Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

501.BC Atomic/9–2046

Memorandum by The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to President Truman ⁵⁷

secret

New York, September 17, 1946.

Subject: Request for Further Statement of Policy for U.S. Representative, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, in the Light of Proceedings to Date

The first stage of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, which began three months ago with my statement of the United States plan for international control, is now coming to an end. A new phase is about to begin. The Commission’s future course is so dominated by the general development of international policy that I feel it essential to report to you on the progress of our negotiations to date, to acquaint you with the issues, and to seek your instructions as to the alternative courses of action likely to face us in the near future.

I. Organization and Approach of the U.S. Delegation

The Staff of the United States Delegation has been organized so as to include experts in all of the various specialties required for our task. In my long experience, I have never been associated with a group of men of such outstanding calibre and unqualified devotion to the public interest. Many are serving entirely at their own expense. All are unstintingly sacrificing their personal interests and willingly undergoing inconvenience in order to further this work, so important to this nation and to the entire world.

In addition to the distinguished full-time scientific members of our staff, we have had the continuous assistance of a panel of outstanding scientists through whom we have kept closely in touch with the scientific profession at large. We have also maintained close contact with the Department of State, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the United States members of the United Nations Military Staff Committee, with Major General Leslie R. Groves, representing the Manhattan Project, and with members of the Lilienthal Board of Consultants who prepared, last March, the State Department “Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy”.

In accordance with the basic United States policy, confirmed in your instructions to us, we have provided other members of the Commission with the underlying scientific information “essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals” we have advocated. It has been possible for our Delegation to fulfill this commitment without disclosing any information not contained in previously published scientific or official literature or not properly cleared under security provisions.

No secret information has been released in the course of the discussions. Obviously, even the mere discussion of published information inevitably helps to clarify the picture to some extent for the scientists of other countries. Such clarification has been contemplated as a part of our national policy ever since the Agreed Declaration of Washington announced by you and Prime Ministers Attlee and MacKenzie King last November, and is, of course, a prerequisite to any attempt to negotiate a treaty of the kind sought by our government.

In this connection, you should be aware that there is considerable doubt as to the precise extent of real secrecy surrounding the science and technology of atomic energy. Much information has necessarily been revealed through the publication of the Smyth Report, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, and scientific literature authorized for release in accordance with our national policy. Information has also been given in publications not presented for official clearance. We know of efforts by other nations to acquire a few items of industrial equipment specially adapted for use in certain atomic energy manufacturing processes. We also know of attempts by other nations to acquire atomic raw materials. Certain secret information and small samples of secret materials have been obtained through espionage activities in Canada, which are now a matter of public record. Similar activities are probably going on in this country. While expert testimony suggests a period of at least five years before any other country will be in a position to produce atomic weapons, we are not ourselves able to assess accurately the length of this margin of time. It is conceivable that this margin may be cut, especially under the pressure of an atomic bomb race.

Throughout the deliberations to date, we have adhered rigorously to your original instructions, on which my initial statement of the U.S. position was based. We have encouraged the presentation of other proposals which would meet the mandate given the Commission by the General Assembly last January, and have indicated that we would welcome suggestions to strengthen the U.S. proposals. Yet only a single alternative proposal has been put forward—that of the Soviet Union—and, for the reasons stated below, their plan in no way meets the Commission’s instructions from the General Assembly.

We have steadfastly refrained from the use of pressure or threats of any variety. Nor have we suggested plans for dealing with the situation which might arise if unanimous agreement on effective international control proves impossible. We have regarded it as our single task to work toward complete agreement on a plan fully satisfying the Commission’s terms of reference as interpreted in your instructions to us.

II. Work of the Commission to Date

The work of the Commission to date may be briefly summarized in three phases as follows:

1. Presentation of Original Positions of the Several Delegates

This phase occupied the Commission in meetings from June 14 through July 15. Only two proposals were put forward. In my address of June 14, I stated in broad outline the United States proposals as approved by you. Our plan was subsequently elaborated in three supplemental memoranda.

As you know, the U. S. plan called for the establishment of an international Atomic Development Authority responsible for the supervision, inspection, and control of all activities in the field of atomic energy, starting with the raw materials as they come out of the ground and including ownership or management of the necessary refineries, plants for the production of nuclear fuels, and major installations producing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The Authority would be supported by a system of rapid and effective punishments for violations and by free access for geological surveyors and other necessary inspectors to prevent misuse and insure compliance. The Great Powers’ veto in the Security Council would not be permitted as a device for nations to protect themselves or their friends from punishment for violations of a treaty controlling atomic energy which they had previously accepted. Thus we proposed to eliminate the veto in the atomic energy field, not on unforeseeable policy issues which might arise in the future, but on punishment for crimes specifically defined in advance by voluntary agreement.

After a system of international control has been brought into effective operation by appropriate stages, we proposed to cease bomb production and dispose of then existing bombs pursuant to a treaty, properly ratified according to our constitutional processes. We left open the question as to whether the treaty should provide for dismantling of the bombs or for their transfer to an international agency for possible use against aggressors.

The Soviet proposal, presented on June 19, called for an international convention merely outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons and requiring the destruction of all stocks of atomic weapons, whether in a finished or unfinished state, within three months after entry into force of the convention.

This agreement would be implemented only through national legislation and through international action by the Security Council under the present provisions of the U. N. Charter. Other features of the Soviet position are discussed in point 2 below.

The U.S. position was generally supported by nine other delegates, representing Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Their statements ranged from an unqualified endorsement by Egypt to a general indication of agreement by others. The Soviet position was supported only by Poland.

2. Consideration of the Soviet Views

The Soviet views were elaborated by Ambassador Gromyko in a series of closed meetings from July 24 to August 6. We then learned that the Soviet plan envisages no systematic measures of prevention, control or inspection, other than through national legislation. Such national legislation might prevent misuse of atomic energy by private individuals within a country, but it would of course have no effect on the national governments themselves.

As a practical matter, the Soviet proposal bears a strong resemblance to the many abortive and ineffectual agreements of the past for disarmament or nonaggression. The only form of international implementing action which the Soviet plan contemplates is punitive measures to be taken by the Security Council under the present provisions of the Charter. We do not see how such measures could be either swift or certain, as is essential from the very nature of the problem, or how they could be kept free from willful obstructionism through the employment of the veto.

Although Mr. Gromyko repeatedly stated a willingness to discuss details of “how the Security Council should carry out its functions as regards sanctions against a possible violator”, he consistently failed to indicate any fruitful line which such discussion of “details” might take. Despite repeated efforts by the Mexican, Netherlands, French, Australian, and other Delegates, as well as ourselves, to have the Soviet representative make plain the workings of his proposal, he refused to consider international preventive control measures (as contrasted with punishment after an offense) and failed to recognize any need for special international arrangements to aid the Security Council in enforcing an atomic energy agreement. He stated, in effect, that the atomic bomb was to be viewed exactly as any other weapon and that it could be handled entirely within the existing framework of the U.N. Charter.

In our judgment preventive measures are the very essence of control. Without them, we do not see how the Security Council could even have knowledge of prospective violations. The very establishment of the Commission and the terms of the Moscow Resolution demand the creation of special safeguards aimed at anticipating and preventing the use of atomic weapons. In the face of this, the Soviet government is apparently proposing that a convention outlawing atomic weapons be signed immediately and that the Commission proceed later to the discussion of controls, safeguards, and sanctions, although every indication suggests that such later discussion would be utterly fruitless.

These meetings had the effect of building up a clear record before the entire Commission of the weakness of the Soviet position, which completely violates the express mandate to work out effective controls and safeguards. That mandate, as you know, was unanimously approved by the General Assembly last January on the basis of the Moscow Declaration of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Thus the Soviet Government’s present position is sharply at variance with the position it endorsed only a few months ago.

In fact, as pointed out by Dr. Padilla Nervo⁵⁸ of Mexico, the Soviet proposal adds almost nothing to the commitments already undertaken in the United Nations Charter itself, since all members have already agreed to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force”. (Article 2)

During these same discussions, the Soviet representative stated flatly that his Government could not accept the U.S. proposals as now presented, “either as a whole or in their separate parts.” He regarded our plan as incompatible with Soviet views on national sovereignty which would be violated, he asserted, by any form of international inspection. He also objected vigorously to any change in the application of the veto, although we have proposed to forbid the use of the veto only (1) to prevent escape from punishment for violation of crimes specifically defined in a treaty voluntarily agreed to by all participants, and (2) in the day-to-day administrative operations of the Atomic Development Authority. He assailed any suggestion for modifying the veto as “undermining” the United Nations, although in our opinion adoption of the U.S. proposals would greatly strengthen the United Nations. In his view, the importance of inspection, which, along with access, we regard as essential, was “greatly exaggerated” and “a superficial approach” to the problem.

Two of the chief fundamental issues separating the Soviet and Polish views from those held by other ten nations may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Soviet proposal relies for compliance solely on the good faith and mutual trust of nations, backed up by punitive action through the Security Council with the Great Power veto intact, and without any systematic means of warning the Security Council of prospective violations; whereas the U.S. plan calls for an effective international organization to prevent in advance, so far as possible, the misuse of atomic energy, and to provide adequate warning and swift and certain punishment, unimpeded by the veto, for violations if they do occur.

(2) The Soviet proposal calls for the immediate outlawry of the production and use of atomic weapons, and the destruction of existing stocks, prior to the erection of international safeguards to ensure compliance and without any provision for swift and certain punishment of violators; whereas the U.S. proposal requires as a prerequisite to the elimination of atomic weapons that there be established effective preventive safeguards and machinery for punishment.

The U.S. plan includes the Soviet proposal in the sense of also embracing a convention outlawing atomic weapons. But the Soviet plan stops at that point, while we insist on simultaneous, effective, and enforceable safeguards to ensure that the production and use of atomic weapons is not merely illegal but is in fact prevented.

We see no possibility of reconciling these views. Agreement could be effected only through a drastic change in the Soviet position or through a sacrifice by us of the very principles which were unanimously endorsed by the United Nations last January and restated in your instructions to me. Abandonment of those principles would mean defrauding the peoples of the world.

3. Work of the Scientific and Technical Committee

By the end of July, it was generally recognized that no further progress could be made by discussions on the policy plane, without serious risk of breaking negotiations in advance of a general understanding of the scientific aspects of the problem. We also appreciated the particular importance of avoiding any open rupture at that time, when the Peace Conference in Paris was just getting under way.

In view of our instructions from the State Department, we therefore acquiesced in the motion of the French Delegate, to adjourn the discussion of policy for the time being, and to request the Scientific and Technical Committee to prepare a report on “the question of whether the effective control of atomic energy is possible, together with an indication of the methods by which the Scientific and Technical Committee considers that effective control can be achieved.” The Scientific Committee has been working intensively over the last five weeks. Its report was completed on September 3rd, but still awaits formal action by the Soviet Delegate.

Early in the discussions of the scientists, it was found that a direct reply to the request before their Committee would inevitably involve policy considerations. The Committee, therefore, limited itself to a discussion of the basic underlying facts in the production and use of atomic energy, together with an indication of the possibilities of misuse at each stage through diversion of nuclear materials, through seizure of installations, or through clandestine activities. The members also reached the important conclusion that there is no basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible.

The report is significant in providing a general international scientific recognition, in contrast with ex parte American assertion, of the basic facts on which our proposals for control are based. While the report on its face avoids reference to any particular system of control, the facts there set forth point inescapably, in our opinion, toward the U.S. proposals, once the necessity for effective control is recognized.

The report received the unanimous concurrence of the members of the Scientific Committee, including Soviet members, in informal meetings. However, the Soviet Government has not yet authorized formal approval of the report. This step has been promised and then postponed, without stated reasons, on three successive occasions. In a conversation on September 11 with the Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he was in personal agreement with the report, but that he would like a little more time for the experts of the Soviet Union to study it. He indicated that their report would be ready very soon, perhaps in a few days. If other delegations thought it was important to proceed earlier, he had no objection, and in this case the Soviet Union would merely refrain from voting for the present. Mr. Gromyko indicated that he did not think that particular importance should be attached to the report of the Scientific Committee in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission.

If formal Soviet approval is not forthcoming in the near future, the Scientific Committee will presumably submit its report without Soviet (and probably without Polish) concurrence.

III. Further Work in the Immediate Future

The late Chairman of the Commission, General McNaughton of Canada (who was succeeded by Dr. Hsia⁵⁹ of China on September 15), has proposed that immediately on receipt of the Scientific Report, and working with it as a foundation, the policy committee proceed to a further development of the factual problems of control, delaying for the time being any crystallization of the political issues. This process would involve a review of each stage in the production and use of atomic energy, with a discussion of the types of technical control measures needed to prevent diversion or clandestine operations. This course would not require the disclosure of additional scientific or technical information.

This line of discussion appears useful, and will assist in further clarifying the problem and promoting general understanding of the complex technical considerations involved in devising workable measures of control. We cannot be certain that the Soviet representative will agree to pursuing any discussions along this line. In any event, it can last only a month or two. Then the basic issues of policy will again be sharply before us.

IV. Conclusions

In the light of the discussions to date, and barring a drastic shift in the Soviet position, it seems clear that unanimity on the fundamental issues of policy facing the Atomic Energy Commission cannot be achieved in the now foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the best we can presently hope for on any vote in the Commission on such issues is a 10–2 majority for an international control plan along the lines we have advocated.

The question of exactly when and in what manner the issue shall reach decision in the Commission seems to us a matter of high policy, intimately related to the general course of our international relations and the entire worldwide diplomatic situation. The deliberations of the Commission are inevitably becoming dominated more by influences of the international political atmosphere, notably the peace negotiations in Paris, than by our specific problem of preventing the misuse of atomic energy.

Once the short-term work of the Commission is concluded, we can see only two possible courses of action. These are:

Alternative No. 1. We might recognize frankly the difficulty of reaching unanimous agreement on the fundamental issues, press the matter to a probable 10–2 vote in the Commission, and then render a divided report to the Security Council.

The majority report would consolidate the record of our position, which has thus far stood up against all assaults. Our proposals appear to have received the almost unanimous endorsement of all nations in the world outside the Soviet sphere. We would also take the appropriate opportunity for a public statement of the total inadequacy of the Soviet proposals.

Such a divided report would doubtless be the subject of bitter debate in the Security Council, and might further aggravate the frictions already present in that body. It might also force a premature decision on the treatment of the atomic energy problem in the world outside the Soviet sphere—a matter which lies outside our assignment and involves the most vital diplomatic and military considerations.

Moreover, it is by no means certain that we would have the support of all the friendly delegates in bringing the matter to a vote promptly. However, if actually forced to a vote, we believe that we would have the support of all except Poland and the Soviet Union.

If a showdown is inevitable, both its proper timing in relation to the whole international picture and the manner in which the issues are presented to the world are clearly of crucial importance.

Alternative No. 2. A sharp cleavage in the near future could be avoided by recessing the Commission to permit the delegates to consult with their governments. Some delegates, notably the French, have already made this suggestion informally, on the ground that the questions remaining before the Commission, once the short-term phase of technical exploration is concluded, involve matters of high international policy.

At the same time, the Commission might render an interim report to the Security Council, summarizing the discussions up to that point, and pointing up the issues without seeking to resolve them or to create a break. Depending on the general course of international relations, following such recess the work of the Atomic Energy Commission could (1) be resumed after a reasonable interval, (2) be suspended until a brighter outlook in the broad international scene gave promise of a successful outcome, or (3) await advice from the Security Council or the General Assembly.

V. Recommendations

1. Short-Term Policy

Our oral instructions from the Acting Secretary of State make it clear that we should not take the initiative in precipitating a break in the negotiations. Assuming that the initiative remains with us, these instructions call for continued efforts at joint exploration of all aspects of the subject, with special emphasis on the technical problems of effective control and safeguards. In the absence of altered instructions, we shall continue along the course now indicated for the short-run future. I must emphasize, however, that this line of discussion can hardly last more than another 30 to 60 days.

It is of course always possible that the Soviet Union may initiate a break. In this event, we would be forced immediately to mount a vigorous counter-attack on the Soviet position, aimed at demonstrating the utter inadequacy of the Soviet plan and its repudiation of the Commission’s mandate which they themselves sponsored in the Moscow Declaration.

2. Long-Term Policy

Within the next 30 to 60 days, it will become necessary to choose one of the two alternatives outlined in Section D [IV] above. This decision on the longer-run action requires new instructions taking into account the relation of the negotiations on atomic energy to the overall pattern of our foreign policy.

A decision as to the course which we shall pursue is essential before the end of this year, because three present members, namely Egypt, Mexico, and the Netherlands, retire on January 1, 1947. These three nations are all supporters of the U.S. proposals. They will be replaced by three others selected by the General Assembly. The successors that have been discussed are Belgium, Colombia, and Syria. It is impossible to be certain of the position that they will take, and in any case a considerable period of time must elapse before they can express themselves formally on the proposals. Present indications do not point to the likelihood of obtaining the acquiescence of Poland or the Soviet Union to our proposals in the near future. The possibilities are rather that we may lose present support than that we can gain new support.

In these circumstances we feel that, unless overriding international considerations dictate a different course, it would be advisable to follow Alternative No. 1 and bring the U.S. proposals to a vote within a reasonable period. Such action would be a clear indication to the American people and to the world of the views of the several nations on the control of atomic energy. Action in this Commission is, of course, not final or binding on any nation. As you know, its recommendations go to the Security Council, where they can be acted upon by way of approval, modification, or rejection.

On the other hand, considerations of general foreign policy may suggest that we follow Alternative No. 2. We do not possess the necessary knowledge to appraise such factors. For this reason, we now seek instructions based on the international situation as a whole so that our efforts may become a positive, rather than a passive, factor in the overall foreign policy of the United States.

3. Necessary National Action

Regardless of the progress of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, I cannot emphasize too strongly the vital importance of readiness to take the necessary national measures in the event of failure to achieve an adequate plan for the international control of atomic energy. We cannot afford to base national security on the assumption of success in our negotiations. Pending establishment of the national Atomic Energy Commission on a fully operating basis, there must be assurance that there is no lack of decisiveness in any aspect of our atomic energy program. These considerations add further weight to the importance of a prompt appointment of very able men to that body.

I shall welcome the opportunity of further discussions with you on the matters covered in this report and on the future course of action which I should pursue.

Respectfully submitted,

Bernard M. Baruch

57. Mr. Baruch came to Washington on September 18 to report to the President, but due to the fact that their conversation was devoted to the Wallace incident (see Mr. Hancock’s memorandum, p. 932), Mr. Baruch did not deliver this paper at that time, instead transmitting it from New York on the following day. On September 26, the Department forwarded a copy to Secretary Byrnes in Paris. On September 25, Acting Secretary Clayton asked President Truman to defer a decision on Mr. Baruch’s recommendations until the Acting Secretary had studied the memorandum and had had an opportunity to discuss it with the Chief Executive. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)
58. Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Representative at the General Assembly and on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission.
59. Dr. C. L. Hsia, Alternate Chinese Representative on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission; Secretary, Chinese Delegation to the General Assembly, New York.