Department of State Atomic Energy Files
The Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Eisenhower) to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)
Dear Mr. Baruch: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that their views on the complex questions raised in your letters of 24 May 1946 can best be dealt with individually. My personal views follow.
[Page 855]General. I completely agree with you that only through effective international control of atomic energy can we hope to prevent atomic war. Arriving at the methods for such control is, of course, the difficult task. The national security requires that those methods be tested and proven before the U.S. can enter any international agreement limiting the production or use of atomic bombs.
Approach to the Problem. The procedures outlined in the Acheson report appear to offer the most practicable initial steps towards international control, provided that in the step by step accomplishment of those procedures, the U.S. does not recede from its position of advantage faster than realistic and practical reciprocal concessions are made by other powerful nations. We must not further unbalance against us world power relationships.
Inspection, the First Step. An essential primary step is to establish, and prove in operation, a system of free and complete inspection. We must satisfy ourselves of complete good faith on the part of the other great powers; their past and current policies are not altogether reassuring. In this connection, as I understand present atomic energy production techniques, no system of inspection can be expected to guarantee completely against the construction of some atomic bombs.
Preventive Measures. For the present, I am sure you agree that there must be force behind any system for preventing aggression. There must exist for deterrent purposes, provisions for retaliation in the event other control and prevention devices should fail. Further, the sanctions employed against a willful aggressor by law-abiding nations can be no less effective in character than the weapons the aggressor nation is capable of using. To my mind, this means, for the present, that to prevent the use of atomic weapons there must exist the capability of employing atomic weapons against the recalcitrant.
Decisive Weapons in War. Biological, chemical, and other as yet unforeseen weapons may prove no less effective than the atomic bomb, and even less susceptible to control. Another major war may see the use of such destructive weapons, however horrible, including the atomic bomb. The problem of controlling, and finally preventing, the use of atomic bombs (and other decisive weapons) thus becomes the problem of preventing war itself.
The Dilemma. If we enter too hurriedly into an international agreement to abolish all atomic weapons, we may find ourselves in the position of having no restraining means in the world capable of effective action if a great power violates the agreement. Such a power might, in fact, deliberately avoid the use of atomic weapons and embark on aggression with other equally decisive weapons. If, on the other hand, we enter into agreements providing for the maintenance of atomic [Page 856] weapons under international control, we face extraordinary difficulties. First, in providing adequate control and inspection systems and second, the possibility that the national leaders of a totalitarian state, possessing a supply of the weapons, might choose to strike first rather than to compromise. This dilemma, unless other approaches to a solution come to hand, must be solved before we should proceed to any treaty, abolishing atomic weapons.
Fundamental National Interest. The U.S. should be party to no control treaty which militates against our vital security interests. I have touched upon aspects of this scarcely debatable point. However, the fundamental interest and security of the American people is bound up with a solution to the problem you face. We can yield much, even certain points of our sovereignty, to reach this solution. Whether our people could be brought to see this necessity at present is a question. There will exist practical difficulties in keying up the American people to accept even the necessity for immediate preventive military action with conventional weapons in case an aggressor violates measures for inspection and control. Historically, in the face of threats of unmistakable import and seriousness, our practice has been to indulge in wishful thinking rather than to undertake decisive action.
To summarize:
- a.
- The existence of the atomic bomb in our hands is a deterrent, in fact, to aggression in the world. We cannot at this time limit our capability to produce or use this weapon.
- b.
- We must move, by steps, toward international control of atomic energy if we are to avoid an atomic war. The Acheson report is a practicable suggestion for an approach to such control. A first step is to prove a system of inspection.
- c.
- Atomic weapons are only a part of the problem. There will be other equally terrible weapons of mass destruction. The whole problem must be solved concurrently with the problem of controlling atomic energy. To control atomic weapons, in which field we are preeminent, without provision for equally adequate control of other weapons of mass destruction can seriously endanger our national security.
I will continue to consider this problem and will communicate to you any ideas which might assist your difficult decisions.
Sincerely,
[At the First Meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission at Hunter College, The Bronx, New York, June 14, Mr. Baruch presented the United States proposal for the international control of atomic energy. The U.S. plan provided for the creation of an international Atomic Development Authority to which all phases of atomic [Page 857] energy development and control were to be entrusted. For the text of Mr. Baruch’s statement, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Plenary Meetings (hereafter cited as AEC (I), Plenary), pages 4–14 or Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1946, pages 1057–1062. A complete set of the records of the AEC and its committees and subcommittees is located in the files of the Office of International Organization Affairs, Department of State. For an account of negotiations in the AEC in 1946, see Hewlett and Anderson, pages 576–619.]