Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)
On reading the scientific reports, the only query I had—because of my ignorance of the subject—was whether we were releasing information that was not necessary to an understanding of the subject. Dr. Tolman, General Farrell42 and General Groves have assured us that practically all of it is information that has been given out at different times in the Smyth and Acheson–Lilienthal reports and various scientific newspaper and magazine articles. It only has been correlated here—something that could be done and doubtless has been done by others.
I have always been puzzled about the amount of secrecy that was connected with the production of atomic energy. We do know that certain pumps have been ordered by the Russian government. We do know they try to buy certain raw materials. We do know they have received information and small samples through their spies in Canada and probably in other places.
The object of the scientific report was to show the necessity of controls at various points. I think it clearly does that. I hope that it will convince those who heretofore did not approve of the American proposals that the proposals were fair and just in the circumstances. The acceptance of this report will be evidence that controls and inspections are necessary. The public should be acquainted with the facts that there [Page 898] is nothing new and the security of the United States has not been affected, as evidenced by the statement of those who best know (Dr. Tolman, Gen. Farrell and Gen. Groves). We should be careful not to put ourselves in the position of really having told anything that was not necessary. As a matter of fact, it now appears that they already had all that was necessary and it had only to be correlated—which, as stated above, they doubtless had already done.
This makes all the more puzzling to me the paragraph referring to the necessary giving of information to make the proposals more understandable in the Acheson–Lilienthal report. I appreciate that later on, if the A. D. A. is set up and it progresses, that more information of a secret nature will have to be made available, but only after a treaty is signed for controls, inspections and punishment.
We have to face very soon the fact that Brazil, Egypt and Mexico will be replaced. Therefore, some decisions must be heard before their exit and others come on the scene.
- Maj. Gen. Thomas F. Farrell, Associate United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.↩