Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

SWNCC Files

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee⁴⁴

secret

Washington, May 24, 1946.

Guidance as to Command and Control of the Armed Forces To Be Placed at the Disposal of the Security Council of the United Nations

1. The following are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain matters which may be subjects for discussion in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. In arriving at these views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered USMS/25 … and USMS/19/1/Rev/1 …⁴⁵

2. Armed Forces to be Placed at the Disposal of the Security Council of the United Nations. Agreements should be completed as soon as possible as to the size of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by each member nation and as to the broad principles for employment of these forces in accordance with J.C.S. 1567/32⁴⁶ and this memorandum.

3. Establishment of Permanently Available International Military Forces. Establishment of international armed forces on a permanent basis is contrary to present United States policy, except in the case of such security forces as may be required for the internal policing of areas under United Nations trusteeship.

4. Command and Staff Arrangements for Security Forces. The following general policies will govern for the present:

a. Predetermined rules covering establishment of international command and staff arrangements for security forces are deemed inadvisable. However, it is recognized that the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should have available a statement of general principles for guidance in the event discussion of command and staff arrangements is precipitated by the representatives of other nations.

b. Arrangements in each instance for the command and staff of combined security forces of the United Nations should not be made until immediately before such forces are to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

c. It is undesirable and impractical to establish any rigid criteria for the designation of a supreme commander. The Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should seek clearly to establish the principle that their advisory responsibilities extend to the question of command designation but should leave the question of arriving at their choice for resolution when occasion arises.

d. In event discussion of the question of command is precipitated by representatives of other nations on the Military Staff Committee, the following may be presented as the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) There should be unified command under a supreme commander of a United Nations military force and attached civilian personnel for the execution of a particular mission assigned by the Security Council, under the provisions of Article 48 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) The United States will not agree to choice of a supreme commander nor to the designation of commanders of air, naval or ground components, nor to the designation of commanders within regions, until immediately prior to the time such forces are to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

(3) Other than those appointments reserved for the Security Council, the appointment of commanders of subordinate forces of mixed nationalities should be the responsibility of the supreme commander of a United Nations military force and such appointments should be made from officers made available to him for this purpose by the nations furnishing the armed contingents. The appointment of the senior commander and subordinate commanders in any national contingent should be the responsibility of the nation which furnishes that contingent.

(4) Any agreement approved by the United States must include provisions to permit senior commanders to communicate directly with the military authorities of their own governments.

(5) When armed contingents of two or more nations participate in an operation, the nations concerned should provide suitable officers, acceptable to the supreme commander, for service on the operational, administrative, and civil government staffs of the supreme commander.

(6) It is essential that any supreme commander:

(a) Receive instructions for strategic direction of the armed forces under his command directly from the Military Staff Committee (paragraphs 1 and 3, Article 47).

(b) Have military operational command of all contingents assigned to his forces, to be exercised through the respective commanders of these contingents. Internal discipline and administration should remain as responsibilities of the commander of each national contingent.

(c) Administer within the theater of operations all matters pertaining to external and intercontingent logistical problems of the forces under his command.

(d) Have administrative and disciplinary control (except courts-martial jurisdiction) over all personnel accompanying the forces under his command, including observers appointed by the Military Staff Committee.

5. General. The Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should refrain from expressing opinions to representatives of foreign governments and from entering into any commitments, express or implied, on major matters on which they have not received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom this responsibility rests and who may freely be consulted.

Appendix

Discussion

1. On 24 August 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks, the representatives of the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of an international military force, particularly an international military air force corps, to be permanently available to the Security Council for the enforcement of world peace and security. They supported this proposal with the arguments that the Security Council should have “the most effective means to bring to bear against an aggressor either to force him to stop the aggression or to bind him until national forces can be thrown into action.” They thought an international force best met this requirement and, further, that the very existence of such a force would create fear in potential aggressors, which would make them think twice before undertaking actual acts of aggression.

2. The United States and British delegates rejected the principle of permanent international forces. The Charter of the United Nations reflects this rejection in Article 43 of Chapter VII, which specifies that armed forces shall be made available to the Security Council “on its call.” Although Article 45 of Chapter VII provides that national air force contingents shall be held immediately available for combined international enforcement action, the rejection of the principle of a permanent international air force corps is nevertheless implicit in this article. When the United States ratified the Charter, the United States objection to the principle of permanent international security forces became national policy. Further, the United States position has always been that specific operational plans would be developed within the United Nations only in the event of an existing or potential threat to the peace. Therefore, the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations should initiate no discussion of the formation of permanent international armed forces and under no circumstances should they indicate approval of such a proposal.

3. When considering problems relating to the command, control and employment of armed forces made available to the Security Council of the United Nations, the following factors should be kept constantly in mind:

First, the existence of the veto power makes use of force by the Security Council highly improbable, and in any event force can be used only against the small nations.

Second, under the provisions of the United Nations Charter, “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize … regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority” (paragraph 1, Article 53).

These two considerations make elaborate predetermined arrangements for international command and staff for the security forces, or combined maneuvers to train them, both unnecessary and impractical. If subsequent developments remove the veto power such matters should be re-examined in the light of the then existing situation.

4. Paragraph 4 of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to appropriate regional agencies, taken in conjunction with Articles 52, 53, 54, 106, and 107, recognizes regional arrangements or agencies as appropriate international agencies for implementing decisions of the Security Council. An example of an appropriate regional arrangement is the Inter-American system. If the decisions of the Security Council requiring the use of force are in fact carried out by utilization of regional arrangements or agencies (paragraph 1, Article 53):

a. Our desire, as expressed by members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (conference between State Department officials and Senators Connally, Thomas of Utah, Vandenberg and Austin, 1 April 46), to exclude non-American forces from the Western Hemisphere and keep the Monroe Doctrine unaffected by United States ratification of the Charter of the United Nations will be facilitated. However, since regional arrangements are subject to the final authority of the Security Council and since non-American forces can operate in the Western Hemisphere only on its authorization, our most practical means for excluding such forces lies in the actions of our members on the Military Staff Committee and on the Security Council.

b. It would be both possible and practicable for the United Nations security forces to take speedy action against adjudged aggressors; and

c. It would be unlikely that substantial United States ground forces would be called upon to operate as a part of United Nations security forces under foreign command, particularly in Europe or in Asia.

5. However, there are numerous bilateral alliances in existence, particularly alliances between Russia on the one hand and England, France, China, Yugoslavia and Poland on the other, which might be construed by parties thereto as “regional arrangements or agencies” appropriate for enforcement action under authority of the Security Council and (keeping the veto in mind) used to exclude American armed forces from participating in action by the Security Council in Europe and Asia. It is for this reason that the United States desires the relevant sections of the Charter to apply to regional arrangements already in existence when the charter was drafted (the Inter-American System) or to other regional systems which might develop through natural evolution. In any event the United States does not believe that the Charter was intended to promote the artificial development of regional arrangements for security purposes. Considerations such as those outlined above serve to illustrate the undesirability from the United States point of view of concluding predetermined principles for the selection of commanders and the employment of United Nations security forces. Furthermore, the drawing up of principles for selection of commanders might cause theoretical debate in the Military Staff Committee on questions involving power politics. This should be avoided. The establishment of technical or temporary rules beyond the scope of the broad principles enunciated below is also undesirable. The functions of the Military Staff Committee in these matters are advisory, and the United States members should seek clearly to establish that their advisory responsibility extends to the question of command designation, leaving the question of the method of arriving at their choice for resolution when occasion arises.

6. With regard to USMS/19/1/Rev/1 (J.C.S. 1670/1), it is considered that the United States representatives should not introduce for discussion in the Military Staff Committee the subject of principles relating to command of United Nations armed forces. However, it is recognized that the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should have available a statement of general principles for guidance in the event discussion of command and staff arrangements is precipitated by the representatives of other nations. In such case, the United States representatives should express opinions which conform to the following:

a. There should be unity of command, under a supreme commander, of a United Nations military force and attached civilian personnel for the execution of a particular mission assigned by the Security Council, under the provisions of Article 48 of the Charter of the United Nations.

b. The United States will not agree to choice of a supreme commander nor to the designation of commanders of air, naval or ground components, nor to the designation of commanders within regions, until immediately prior to the time such forces are to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council. This is realistic in that the considerations of command, composition of forces and the method of application of forces must in each case be affected by both the political and the military situation which then prevail.

c. Other than those appointments reserved for the Security Council, the appointment of commanders of subordinate forces of mixed nationalities should be the responsibility of the supreme commander of a United Nations military force and such appointments should be made from officers made available to him for this purpose by the nations furnishing the armed contingents. The appointment of the senior commander and subordinate commanders in any national contingent should be the responsibility of the nation which furnishes that contingent.

d. Any agreement approved by the United States must include provisions to permit senior commanders to communicate directly with the military authorities of their own governments.

e. When armed contingents of two or more nations participate in an operation, the nations concerned should provide suitable officers, acceptable to the supreme commander, for service on the operational, administrative, and civil government staffs of the supreme commander.

7. A supreme commander should have military operational command of all contingents assigned as a part of his force, exercising this command through the respective commanders of these contingents. Internal discipline and administration should remain as responsibilities of the commander of each national contingent. A supreme commander should administer within his theater all external and intercontingent logistical matters for the forces under his command.

8. It is not considered advisable to burden commanders with observers responsible only to the Military Staff Committee and reporting directly and only to the Military Staff Committee. Certainly the supreme commander must have administrative and disciplinary control (except courts-martial jurisdiction) over all personnel accompanying the armed forces under his command, including observers appointed by the Military Staff Committee. Further, copies of all reports should be furnished him to facilitate and expedite corrective action when appropriate. It must, of course, be borne in mind that no arrangement as to observers obviates the normal necessity for operational reports and other information that will be made available to the Military Staff Committee by the supreme commander.

9. By ratifying the Charter of the United Nations, the United States subscribed to the general principles and objectives therein, but the means of implementing them are yet to be agreed upon. The character and extent of United States participation in the implementation are matters which necessarily still remain subject to decision on the highest governmental level. In consequence the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should refrain from expressing opinions to representatives of foreign governments and from entering into any commitments, express or implied, on major matters on which they have not received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom this responsibility rests and who may freely be consulted.

44. This document, a report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee dated May 22, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 24. The JCS forwarded the report to the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee on May 24 “as an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff … pending receipt of comments from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.” The U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee took note of the report at their 11th Meeting, June 3 (IO Files). The JCS also presented the report to SWNCC on May 24 for concurrence or comment; it was circulated as SWNCC 219/9, May 27. SWNCC approved it on June 20. (SWNCC Files)
45. Neither printed.
46. SWNCC 219/8; for a description, see footnote 2, p. 769.