811.2423/2–146
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating
Committee
67a
top secret
SM–4810
[Washington,] January 23, 1946.
Guidance as to the Military Implications of a United
Nations Commission on Atomic Energy
Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee in
Collaboration With the Joint Staff Planners After Consultation With the
Commanding General, Manhattan District68
the problem
1. To develop conclusions as to the military implications of the creation of
a United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy.
2. To provide guidance to the representatives of the United States Chiefs of
Staff on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations as to the
military advice to be given the United States representative on the
Commission on Atomic Energy.
3. J.C.S. 1567/2569 was considered by the Joint
Strategic Survey Committee and the Joint Staff Planners in connection with
this study.
facts bearing on the problem and discussion
4. See Appendix “A” (page 131).
[Page 739]
recommendations
5. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that:
-
a.
- Rapid resolution by the Congress of the United States as to the
governmental machinery for handling matters connected with atomic
energy and the security thereof is desirable in the interest of
sound action in the international field.
-
b.
- The production of atomic energy for industrial and scientific use
by any nation will place that nation within a short step of the
immediate capability of production of the atom bomb. Information
essential to such use of atomic energy must be therefore regarded as
in the same category as the “know how” of the atomic bomb
itself.
-
c.
- No realistic system of inspection and control is as yet apparent
which will ensure against the production of atomic bombs for
military use in a nation which possesses such capability. However,
in view of the certain alternative that failure of international
regulation and control will result in an atomic armament race, every
effort must continue to be made to develop and establish such a
system.
-
d.
- Atomic weapons can be most effectively used against highly
developed nations having centralized industries. The United States
is such a nation. Consequently it is to the interest of the United
States to assume active leadership in establishing international
means to control atomic weapons. So long as the United States is the
sole nation actually having atomic bombs and is furthest advanced in
the field of atomic energy, it holds a preeminent position for the
exercise of such leadership. This preeminence will wane with the
passage of time. Therefore, all possible action should be taken
under United States leadership before other nations develop their
own atomic weapons.
-
e.
- The United States is committed to the establishment of a
Commission on Atomic Energy under the United Nations in accordance
with and for the purposes defined in the declaration on atomic
energy of 15 November 1945, issued by President Truman and Prime
Ministers Attlee and King and in the communique of 27 December 1945
from Moscow following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the
United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United Kingdom.
-
f.
- The work of the Commission is of vital interest to the United
States from the standpoint of its national security.
6. It is not possible to state categorically in specific and comprehensive
terms the military implications of the creation of a United Nations
Commission on Atomic Energy, and the consequent opening of this matter to
consideration and action by that Commission. While it is not possible to
furnish a firm and complete list of objectives to be sought by the U.S.
representative, it is apparent that any revelation of atomic information now
held alone by the United States accelerates the rate at which other nations
reach equality in respect to atomic weapons. The degree of agreed safeguards
must thus be the criterion of the amount of information disclosed.
7. Much reliance will have to be placed on step by step analysis of
[Page 740]
problems as they arise in
committee. The representatives of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations should be given a position
advisory to the United States Representative on the Commission. Furthermore,
there should be available, both as an assistant to the United States Member
on the Commission and as one of the United States Military Staff Committee
organization, an individual cognizant of matters of atomic energy and with a
broad military background.
8. As a statement of implicit limitations on the functions of the Committee,
the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff
Committee should be guided by the following principles:
-
a.
- It is essential that any action contemplated in the Commission be
not prejudicial to the security of the United States.
-
b.
- Progress should not be hurried. Painstaking examination and
thorough coordination of each step within the United States
Government are required.
-
c.
- A satisfactory solution from the United States’ point of view of
the problem of effective controls and safeguards must be arrived at
before any disclosure or exchange of specialized technological
information is agreed.
-
d.
- Normal reciprocal peacetime interchange of basic scientific
information and the restricted interchange of scientists and
students is acceptable only under the limitations imposed in
paragraph 17 of Appendix “A” and in subparagraphs a and b above.
-
e.
- Exchange of information on raw materials should not be undertaken
at the present.
9. A copy of this paper be transmitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee for consideration in formulating the State Department’s
instructions to the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Organization.
10. This paper be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to their
representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations for
their interim information with the caution that it is a highly classified
document and should be discussed only with United States personnel
authorized to deal with matters concerning atomic energy.
Appendix “A”
facts bearing on the problem and discussion
- 1.
- On 15 August 1945, the President issued the following memorandum …
to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and
Development:
[Page 741]
“Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as
are necessary to prevent the release of any information in
regard to the development, design or production of the
atomic bomb; or in regard to its employment in military or
naval warfare, except with the specific approval of the
President in each instance.”
- 2.
- On 30 August 1945, the President modified his memorandum of 15
August 1945, … to permit:
- “a. Identification of individuals
and organizations now or formerly associated with the
project together with disclosure of the general nature of
their project activities, subject to rules already laid down
by the War Department. These rules prohibit the release of
any information of value to any foreign government which
that government could not easily obtain without recourse to
espionage.
- “b. Release by the War Department
of information of general interest which in the opinion of
the Department will not jeopardize national
security.”
- 3.
- The question as to how matters related to atomic energy will be
controlled within the United States has not yet been settled. There
are several bills before Congress now under consideration by the
Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Senate. It appears
probable that a commission on the Cabinet level will be established
to oversee all matters related to atomic energy and that the
legislation establishing this commission will impose definite
security regulations and some measure of Congressional control upon
the commission.
- 4.
- On 15 November 1945, the President of the United States and the
Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada jointly issued a
declaration on atomic energy which suggested the establishment of a
Commission on Atomic Energy under the United Nations. The full text
of this declaration is attached as Appendix “B” (page 144).70
- 5.
- On 27 December 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the United States,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom jointly
issued a communiqué outlining the agreements reached by them at
their meeting in Moscow. In Section VII of this communiqué, the
Foreign Ministers agreed to recommend to the General Assembly of the
United Nations at its first session, that a commission be
established to consider problems arising from the discovery of
atomic energy and related matters. The full text of Section VII of
the communiqué is attached as Appendix “C” (page 148).71
- 6.
- The above mentioned declaration and communiqué established
[Page 742]
as major missions of the
proposed commission the preparation of recommendations for control
of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; for
the elimination of atomic weapons and all other major weapons of
mass destruction; and the provision of adequate safeguards against
use of atomic weapons. Atomic weapons as presently known consist
primarily of the atomic bomb. Radioactive by-products of the
manufacture of atomic bombs also have a potential military use.
“Other weapons of mass destruction” such as gas and biological
warfare are not discussed herein since it is considered that their
elimination is a somewhat separate problem.
- 7.
- The precise military characteristics and effects of atomic weapons
have not as yet been fully developed, but the following general
points may be assumed as factual:
-
a.
- The explosive effect of the present atomic bomb is roughly
equal to that of 20,000 tons of TNT. As the development of
the new weapon progresses, it is reasonable to expect that
its effectiveness will increase.
-
b.
- The explosion of the bomb is accompanied by heat of solar
proportions and the creation of radio-active material which,
if the bomb explodes on or very near the surface of the
ground or water, impregnates a limited area of that surface
to such an extent that lethal effects may for sometime
result to humans moving through the area affected.
-
c.
- The bomb is presently best transported by aircraft but
could in anticipation of its future use be transported
piecemeal to the target in secret, assembled on the spot,
and exploded by remote control. In the future, it might be
delivered by rockets and guided missiles, launched alone or
from subsidiary airborne, surface or sub-surface
carriers.
-
d.
- There are no defensive measures now envisaged which will
guarantee protection of vital points from atomic weapon
attack.
-
e.
- The elements presently utilizable for manufacture of the
bomb are uranium and possibly thorium. All major powers have
access in some degree to the necessary raw materials, but
control of areas of rich deposits and assured communications
thereto will assume increasing strategic importance.
-
f.
- Radio-active materials can be produced as a by-product to
either production of atomic bombs or power in an atomic
energy plant. Consideration has been given to the
utilization of such radio-active materials to force the
evacuation of vital points or to deny sizeable areas of
terrain to any enemy armed force. Present indications are
that such use would not be of extreme military importance
because of difficulties attendant to their proper
utilization and to the fact that they probably are no more
effective than existing known gases under many conditions.
Moreover, such utilization of radio-active materials
probably would be considered to be in the same category as
gas warfare and therefore barred by existing
agreements.
- 8.
- The “secret” of the atomic bomb is not so much a scientific secret
as it is one of scientific, industrial and engineering “know how”
and
[Page 743]
particularly “top
notch” American management and the ability to produce in quantity
the intricate instruments, equipment and machinery required.
- 9.
- The manufacture of fissionable elements for use in atomic
explosives is a gigantic undertaking. Any great power, starting from
scratch with presently available information and determined to
produce atomic explosives, can be expected to do so within five to
seven years, if it received assistance in the procurement and use of
specialized equipment and machinery from nations best able to
produce them, and within fifteen to twenty years without such
outside assistance.
- 10.
- Atomic weapons increase the incentive to aggression by enhancing
the advantage of surprise. They can most easily be used in such
fashion by authoritarian or totalitarian nations. They would be most
effective against highly developed nations where industries are
centralized, the national mode of life would not easily accept the
cost and disruption of decentralization, and where complete military
preparedness is difficult to maintain. The United States falls in
this latter category of nations, and, consequently, it is highly to
its advantage to take the lead in establishing means to control
atomic weapons. To this end, it is most desirable that the proposed
commission on a Cabinet level, mentioned in paragraph 3 on page 131, be established at an early date
so that international negotiations may be adequately
directed.
- 11.
- Enemy states in possession of atomic weapons can deliver
destructive force thousands of times more effective than previously
possible. A nation attacked with such weapons must be highly
courageous and disciplined to withstand the mass killings that would
result, and still be able to continue to fight. Its most effective
use would be against cities and industrial concentrations, and a
relatively few bombs successfully delivered could kill millions of
people and destroy a large percentage of the total critical
industrial capacity. The implications of atomic warfare, so long as
no effective international safeguards exist, emphasize the necessity
for the United States to maintain:
-
a.
- Forward bases from which aircraft could intercept attacks
against the United States and in counter-attacks could
deliver bombs against possible enemies.
-
b.
- Balanced armed forces, including highly perfected air
forces, in a state of readiness, capable of: holding these
bases; maintaining sea and air communications to them;
retaining control of the land, air and sea spaces around the
United States; providing instantaneous defense against air
attack or sea forays against the United States; delivering
offensive action by a striking force to the limit
feasible.
-
c.
- Additional forces capable of very rapid mobilization to
provide full defensive organization against atomic weapon
attack and to provide further augmentation to offensive or
holding forces in the field.
-
d.
- Adequate plans for complete mobilization of the country,
including the civilian population, in order to carry on
production in the face of great destruction, to prevent
sabotage and secret delivery of atomic weapons, and to avoid
hysteria and panic.
- 12.
- Future peacetime uses of atomic energy are considered possible,
but the threat of military use will overshadow them until a system
of effective world-wide control of military use is established.
Highly important in this connection is the fact that materials used
in atomic-energy plants as presently envisaged could rapidly and
comparatively easily be converted into bombs. Furthermore,
atomic-energy plants could produce fissionable materials as a
by-product of producing controlled energy. Any system of inspection
for the purpose of controlling war-like use of atomic energy will be
greatly complicated should industrial use be authorized and in
practice. Therefore, international disclosure of technological
information even for peaceful use should be withheld until effective
inspections, controls and safeguards against military use are
established.
- 13.
- Effective international control to guarantee that atomic weapons
could not be used by an aggressor nation is virtually impossible
under the present concept of a world divided into nations
maintaining their full sovereignty. No system of inspection can be
expected to be one hundred per cent effective in such a world, and
ninety-nine percent effectiveness is no guarantee. The best possible
system of inspection is a necessary adjunct to any effort at control
but effective sanctions, should inspection uncover violations, are
equally vital. Since such sanctions probably cannot be applied by
the United Nations, at present, because of the veto provision,
immediate consultation and agreement of nations other than the
offending state will be necessary. Obviously the United Nations
system will then have broken down as such. The final solution, as
yet apparently unattainable, is the creation of a world state in
which all nations surrender sufficient of their sovereignty to
assure the rule of law and the prevention, if not of war itself, of
illicit means of waging war.
- 14.
- The prospective negotiation of atomic energy matters by
representatives of the United States must be done with the nicest
balance between the requirements for international cooperation on
the one hand and an enlightened understanding of the demands of
national interest and national security on the other. In this
regard, the probable intent of Congress to hold close control over
atomic energy matters must be kept in mind. The United States is in
fact the sole power which holds the necessary scientific knowledge
and has existing manufacturing plants which permit the production of
atomic weapons. The United States thus holds a position of
pre-eminence in the field and by virtue of this position and the
part played in developing the
[Page 745]
weapon has a great responsibility to the world
to maintain enlightened leadership in formulating: the international
controls and safeguards required.
- 15.
- The declaration by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee
and King, issued on 15 November 1945 (Appendix “B”) states that they
are of the opinion that a commission under the United Nations should
be established to prepare recommendations on how to attain the most
effective means for entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy
for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for industrial
and humanitarian purposes. The commission should, according to the
declaration, make specific recommendations:
- “(a) For extending between all
nations the exchange of basic scientific information for
peaceful ends.
- “(b) For control of atomic energy
to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful
purposes.
- “(c) For the elimination from
national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major
weapons adaptable to mass destruction.
- “(d) For effective safeguards by
way of inspection and other means to protect complying
states against the hazards of violations and
evasions.”
- The declaration goes on to say that the work of the commission
should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each
one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world
before the next stage is undertaken. Work by separate stages is
interpreted to mean that affirmative action along any fruitful lines
is permissible so long as effective safeguards are in force before
information contributing to the production of atomic weapons is
revealed.
- 16.
- The communiqué from Moscow (Appendix “C”) repeats almost verbatim
the above missions for the commission and, in addition, clarifies
its composition and competence and proposes to place it, for matters
affecting international peace, under the Security Council of the
United Nations. Neither in the declaration nor in the communiqué is
it clearly stated in which order the separate stages shall be
considered, except perhaps by implication.
- 17.
- The matter of the exchange of basic scientific information for
peaceful ends as a possible first step, has raised considerable
controversy, particularly if it is envisaged to mean completely free
exchange visits of scientists. As stated above, the “secret” of the
atomic bomb is less a matter of restricting the dissemination of
knowledge related to nuclear physics than it is in retaining
information as to the application of this knowledge to the mass
production of essential ingredients and their assembly in the bomb.
Pure science is international in times of peace and complete control
of atomic research is virtually impossible. The interchange of
scientific information and advances in scientific
[Page 746]
thought existed before World War II
through the medium of technical journals and through conventions of
scientists and their normal travel and study. Any restriction on
such an interchange would meet great resistance and might slow down
appreciably advance in peaceful fields. However, the interests of
national and world security are jeopardized when scientists holding
either the theoretical or the practical knowledge of production are
given authority to exchange this knowledge with others who may,
through lack of effective controls and safeguards, be free to apply
the knowledge gained towards selfish individual or national aims not
in consonance with the world effort to abolish all use of atomic
weapons. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of Appendix “B” this problem is
discussed and the answer there suggested appears sound, i.e., that
detailed information concerning the practical application of atomic
energy can be shared only so soon as effective, enforceable
safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised.
Therefore, no interchange of information other than basic theory and
no interchange of numbers of scientists holding detailed information
regarding production and application of fissionable materials should
be permitted until definite progress has been made in the field of
safeguards and controls.
- 18.
- As for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to
insure its use only for peaceful purposes, this is inevitably only a
phase of the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons
and the provision of adequate safeguards to protect complying states
from the hazards of violation. As stated above, the materials used
for the peaceful industrial applications of atomic energy are
precisely those which are used in atomic weapons, and the problem of
their production is more difficult than their final adaptation to
form the bomb. Once produced, they can be relatively rapidly,
easily, and secretly diverted from peaceful use and made into atomic
weapons. Even the most extensive and effective inspectional
machinery might find it impossible to detect on all occasions such a
diversion, particularly if it were done bit by bit over an extended
period of time. The surest guarantee against such action could only
come from the basic conviction by all individuals and all nations
concerned that atomic energy should not be used in weapons. This
conviction must be recognized as impossible of attainment,
certainly, at any rate, under the present world order.
- 19.
- Inspection can be relatively effective only if the inspecting
teams are fully cognizant of the processes for manufacturing and
applying atomic energy to warlike use. No great power is likely to
trust the reports of inspectors of other nationalities. Furthermore,
to admit inspectors of alien allegiance into U.S. industrial
installations, let
[Page 747]
alone
into U.S. plants producing fissionable materials, would be to
violate all present day concepts of patent rights and the rights to
secret commercial processes. To apply the concept of completely free
inspection in all other nations of the world would be equally
revolutionary and equally unlikely to be accepted. Therefore, to
establish an even partially effective inspection system will be an
unprecedented and most difficult task. One variation of the
inspectional scheme envisages dependence on national inspection
forces, each inspecting within its own country and being inspected
in turn by an international inspection force. This is comparable to
the present international system of controlling narcotic drugs and
has, in that field, been relatively successful. However, it is a
well-known fact that quantities of narcotic drugs are still sold in
all parts of the world to those willing to pay the price demanded.
Therefore, in view of the potentialities of the atomic energy, it is
believed that such a system of control would be entirely
unacceptable.
- 20.
- The provision of rapid and effective counter-action, including
war, against any nation using or taking steps to use atomic weapons
might be easier to attain. Under this concept the violation of the
atomic agreement by any nations would be considered by all others as
a prima facie act of war and all possible effective action against
the aggressor would be enforced. The application of such measures
would, it is true, be an admission of failure and would most
probably mean the plunging of the world into atomic warfare.
Nevertheless, such a system seems vital. The danger of any one
nation electing to use atomic weapons should be measurably lessened
if it were realized that all others capable of using atomic weapons
or any other means of force would effectively apply these means
against the aggressor. This is an extension of the present basis for
the enforcement of world peace as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations, with one notable difference, i.e., no offending
nation, whether it be one of the five permanent members of the
Security Council or not, would be free from the threat of the use of
force by all others. The whole concept of effective action against a
great power intent on violating its agreement is a highly
theoretical and controversial matter which can only be resolved,
nationally and internationally, after much discussion and
negotiation.
- 21.
- The United States already has available atomic weapons in some
quantity, has used them, and is making more of them. Consequently,
it would be logically difficult to forbid other powers from
developing and making ready atomic weapons unless the United States
ceases production and destroys all its bombs or unless all other
nations agreed to make the United States the trustee of the weapons;
[Page 748]
agreed further that no
others should manufacture them and that if any attempted to do so,
it would be proper that U.S. atomic bombs, in conjunction with the
forces of the balance of the United Nations, should be used to
destroy the unauthorized manufacturing plants. The United States
should not destroy its bombs, and as to the second alternative, it
seems unlikely that other major powers, as for instance the USSR,
would agree. However, appointment of the United States as a trustee
of the bomb might profitably be explored, since, if universally
accepted, it would provide an interim means for enforcing the safe
development of atomic energy.
- 22.
- Whether or not such an interim step be feasible or even desirable,
the important situation to plan upon is the ultimate one where some
or all nations are using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This
implies that they have then readily available the basic materials
for conversion to atomic weapons. Under this hypothesis and by that
time the necessity for agreement on effective action to be taken
against a violator is apparent, and the United States should take
the lead in establishing provision for such action. It is not to be
envisaged that the United States would ever use the atomic bomb
except against an aggressor state. Therefore, the national interest
of the United States would coincide with that of other non-offender
nations and the threat of the use of the atomic bomb would be a
great deterrent to any aggressor which might be considering
embarking on an atomic war. A pool of atomic weapons under the
Security Council, with provisions prohibiting the existence of any
other atomic weapons, has been proposed. Were it not for the veto
power this procedure might be of value, but, with the failure of the
Security Council to operate, no legal means of using this pool
against a major aggressor appears available. Again, the location and
trusteeship of the pool present difficulties. The Council has no
inviolate territory of its own; agreement as to custodianship of all
weapons by any one nation seems impracticable to achieve. Division
of them among several, or many, nations will be dimply furnishing
those trustee nations with ready-made surprise weapons. The
realistic working out of a scheme whereby such a pool could be
established is therefore exceedingly difficult since the location of
the pool, the means of using the pool, and its protection against
capture by an unscrupulous power are matters hard to resolve.
- 23.
- A system of inspection should not be considered as a completely
reliable solution to the problems raised by the development of
atomic energy. Correlative with the establishment of such a system,
the United States should support, realistically and vigorously,
development of education throughout the world, to push towards the
establishment of the regime of world law and order wherein lies the
only hope for a
[Page 749]
more
permanent removal of the dangers inherent in atomic weapons.
- 24.
- The great complexity of the problems discussed above leads to the
conclusion that progress can be expected to be slow. The United
Nations in the first days of the existence of their organization
will be hard put to solve the problems involved. Close integration
of action proposed by the United States representatives on the
Atomic Commission with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, appropriate Congressional
leaders, and finally with the President, is essential.
