee [Page 1003] the enforcement of the convention as a part of its duties in connection with maintenance of international peace and security.” But despite the most persistent questioning by the representatives of other nations, the Russians have never been willing or able to explain what measures they believe the Security Council could possibly use to make this guarantee effective.
When in the course of the proceedings, the United States representatives have proposed real safeguards involving inspection and access to the various countries of the world by an international organization, the Russian representatives have responded that inspection is not reconcilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. This attitude, which is hardly consistent with the terms of the Resolution of January 18, 1946, is amplified in the following paraphrased translation from the Russian, issued to the press on July 31. The press release covered statements which the Russian representative was reported to have made in a committee meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on that day:
“Mr. Gromyko said that the proposed inspection is not reconcilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. ‘No inspection as such can guarantee peace and security.’ And, he added, ‘This idea of inspection is greatly exaggerated in importance. It is a too superficial understanding of the problem of control.’ The Soviet Delegate repeated that inspection had assumed undue importance in the course of the discussions and said that the only real underlying method of control is ‘by the cooperation of the United Nations.’”
The statement just quoted is typical of the position which the Russians have taken throughout the deliberations of the Atomic Energy Commission. In the process of discussion it has become increasingly clear that they are evading the main issue. The repeated attempts by the representatives of other countries to draw the Russians out have highlighted this fact, and in consequence the position of the Russian representatives has become more and more awkward. It is this situation which probably accounts for the rather conflicting statements of Alexandrov, Gromyko, Molotov, and Stalin in recent weeks. They are certainly aware of the difficulties of their stand in the Commission and of the impracticability of maintaining that stand indefinitely, and they have been searching for a way out.
It is in this setting that the proposal of Molotov should be appraised. As already suggested, its effect would be to divert attention from the untenable position in which the Russians find themselves. If the Molotov resolution or something similar is adopted it will mean that discussions of disarmament will be carried on in broader terms and in a new forum and the proceedings of the Atomic Energy Commission will be minimized. Attention will be centered instead upon such [Page 1004] matters as “banning the manufacture of atomic weapons”, reducing the size of navies, reducing the size of air forces, and reducing the size of armies, and the issues as to safeguards will be buried in a maze of generalities and technicalities.
This is the serious danger in any attempt to develop in company with the Russians a broad new approach to the problem of disarmament in the General Assembly. To guard against it our representatives in the General Assembly should emphasize the futility of any proposals for reduction in armaments unless there is some real possibility of agreement upon effective international safeguards; they should emphasize that effective international safeguards are impossible without some form of inspection, or international operations, or other measures which involve ready access by an international organization to the various nations of the world.
Our representatives should point out that the most important aspects of disarmament have already been acted upon by the General Assembly in its resolution of January 18, 1946; that the Atomic Energy Commission, the special organ of the Security Council set up to implement this action, is the agency through which the work ought to be continued with all possible vigor; that it can only serve to confuse the problem and give the world a false sense of hope for the General Assembly to adopt, as a dramatic new measure, a resolution which in fact would be less effective than the measure adopted a year ago.
In view of the paramount importance of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the main purpose of the United Nations should be to make progress in disarmament in those fields. Obviously, if the ambitious program already voted can make no progress, it is foolish to believe that a still more ambitious program, such as that which Molotov professes to advocate, could have any hope of success.
An early decision should be reached as to what, if any, formal action on this subject the United States should advocate in the General Assembly. If we do not propose or join in an affirmative measure of some kind, it may appear that the Russians are taking the lead in pressing for disarmament, a widely popular move, and that we are opposing this policy. Effective exposition of our true position as suggested in this memorandum, should go a long way toward meeting this danger. And Mr. Baruch’s proposal in his memorandum of September 17, which the President and you have approved, should serve to complement this line of action. In addition, however, it may well prove desirable for us to propose a specific measure in the General Assembly.
One possibility for such action would be a resolution by the General Assembly reaffirming that the resolution of January 18, 1946 is the most important step in approaching the problem of disarmament, expressing the conviction that the establishment of safeguards by way of [Page 1005] international inspection and other means is basic to any measures of disarmament, and recording its sense that the expeditious fulfillment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference with respect to atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is of the highest importance. The foregoing is merely one suggestion.
There are doubtless a number of other possibilities for action which would serve the purpose as well or better, and the discussions which Senator Austin and Mr. Baruch are having should be very helpful in determining the best course to take. Through these discussions it should be possible for Senator Austin and Mr. Baruch to work out a program in which each would strengthen the other’s position.
- For the text of the resolution on disarmament proposed in Molotov’s address to the General Assembly, October 29, see p. 973.↩
- A draft memorandum for the Secretary of State prepared by Mr. Hiss and dated November 5, not printed, had the same title as the present document and advanced substantially similar arguments. It included a draft resolution to be introduced in the General Assembly of the type described in the penultimate paragraph of the present memorandum. Although the Hiss draft is not a recognizable antecedent of the present document with respect to phraseology, the Office of the Under Secretary presumably considered its content in drafting the memorandum printed here. (501.BC Armaments/11–546)↩
- The reference is to General Assembly Resolution 1 (I), “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy,” approved January 24, 1946; for text, see GA(I/1), Plenary, pp. 258–59, or Department of State, Documents on Disarmament 1945–1959, vol. i, pp. 6–7.↩