Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I
Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Mr. George F. Kennan to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Mr. Acheson: The demands of my new job with the War College have forced me to study a good deal of the basic material on the problem of the international control of atomic energy.
[Page 861]To clarify my own thoughts on the position of the USSR with relation to this subject, I have written them out in the form of a few questions and answers.
I thought you might find these of interest, and attach a copy.
I am off for a speaking tour in the far west, and will be back in the end of August.
The Soviet Position With Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy
(As of July, 1946)
1. Original Effect on the Russians of our Development of Atomic Weapons.
Q. Has our monopoly of atomic weapons made the Russians more hostile towards us?
A. No. To the Soviet leaders all forces are considered hostile which they cannot control, quite regardless of the weapons these forces may possess. We were viewed as an inimical element before we developed atomic energy. We continue to be viewed as an inimical element today. Thus, atomic energy has changed nothing in the basic attitude and objectives of the Soviet Union with respect to us.
Q. Did our monopoly of atomic weapons have any effect on the behavior of the Russians and their attitude toward us?
A. Yes. It upset their previous estimate of the military-political potential of the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war period. It caused them to revise this estimate basically. It forced them to modify their internal economic and their foreign political plans. For these reasons, it has caused them intense vexation and irritation.
Q. Has it made them more suspicious of our actions?
A. Probably it has; but principally in the sense that it has given a welcome set of opportunities to those elements within the Soviet system who have reason to fear improved relations between Russia and the west and who lose no chance to cast suspicion deliberately on the actions of the United States. Presumably, these elements have not been slow to interpret as threats of atomic retaliation any instances of American firmness in the face of Soviet demands and in this way to fan the existing bitterness over our possession of atomic weapons. It must not be forgotten that the men in the Kremlin, who would themselves never hesitate to use atomic energy as a means of extortion if they themselves had the exclusive possession of it, would [Page 862] be particularly loathe to believe that we could really withstand the temptation to do this.
2. Background of the present Soviet Proposals.
Q. What is the predominant motive of the proposals which Gromyko has advanced in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission?
A. The predominant motive is a desire to turn the tables on us and to produce a situation in Which the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, would be the sole power able to use atomic energy in war.
Q. How does this jibe with the Soviet proposal that existing stocks of atomic bombs be destroyed and that further production and storing of the weapons be prohibited?
A. This proposal is designed primarily to effect the earliest possible disarming of the United States with respect to atomic weapons. Once that disarming had been achieved, the Soviet Government would feel itself in a far stronger position to put forward its further desiderata in connection with the international control of atomic energy.
Q. But would not the Soviet Union then likewise be inhibited from developing atomic weapons?
A. Not at all. In making this proposal, the Russians are counting on the American conscience and on the merciless spot-light of free information and publicity in the United States, supplemented by the vigilance of the communist fifth-column, to guarantee the faithful fulfillments of such obligations on our part. At the same time, they are counting no less confidently on their own security controls to enable them to proceed undisturbed with the development of atomic weapons in secrecy within the Soviet Union. If their proposal were to be accepted, they could thus look forward with confidence to the day when the democratic powers, caught in their traditional respect for solemn international engagements and in the overriding power of public opinion, would be stripped of atomic weapons where as Russia, having been secretly developing them behind the scenes, would be their sole possessor.
Q. But the Russians have implicitly acknowledged the desirability of some scheme of control. Do they not fear that this would hamper them in secretly developing atomic energy?
A. No. They do not fear this. They feel that if they could once get the weapon formally abolished they could easily prevent the maturing of any international agreement which could seriously hamper the clandestine development of atomic weapons in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they know that their internal controls are so elaborate that they would have good facilities for evading any ordinary international control system. They are well aware that the only really effective [Page 863] type of control would be that which we have proposed: namely the entrusting to an international atomic development authority of all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material. Once they were able to get agreement to the abolition of atomic weapons as such, they could oppose the establishment of such an authority, as being illogical and unnecessary. Hence, their time-table, and particularly the emphasis on the early destruction of existing stocks.
Q. Is this not direct bad faith on the Soviet side?
A. To the communist mind, all words are relative. Once in possession of the bomb, Russia could confidently risk an outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and the western powers. In modern wars, all holds are fair; and once hostilities were in progress the sudden revelation that Russia had the bomb could be exploited propagandistically as a demonstration of the wisdom and foresight of Soviet leadership, which had once more outsmarted the capitalist world and foiled its most evil designs. It should be remembered that a state propaganda machine would find no difficulty in producing evidence to indicate that western nations, too, had been ratting on their obligations not to produce atomic weapons and that Russia had been saved only by the vigilance and decision of the Kremlin.
3. The Soviet Reaction to our Plan.
Q. What is the basic Soviet objection to our plan?
A. The basic objection is that our plan provides no loophole through which the Soviet Union could itself achieve monopolistic possession of the atomic weapon.
Q. Are there other objections as well?
A. Yes. Our plan implies a breaching of the security controls which exist in Russia and which are anchored in the selfish interests of the all-powerful secret police. It further implies a certain derogation of the absolute and unlimited power which the Soviet leaders now exercise over economic processes and property relationships within the Soviet Union. Finally, it implies the participation of foreign elements in scientific work conducted within the Soviet Union, thus introducing foreign influence into Soviet science and providing opportunities for the satisfaction of foreign scientific curiosity.
Q. Why are the Russians so averse to the limitation of the veto power in the case of atomic energy?
A. Partly because they see in it an attack on the veto power in the Security Council as well as on the principle of the veto in general. But also because they have every intention to proceed independently with the development of atomic weapons, regardless of any engagements they may have entered into, and do not want any international [Page 864] agreement outstanding which could penalize them if there should be undesirable revelations. In this sense, it is precisely the penalties for the preliminary evasions of restrictions on atomic weapon production which worry them most and where they are most concerned for the preservation of the veto power.
4. Chances for obtaining Soviet acquiescence to our Plan.
Q. Is it then useless to hope that the Soviet Government can be brought to accept our plan, in its general outlines?
A. No—not if it can be proved to them that not only is there no possibility of their actually attaining monopolistic possession of the weapon, but that the further pursuit of it may even prove actually dangerous to the security of their state.
Q. By what arguments can this be proved to them?
A. There are no arguments by which this could be proved to them. It can be proved to them only by facts. They will not be amenable to any presentation of ideas on our part.
Q. By what set of facts could they then be influenced?
A. By the policies we ourselves adopt with relation to our own defense and our collective arrangements with other nations. If we follow a resolute policy of preparing for all eventualities: if, while carefully continuing to press for full international agreement, and holding the door open for such agreement, we quietly and vigorously proceed to develop the U.S. capacity to absorb atomic attack and to effect instant retaliation; if we adapt our armed forces to the demands of atomic warfare and effect intelligent dispersal and “compartmentation” of essential services within our own country; if we do not hesitate, in the absence of Soviet agreement, to enter into international agreements with other countries for the joint development of atomic energy as far as this is consistent with our own security; if in this way we make it evident to the Soviet Government that the idea of using atomic weapons against this country is a dangerous pipe dream that has little prospect of successful realization and might well lead to the atomic isolation rather than the atomic superiority of the Soviet Union—then there is a possibility that we might eventually maneuver Moscow into a grudging acceptance of the main points of our program.
Q. Could such a change of front on Russia’s part be a whole-hearted one which would mean clear sailing in the future for an eventual atomic energy development authority?
A. No. Unfortunately, the execution of Russia’s participation in any such a scheme would encounter deep-seated inhibitions in the nature of Soviet society and powerful elements within the Soviet Union would try at every turn to sabotage the efficacy of the authority, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Soviet acceptance of our proposals would mean only the beginning, not the end, of our difficulties; [Page 865] and we would have to fight a long and practically constant battle to achieve a real and successful functioning of the authority within the Soviet Union itself. For this reason, we would have to maintain at all times some instruments of pressure, through which we could present the Soviet Government with some sort of ugly and undesirable alternatives, in the events that Soviet collaboration in the execution of the agreements should prove unsatisfactory.