501.BC/8–3146: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
urgent
[Received August 31—9:48 p.m.]
534. Cadogan has received instructions from the Foreign Office and comment from Mr. Bevin regarding Soviet proposal that the Security Council ask for full data regarding military forces stationed in foreign countries.
Following is substance of Foreign Office instructions to Cadogan. [Page 895] This telegram was repeated to Mr. Bevin in Paris and his comment will be outlined later.
British Foreign Office comments that the scope of the Soviet proposal is by no means clear. They suggest two alternatives.
- (1)
- That a robust line be taken by the British representative as soon as the provisional agenda on which this item appears is under discussion. Cadogan should denounce the Soviet move as another typical and irresponsible maneuver designed to damage the prestige of the Security Council, and to declare that he will vote against placing it on the agenda provided his U.S. and French colleagues can be brought to agree.
- (2)
- It is suggested that the British representative inquire at the Council meeting what provisions of the Charter are involved in the Russian proposal and on what grounds the Security Council could properly call for such information. Perhaps the Russians have chapter 7 of the Charter in mind. British Foreign Office points out that this line of approach would afford an opening to comment on the manner by which the Military Staff Committee has been hamstrung in its work though lack of instructions to the Soviet representative. The type of information called for by the Soviet demand should normally be asked for by the Council on the advice of the Military Staff Committee. The fact that this is not so in the present case coupled with the urgency of the Soviet demand suggests that the Council is being asked by Russia to presume some danger to the maintenance of international peace exists in the presence of troops in foreign countries. If that is the real intention of the Russians, their request should be reframed to make this point clear. Until this is done, the Soviet proposal is irrelevant and inconsistent with the procedure of the Charter.
The British Foreign Office itself prefers this second alternative. It feels that this method would serve to expose to public view the Russian attitude to the Military Staff Committee and would also offer an opportunity to force into the open the Russian attitude toward foreign troops in former enemy countries, expressly excluded in the Russian request. (See penetrating comment in leading editorial, New York Times, August 31.)
Mr. Bevin has sent a telegram to Cadogan commenting on the foregoing. He states that he prefers the first alternative providing Cadogan can bring his U.S. colleague to concur. Mr. Bevin says the British cannot take a stronger line than the U.S. and points out that the Russian proposal is aimed at the presence of U.S. troops in China as well as British troops in Greece and elsewhere. Cadogan is instructed by Mr. Bevin to make every effort to secure concurrence of both his American and French colleagues in this matter. In a passage of his telegram which was garbled and the meaning of which the British here consider to be uncertain, Mr. Bevin apparently instructed Cadogan under no circumstances to vote in favor of the Russian request being placed on the Council’s agenda.
I understand from telephone conversations with officers in the Department that we are considering meeting the Russian demand openly and giving full information as we have nothing to hide or apologize [Page 896] for. There may well be advantages in following this line rather than either of the lines suggested by the British. I think it important, however, that our action in this matter be carefully concerted with the British and that we agree together and follow the same line. From the Russian point of view, we are both in the same position and our rejoinder would be greatly weakened in effect if we take divergent lines. Whatever line we take, we should consider a counterblast at Russia with well-documented details.
There was nothing in Cadogan’s message from the Foreign Office or the one from Mr. Bevin to indicate that Mr. Bevin had discussed this matter with the Secretary. He may have done so. In any event, I request that this telegram be immediately repeated to the Secretary in Paris for his consideration.