Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

501.BB/12–546

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[Washington,] December 5, 1946.

Participants:	John Foster Dulles—U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly
	Elizabeth Armstrong—U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly
	Alger Hiss—SPA

Miss Armstrong called me yesterday afternoon and read over the telephone the attached draft proposals which she said Mr. Dulles wished to introduce in the subcommittee of Committee IV considering trusteeship agreements.⁷⁵

After consulting Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Green and Captain Dennison, I called Miss Armstrong back and told her the following:

With Respect to the Proposal Dealing with “States Directly Concerned”⁷⁶

I assumed that in the third sentence of the second paragraph the word “permanently” had inadvertently been omitted from the phrase “no state has waived or prejudiced its right to claim”, in as much as we have proposed waiver of claims for the purposes of approval of the agreements now before the Assembly. I said that as to the last two sentences we had serious doubts as to their wisdom. It seemed to us that they would simply keep alive the issue of “states directly concerned” whereas we hoped that the issue would die out at least for some time to come upon the completion of the current session of the General Assembly. These two sentences would require the Trusteeship Council to consider this problem and hence it would keep it alive. In addition, if the Trusteeship Council should not take our view and should list as “states directly concerned” some states which voted against the adoption of particular agreements, this might tend to cloud the title of the administering authorities named under such agreements. The last sentence in particular was disturbing as it would specifically require the Trusteeship Council to consider the explosive question of “states directly concerned” if and when an agreement for Palestine or for the Italian colonies is submitted.

Miss Armstrong told me that the draft was also being taken up with Mr. Cohen. I said that I was glad to hear that and that the views which I had expressed should be regarded as tentative. I said that in the event Mr. Cohen and Mr. Dulles felt that the two sentences to which I had called particular attention were necessary in order to get by the problem of “states directly concerned” I thought the Department would be prepared to rely upon their judgment.

With Respect to the Proposal on Military Establishments⁷⁷

I said that our feelings were much stronger about this point. In particular, the proposed second paragraph seemed to us very inadvisable. I pointed out that we already had a tentative arrangement with New Zealand for the use of bases in Western Samoa and that also the paragraph would be inconsistent with our plans with respect to the mandated islands.

As to the first paragraph, we were worried about the phraseology as it might seem to give support to the Soviet interpretation of Article 43, namely, that military establishments in trust territories are only permissible if the Security Council specifically authorizes them. I said that I was working on a redraft of that paragraph along the lines of making it clear that, of course, any later agreement under Article 43 on the regulation of armaments would apply no less to trust territories than to the administering authority’s own territory.

I said that I felt confident that the views I had expressed with respect to the military establishments proposal represented strongly held views of the State, War and Navy Departments.

This morning Mr. Dulles called me on the above subjects and said that Mr. Cohen was with him. He said that he had agreed to strike out the last two sentences of the proposal relating to “states directly concerned” and instead simply to add a general statement to the effect that the procedure now being followed by the Assembly on this point would not necessarily have to be followed in the future.

With respect to the proposal on military establishments, Mr. Dulles said that he had agreed to eliminate the second paragraph; however, he felt very strongly that it was necessary to have something along the lines of the first paragraph and that he thought the suggestion I had made to Miss Armstrong as to alternative language would not help meet the problem he was facing. He said that the other delegations and the public simply do not understand that closure of a military area from Trusteeship Council inspection does not mean closure of that area for purposes of armament inspection. He said that Senator Vandenberg himself in the last day or so had said that he thought our position of urging the Soviets to agree to international inspection for disarmament was inconsistent with our position of insisting upon the right to established closed areas in trusteeship territories. Mr. Dulles said he had readily explained the matter to Senator Vandenberg, whereupon the Senator said “why in the world isn’t that made clear publicly?”.

I told Mr. Dulles that I would attempt to clear a revision of the first paragraph of the proposed statement on military establishments within the Department and with the War and Navy Departments and that I thought it should be possible to maintain the essence of his draft.

I then cleared with Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Vincent, Mr. Green, Captain Dennison and Colonel Parker (in Colonel Giffen’s office) the following draft which I telephoned to New York for Mr. Dulles:

“The General Assembly in approving those terms of trusteeship which authorize military establishments calls attention to the fact that whenever any administering authority, as such, becomes a party to the special agreement or agreements to be negotiated on the initiative of the Security Council pursuant to Article 43 or a party to any agreement or agreements with reference to control or limitation of armaments providing for inspection or supervision of military establishments, such agreement or agreements will, of course, be controlling as to the matters covered by them and will govern the availability of such military establishments to the Security Council and their subjection to inspection or supervision for the purposes specified in such agreement or agreements.”⁷⁸

[Annex I]

The Subcommittee proposes that Committee IV, in recommending any terms of trusteeship to this session of the General Assembly for approval, should propose that approval thereof be on the following understanding with respect to “states directly concerned”.

All members of the United Nations have had an opportunity to present their views with reference to the terms of trusteeship. There has, however, been no formal determination as to which of these nations are “states directly concerned” within the meaning of Article 79. Accordingly, the General Assembly in approving particular terms of trusteeship does not prejudge the question of what states are or are not “directly concerned” within the meaning of Article 79 and recognizes that no state has waived or prejudiced its right to claim to be or to be held to be such a “state directly concerned”. The General Assembly instructs the Trusteeship Council promptly upon its constitution to consider what states are “directly concerned” in the terms of trusteeship now approved and to submit its opinion on the matter to the next session of the General Assembly. It further instructs the Trusteeship Council to submit its opinion as to “states directly concerned” in connection with any future submission to the General Assembly of terms of trusteeship.

December 4, 1946.

[Annex II]

The General Assembly approves those terms of trusteeship which authorize military establishments on the understanding that as soon as any administering authority, as such, becomes a party to the special agreement or agreements to be negotiated on the initiative of the Security Council pursuant to Article 43 or a party to any other agreement or agreements with reference to control or limitations of armaments or inspection or supervision of military establishments, such agreement or agreements will be overriding and the administering authority cannot claim, under the present terms of trusteeship, any rights or privileges inconsistent therewith.

The General Assembly expresses the hope that administering authorities will not exercise their right to develop military establishments until the United Nations, through its Security Council, shall have had a further reasonable period of time in which to develop international agreements of the character referred to in furtherance of international peace and security.

December 4, 1946.

75. On December 4 Sub-Committee 1 completed for all practical purposes its examination of the eight draft trusteeship agreements (although the final formal decisions were not taken until December 6), and prepared to turn to the question of the preambles of the agreements all of which except the New Guinea draft contained either a reference to Article 79 or a specific statement that the states directly concerned had concurred in the terms of the draft agreements. For an analytical summary of the handling of the question of States directly concerned at this time by the committees and the General Assembly, see Repertory of UN Practice, pp. 175–191, passim.
76. See Annex I.
77. See Annex II.

78. This statement was submitted by Mr. Dulles to the Fourth Committee on December 9 with the proposal that it be included in the Report of the Rapporteur to the General Assembly (GA(I/2), Fourth Committee, Pt. I, pp. 143 and 144). Mr. Dulles initiated this action in connection with the Committee’s discussion of a series of amendments to the eight draft agreements proposed by the Soviet Union which restricted the administering authority’s right to establish military bases, erect fortifications, and station and employ armed forces in the trust territory except on the basis of obligations to the Security Council assumed by the administering authority (ibid., pp. 139–147, passim, and GA(I/2), Fourth Committee, Pt. II, pp. 236, 243 and 244, 252, 258, 259, 267 and 268, 269 and 270, and 271 and 272, annexes 4a, 5d, 6a, 7, 8, 10a, 11, and 12a, respectively). The Committee never gave formal consideration to the Dulles proposal; neither was the statement incorporated in the Rapporteur’s Report. The Soviet amendments were not accepted by the Fourth Committee.

    Actually the Committee’s debate was a telescoped version of an earlier extensive consideration by Sub-Committee 1 of the question of whether the consent of the Security Council was required before naval, air, and military bases could be established in the trust territories (non-strategic). This had been in connection with the Sub-Committee’s deliberations on the draft trusteeship agreement for Western Samoa, specifically Article X. For an analytical summary of the Sub-Committee’s work on this question with copious references to the official record, see Repertory of UN Practice, vol. iv, pp. 253–262.