Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)⁴⁹

secret

[Washington,] September 9, 1946.

Plans and Prospects Relating to the Work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Relation of the Commission’s Activities to Other Aspects of American Foreign Policy

Mr. John Hancock } of Mr. Baruch’s staff Mr. Lincoln Gordon Mr. Frank Lindasy

Mr. Joseph E. Johnson—IS

Mr. Marks—U

Mr. Blaisdell—IS

Mr. Hiss—SPA

I went to New York by previous agreement to have a discussion with Mr. Hancock and other members of Mr. Baruch’s staff, on matters of common interest. During the discussion they indicated that:

(1) Mr. Baruch, and they themselves, have become increasingly conscious of the fact that their plans and activities have to be conceived in terms of the fact that U.S. participation in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission is very closely related to other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. They demonstrated a strong desire to make sure that what they are doing and will do is in line with over-all foreign policy considerations.

(2) They stated that the first report of the Scientific and Technical Committee had been completed and that it was expected the report would be adopted by the Committee at a meeting on Friday, September 6. They believed that there was a fair chance that the Soviet Representative, who had already indicated his personal agreement with the report, would receive instructions to accept it. (They realized that such instructions might not be forthcoming.)

(3) They desire to avoid raising political issues for as long as possible and believe it may be feasible to postpone any further discussion of political issues for a period of from a month to three months.

(4) They hope that the Scientific and Technical Committee can continue its work for as long as six weeks, exploring technical problems related to raw materials and production of atomic energy. They are not yet clear as to how much can be done in this field within the limitations imposed by considerations of security of information.

(5) There is also a possibility that the Soviets may again raise, at any time in the next three months, major political questions, possibly by forcing a vote on the original Soviet proposal.

With respect to (1) above, they asked me what bearing I thought the present acrimonious temper of discussions in the Security Council might have on the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. In reply I stated in effect that the temper of discussions and character of issues in the Security Council are not primary considerations. They result from general over-all relations to which the key is, in my opinion, the situation in Paris. I added that we in the Department who are concerned with Security Council affairs, constantly refer important policy decisions to the Secretary in Paris. This is done not so much because he is the Secretary of State but primarily because the peace conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers are at the present time the focal points in major international relations, particularly those with the Soviet Union. I endeavored to hint as strongly as I could that I felt Mr. Baruch would wish to consult the Secretary in Paris before making major policy decisions, for precisely the same reason. Mr. Hancock and his colleagues appeared to concur in my views and to agree that the policy decisions should be made in the light of over-all developments, particularly of the Secretary’s policy in Paris.

With respect to (5) I was asked whether I thought it likely that Mr. Gromyko would force a decision soon on the Soviet proposal for the control of atomic energy. I replied that while I could speak with no assurance on this point I felt it unlikely that he would do so, saying that I could see no advantage from the Soviet point of view in forcing an early decision on this matter. Moreover, it seemed to me if the Soviets seek additional issues with which to point up their differences with the West there are a number which they would choose before they choose that of the international control of atomic energy. Mr. Hancock and his colleagues appeared to agree that my estimate might be the correct one. Mr. Hancock added, however, that they are preparing material to be used when the political issues are raised again in the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Hancock nevertheless indicated clearly that Mr. Baruch’s present desire is to avoid such issues. In this connection he inquired whether it might not be desirable for the Atomic Energy Commission to take a recess during the meeting of the General Assembly. I gave it as my personal opinion that this might be a good idea and suggested that it might be quite feasible to bring about such an adjournment. I pointed out that many of the Delegates on the Commission have several roles already and that the sessions of the Assembly would greatly add to their labors. I thought, therefore, that they might welcome, and possibly even initiate, a move for the adjournment of the Commission’s work.

Joseph E. Johnson

49. The conversation here described occurred in New York on September 5.