Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum for the Files, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission
This memorandum is aimed to touch upon the matters which I have discussed in Washington the last two days.25
As to Mr. Acheson and my talk with him, I will first outline the matters which I had covered in my agenda before leaving New York.
The first item was the matter of determining policy. In general terms, Acheson would like us to develop our views in outline form at as early a date as feasible and then to come to Washington with them and discuss them with all groups that might properly be asked in. At the moment he thinks of these groups as the State Department (and he is concerned about the immediate absence of Secretary Byrnes), certainly the War and Navy Departments, also the political leaders at some proper stage in the meetings, and certainly the President; and after that has been gone through, any statement of policy and attitude described by the President. In general terms, he would expect us to keep the work of drafting all the necessary papers, including [Page 781] a tentative draft of what we would look upon as the final report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council.
He strongly advises our developing a charter, which would be a sound, fair-minded statement of policy and procedure. While he pretends that this would not be left to Russia and all other nations to accept or reject, still that is about the net result of his thinking so far.
He is very much concerned about the pressure from the public to get this policy determined soon. When I threw out the suggestion that it might take three months to get to that point, he thought there ought to be an organization meeting, at least, held at an early date. He is quite satisfied that all of the nations represented on the Council already have access to all of the published material and presumably it has been thoroughly studied by the delegates chosen. I saw in the press about the appointment of Gromyko26 and the report was in Washington that the Mexicans would appoint their delegate by the end of next week. Acheson agreed that if a statement were made regarding the organization meeting, there might be no public unrest for as short as sixty days or up to about 120 days.
For the time being he prefers that contacts between the State Department and ourselves be channeled from him to me and return.
As to the Committee of Scientists, he believes we can get along in our policy without much reliance on the scientific group. He told me of something I didn’t previously know and that is the unexpurgated Acheson report had a great deal of validation of the report—that there were some 20 scientists of top standing who had agreed with the conclusions of the report.27
I bored in every direction I could to find out whether there was any desire that we attach ourselves to the State Dept. He said he thought it would be a convenience to us from the point of view of staff and contact with people in Washington if we were there. He didn’t push the matter at all. He has no men working on the problem except Herbert Marks28 and Fahy.29 Acheson agrees without reservation that they expect us to take the initiative. He admits that he is concerned—probably in large part because of his own lack of knowledge of what [Page 782] we are doing—about the possibility of our coming up with the outline of a plan in as short a time as say sixty days. He offered to get us an administrative assistant, and if we see Rothwell30 here, it will be arranged for.
He has no projects under way or in prospect which would call for the formation of any committees or the assignment of any duties involving atomic energy. I asked whether there were any open ends or further avenues to explore, because all through the Acheson report they kept touching upon more information being needed in certain fields, and he said he had not been impressed by it. Marks cut in to say that was merely a means of saying they didn’t pretend to know all about the specific subject, and that they knew of no specific fields of inquiry that would properly be undertaken at this time.
As to appointments here, Acheson called in his Administrative Assistant and the discussion rolled around a great deal without my getting any clear view of what they want. They would like us to work out some plan as to employment, oaths of office, and secret documents in order that we will be less likely attacked by Congress and will have fitted ourselves into the ordinary Government routine.
As to budgets, they don’t know of anything but a small amount of money which is available until the end of June and suggest that we see Rothwell quickly and work out any budgets for the periods after July 1, 1946.
I should emphasize throughout that Acheson was very gracious, very friendly and most helpful in his whole attitude. I find nothing to criticize in the whole day’s discussion. …
I had raised the question with General Groves as to whether, by any chance, the desired course of action could be carried out through a United Nations Statute. Incidentally, I raised the same question with McMahon. Neither had any views on the matter, but Acheson was clear that it had to be a Treaty. I told Acheson, it appears from the Wilson Foundation reports, that they were committed to the Treaty procedure. But my query was also, what if the Russians or someone else should take a reverse view and want to strengthen the United Nations—then what would be the answer? And he said there would be no power in the United Nations to pass legislation along these lines.
I asked him whether he had any thoughts regarding the kind of an organization to operate when the body was finally set up. He did not express any desire that it would be in the State Dept. or anywhere else.
I have been somewhat concerned about the apparent conflict between the authority of the United States Commission proposed under the [Page 783] McMahon bill31 and the proposed United Nations’ action. The McMahon bill, of course, provides for over-riding power of any international agreement. In developing that, I asked whether they had any thoughts about the men to represent this country should the McMahon bill be passed. He had no suggestions to offer. I think it would be helpful to us if we could have that man fairly well picked out in our minds and attached to our own staff here so that he could pick up the threads from here and save a great deal of time and effort in getting into the problem.
In reference to this matter of preparing a finished report for the first meeting, with the implied statement to the world that they could take it or leave it, I question the wisdom of that and purely on my own thinking feel that is not the best method of proceeding with the Russians and some of the other nations. I wondered whether the delegates of foreign countries wouldn’t want to be able to take credit for some of the principles of the final document, and I feared it would be too dogmatic an action on our part. He did not argue the merits of the case, and he thought all along that it would be taken for granted that we would give them a fair, sound plan and invite cooperation by our action. I am sure Acheson doesn’t reasonably expect general acceptance of any plan we might propose. With it, the main element of negotiation will be as to the time in which information will be given in the secret aspects of the utilization of atomic energy.
[Here follow further comments on Mr. Hancock’s discussion with Mr. Acheson, and on his conversations with Secretary of War Patterson, General Groves, and Senator McMahon. Matters treated include, in addition to international control, domestic legislation and negotiations with the United Kingdom with respect to continued cooperation in the development of atomic energy. A portion of this memorandum dealing with the last mentioned subject is printed on p. 1242.]
- During this period, Mr. Hancock met with Under Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of War Patterson, General Groves, and Senator McMahon.↩
- Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations; Soviet Representative at the General Assembly and on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission.↩
- An “unexpurgated Acheson report” has not been found in the files of the Department of State, nor is there evidence that the final report of the Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy was abridged prior to publication. While the Board of Consultants had sought the opinions of members of the scientific community, it does not appear that validation based on such opinions constituted an unpublished portion of the final report. For information on the development of the report, see Hewlett and Anderson, Chapter 15.↩
- Herbert S. Marks, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.↩
- Charles Fahy of the Office of the Legal Adviser; appointed Legal Adviser June 19, 1946.↩
- C. Easton Rothwell, Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat.↩
- With respect to Congressional legislation on atomic energy in 1946, see Hewlett and Anderson, Chapter 14.↩