Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph Chase 32 to Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

Subject: Preliminary Comments on Molotov’s Speech

1.
Stalin, in his answers to Alexander Werth33 and Hugh Baillie,34 stated that, as regards the atom bomb:35
a.
Its monopoly cannot endure;
b.
Its use will be prohibited;
c.
It should be under strong international control.
2.
Taking as relevant, only points “b”and “c”, it seems to me that Molotov, in carrying out this program, has reiterated Gromyko’s arguments and added some new features, all of which point to a reaffirmation of the original Soviet position. By considering the atom bomb as merely another weapon, Molotov tied it to a general discussion of disarmament. Now, under the Charter, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee are directed to study the problem and make recommendations concerning the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament (Articles 11, 26 and 47). This new “angle” merely reaffirms the Soviet position that existing organs of the United Nations are empowered and able to deal with atomic weapons and presumably all other phases of the problems of atomic energy. This is undoubtedly what Stalin means by strong international control and may even be an attempt to by-pass the Atomic Energy Commission eventually, and certainly rejects, by implication, an A.D.A. This latter statement is further borne out by Molotov’s reference to the veto, especially in connection with his attack on the Baruch Plan.
3.
This new approach is an attempt to divert the discussion of atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission to other organs of the United Nations and also attempts to separate the discussion of peaceful and dangerous aspects of atomic energy.
4.
I believe that in our reaction to the speech we should keep in mind that we are working for our plan, or a better one if such a plan is suggested or develops. We should not lose sight of our main objective, however strong the urge to react to the personal attack. Any reaction to this attack will make sensational reading, will becloud the real issues involved, and would play into Soviet hands. They just love “to fish in muddy waters”.
Joseph Chase
  1. United States Delegation Staff member.
  2. Correspondent for the Manchester Guardian.
  3. President of United Press.
  4. Regarding the answers under reference, see vol. vi, pp. 784, 786, 793 (bracketed note), and 794.