Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes of the Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, September 10, 1946, 11 a.m.

New York, September 10, 1946, 11 a.m.

confidential

Present:	Mr. Bernard M. Baruch
	Mr. John M. Hancock
	Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt
	Mr. Fred Searls
	Mr. Herbert B. Swope
	Mr. T. F. Farrell
	Dr. Richard C. Tolman
	Dr. D. F. Fleming
	Mr. Lincoln Gordon
	Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay
	Mr. Albin E. Johnson
	Mr. Henry G. Ingraham
	Mr. Joseph Chase
	Mr. R. Gordon Arneson

The staff had before it a draft of a letter to the President concerning the status of negotiations and possible alternatives of future action. The alternatives were: (1) to push ahead toward an open break, or (2) to proceed cautiously avoiding any votes and any aggressive action against the Russian intransigence.

Mr. Hancock: While the draft memorandum to the President is an excellent one, it should not leave the President in the dark as to the course we would propose to take unless instructed otherwise by him.

Mr. Baruch: We have a clear duty to report in writing to the President the present status of the negotiations. It is obvious that the AEC negotiations are now only a sideshow in the international picture. In fact, these negotiations seem to have become more and more a State Department affair, rather than our affair. The sideshow must be tied in with the main rings of the circus. It may be that our group should become advisory to the State Department, thereby tying it in with general diplomatic maneuvers. In any event, it is important that we inform the President now how things stand.

We are handicapped by the failure of the President to appoint members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission. Until this Commission is appointed, the situation regarding the disclosure of information remains very foggy.

Mr. Hancock: Whether the members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission are appointed soon or not, makes little difference to our operations. It cannot materially influence the course of our negotiations, nor can it simplify the problem of disclosure of information.

Mr. Baruch: Two alternatives that we could consider are these: (1) get work started in the Commission on the drafting of the treaty, or (2) prepare an interim report from the Commission to the Security Council. If we must adopt a temporizing procedure this might better be carried out by the bureaucrats.

Mr. Eberstadt: The draft statement should be amended to include this third alternative of preparing an interim report to the Security Council. (Mr. Eberstadt presented a draft paragraph which would accomplish this end).

Mr. Searls: The statement should contain a specific recommendation from us as to the course of procedure we think should be followed. The statement should remind the President that whatever course of action is taken serious consideration must be given to the military needs of the country in the event negotiations break down.

Mr. Hancock: In his statement of 27 August, Secretary Patterson clearly stated that the War Department must plan its operations on the contingency that no international agreement for the control of atomic energy may be reached.

Mr. Baruch: In strengthening our military potential against the day that negotiations may break down, efforts should be redoubled to accumulate stockpiles with raw materials and atomic bombs.

Mr. Hancock: We should follow our present course of avoiding any definite break and avoid the taking of any votes and inform the President that we are doing so unless we receive different instructions. At the same time we must consider the question of whether it may be necessary to begin using threats to force the issue. We might raise this question with the President in the interim.

Concerning the report of the Military Staff Committee about which Mr. Baruch inquired, it is being sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in part as a means of needling them into action. As far as military policy as it relates to our negotiations is concerned, our group should receive these instructions not from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but from the President.

Mr. Eberstadt: The value of using the Military Staff Committee in determining when the various stages to the treaty have been reached lies in the fact that the veto remains with the Big Five in the Security Council. There are four possibilities that might be considered in deciding when certain stages have been completed.

(1) The decision might be left with the United States alone. (It is most unlikely that any other nations would agree to this).

(2) Give the Military Staff Committee responsibility for determining when the stages have been completed.

(3) Leave this decision to the Security Council; and

(4) use the present Atomic Energy Commission as the review board to determine when stages have been completed. (Mr. Hancock felt this was the best alternative, since it would obviate the veto).

Mr. Eberstadt: We should describe to the President very clearly the impasse we have now reached and state that unless we receive instructions to the contrary we will continue our present methods of avoiding a break. We should express regret that the members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission have not yet been appointed. We should point out that even though we continue to attempt to avoid a break, the President should be aware of the necessity of laying plans concerning our national security in the event negotiations fail, and should appoint the members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission as soon as possible.

Mr. Baruch: There is urgent need for a coordination of our work with that of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department, and the military authorities.

Mr. Farrell: We should press for a vote on the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee and throw the discussion of the whole issue back into the political committees.

Mr. Hancock: We cannot afford to let the issue come to a head in the Atomic Energy Commission before the middle of November.

Mr. Eberstadt: We must bear in mind that we cannot control the other delegates to the AEC. The British, French, and Canadian delegations had indicated pretty clearly that they do not want the issue forced. If the decisions were taken, however, to present an interim report to the Security Council, the other delegations would probably go along with us on this proposal.

Mr. Hancock: Our group is not directly concerned with the nation’s military policy. Responsibility on these matters rests with the President. We are charged with responsibility of carrying out an already established policy as regards negotiations leading to the establishment of an ADA and we must proceed in carrying out that objective unless and until our instructions are changed by the President. While we can remind the President of the military implications that flow from the progress of our negotiations, we should not presume to tell him how the military problem should be handled.

Mr. Farrell: An important point to make in connection with the need for the prompt appointment of the domestic commission is that until the commission is established no thorough program for the procurement of raw materials can be established.

Mr. Eberstadt: The advantage of the first alternative of pressing for a break lies in the fact that the public would be aroused to the dangers that confront us and the world, and it would result in widespread, popular support for military preparedness. Adoption of a policy of avoiding a break makes the necessity of prompt military preparations nonetheless imperative but the necessity appears less clear-cut.

Mr. Baruch: The statement to the President should point out the deleterious effect on the international situation of the disintegration of our economy at home.

Mr. Swope: It may be necessary to effect an open rupture with the U.S.S.R. on the return of Secretary Byrnes from the Paris Peace Conference. The memorandum to the President should underscore Gromyko’s specific refusal to accept our proposals either in whole or in part.

Mr. Baruch: In the absence of Secretary Byrnes there is no alternative but to report directly to the President on this situation. The President is entitled to know how things stand in order that he may decide whether any change of instructions is indicated. He is entitled to know all of the things we know about the negotiations and what our views are.

Mr. Swope: Mr. Baruch should see the President personally and talk to him at length on the basis of points prepared in advance. There is no use kidding ourselves about the main issue. Russia is the stumbling block.

Mr. Baruch: It is quite clear that the other delegations would not go along with us at this time if we attempted to force the issue with the Russians. We have lost the initiative to Russia, and other nations are beginning to waver more and more. The longer we hesitate and the more we retreat, the more other nations will shift away from us. We are losing ground every day and we are in danger of losing the support of some of the nine we have had with us. It was quite clear in the discussion with Mr. Ignatieff that Canada wants delay. The same appears to be true of other delegations, notably the British and French and probably the Chinese as well.

Mr. Eberstadt: If we attempt to set a deadline for a vote on our proposal versus the Russian, it is quite probable that the French, British, Canadian, and Chinese delegates would not support us.

Mr. Hancock: In the memorandum to the President we should point out that we are continuing to push forward on the policy established with the approval of the President immediately prior to the opening of the negotiations. We should remind him of the need for considering what steps this nation should take in the event our negotiations fail.

Mr. Baruch: We are all perfectly clear in our own minds that we must do everything we can to bring about the successful conclusions of our negotiations. Nevertheless, we are also clear in our own minds that we must tell the President now what the situation is.

Mr. Farrell: Whatever the outcome of these negotiations may be, our position will be strengthened if we refuse to retreat from our basic proposals. Even if we fail we must be able to say that we stood firm on our position.

Mr. Hancock: The initiative has passed to the Russians and they may take advantage of these in forcing a break. For our parts we must not push for a breakdown unless we are instructed to do so by the President.

Concerning the report of the Military Staff Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it contains three recommendations which are quite controversial:—

(1) That the Navy should go ahead to develop atomic power for use in battleships. This proposal is absolutely contrary to established U. S. policy as transmitted to Mr. Baruch and cannot be countenanced if we are to have any effective system of international control of atomic energy.

(2) That a set of bombs should remain in existence for punitive purposes after the ADA is established. Strong arguments can be made on either side of this question. It is obvious that the chances of getting a treaty are much better if it provides that there should be no bombs in existence.

(3) That the Military Staff Committee should have responsibility for deciding when the various stages have been reached and for passing upon the location of large atomic energy installations, including power plants. This raises the question of whether the Military Staff Committee would be infringing on the administrative operations of the ADA.

Mr. Swope: In view of the confusion that exists in the public mind as to the provisions to the Baruch Plan, it would seem desirable to put out a reaffirmation of the Baruch proposals.

It was generally agreed that the draft of the memorandum to the President should be rewritten in the light of the comments above and that when rewritten it should be sent to Mr. Swope for final editing.