Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: USGA/Ia/Site/4

United States Delegation Working Paper

secret

February [7 or 8,] 1946.

Position of the United States Regarding the Convention on the Site

Committee 6 now has before it a draft convention to be concluded with the United States with regard to the site of the United Nations; and a draft resolution relating to the convention. Both of these documents have been referred to the subcommittee on privileges and immunities.²¹

i. the draft resolution

The Resolution constitutes an authorization by the General Assembly to the Secretary-General to negotiate with the competent authorities of the United States the arrangements required as a result of the establishment of the seat of the United Nations in the United States. The draft convention is transmitted by the Assembly to the Secretary-General for use in these negotiations as a basis of discussion. The Secretary-General is required to report the results of the negotiations to the General Assembly, which must approve any agreement with the competent authorities of the United States before being signed on behalf of the United Nations.

Recommended United States Position

The Resolution, with a few minor changes mentioned below, is satisfactory to the United States, and it is recommended that the delegation should vote in favor of it.

The United States is desirous of seeing to it that no draft convention on this subject is approved by the Assembly at this session, except as a basis of discussion in negotiations. The convention raises many difficult technical questions which cannot be determined at this time but must await the determination of a specific site and actual negotiations with the local state and municipal authorities. We therefore desire to see negotiations conducted by the Secretary-General in the United States after a site has been chosen. The Resolution accomplishes this purpose by authorizing the Secretary-General to negotiate, and transmitting the draft convention to him for use as a basis of discussion.^*

It is the view of the United States that it will probably prove preferable not to have a single convention but a series of agreements with the federal, state and local authorities. We should make our position on this point a matter of record. The draftsmen of the convention have strongly adhered to the opinion that a single convention is better from the standpoint of the United Nations, but have been willing not to foreclose the question and have provided for an authorization to the Secretary-General to make “arrangements.”

In order not to require every detailed local agreement to come before the Assembly for specific approval, we believe that it would be better if the last paragraph of the resolution were amended to read:

“The General Assembly will, after receiving the report, determine which documents resulting from the negotiations shall require specific approval by the General Assembly before being signed on behalf of the United Nations. Provided: that nothing in this Resolution shall prevent the Secretary-General from entering into any arrangements necessary for the establishment of a temporary headquarters in the United States.”

ii. the draft convention

The Draft Convention now before Committee 6 is more satisfactory to the United States than was the Draft transmitted by the Preparatory Commission.²² However, the present Draft is still unsatisfactory in a number of points. Three of the major unsatisfactory points are:

1. The Draft is unitary in character, i.e. it attempts to regulate all questions in a single agreement between the United States and the United Nations. We believe this to be unsatisfactory both from our standpoint and that of the United Nations. It would mean that the federal government would have to presume to be able to speak for and to enter into detailed agreements with the State and local authorities with regard to numerous local matters such as acquisition of, price of and title to land, immunities from state tax legislation, police protection, public utility services, etc. Apart from serious constitutional objections which may be raised, we believe that this would result in cumbersome and complicated administration and would make minor adjustments difficult. We believe it would be much more expeditious and practical for the United Nations to enter into direct relations with the state and, if necessary, local authorities. In order that the state where the headquarters are located may be able to conclude an agreement with the United Nations, it may be necessary for Congress to give approval to the agreement in order to comply with the United States Constitution. If it appears that such approval is necessary, Congress should be asked to give it.

2. Throughout the convention there are proposals which are not likely to prove satisfactory either to the federal government or to the state government where the headquarters are located. For example, it is proposed that obligation be undertaken to supply additional land apart from the original headquarters site whenever the United Nations wants additional land to construct an airport, railroad station, radio telegraphic station or “other purposes.” (Section 8)

Another provision calls for a “guarantee” of means of communication to and from the zone instead of providing there will be no impeding of methods of communication. (Section 19)

Still another provision guarantees the exercise of “all … powers” for supplying the headquarters zone with necessary public services which is to receive “an equal priority with the essential services of the United States Government itself” in these respects. Moreover, interruption of such services is to be prevented to the same extent that interruption would be prevented in the case of “services to the essential departments” of the United States Government. (Section 28)

Finally, differences of interpretation are to be referred “to the arbitration of an umpire appointed for the purpose by the President of the International Court of Justice.” (Section 39)

3. Certain of the provisions of the Draft relating to the authority of the United States and the United Nations with respect to the zone where the headquarters are located, are unsatisfactory. Thus, one of the sections reads:

“The United Nations may enact regulations making provision of an administrative character for the zone. Any such regulation shall prevail over any provisions in the law of the United States of America which are inconsistent with it. It is agreed that within the zone the protection afforded by the Constitution of the United States to the basic human freedoms of expression, worship and personal liberty shall not be lessened and no form of racial discrimination shall be permitted.”

In the draft transmitted by the Preparatory Commission, the United Nations were given a much more extensive power to enact regulations setting aside provisions of the law of the United States. This would obviously have been altogether unacceptable to the United States since it would, in effect, have given the United Nations a blank check to set aside constitutional provisions or the civil or criminal law of the United States. The present draft is less objectionable and its intention appears to be only to permit the United Nations to enact regulations relating to such matters as speed limits, use of streets and other matters of a police nature. Other problems of this type relate to immigration, police protection, use of headquarters zone as a refuge, etc.

4. The Draft has appended to it an Annex which contains provisions relating to the immunities of the Organization, its staff and representatives of Member governments. These provisions are to follow closely the parallel provisions of the Draft General Convention on Privileges and Immunities now under consideration by Committee 6. The most significant objection to these provisions from the standpoint of the United States is that they confer immunity from taxation and from national service obligations on citizens of the United States who are employed by the Secretariat. We object to these on the ground that we do not desire to see the creation of a privileged class of our citizens.

There are also other objections to some of the provisions, such as the extension of diplomatic immunities beyond the point provided in our own legislation and the provision of a United Nations passport.

Recommended United States Position on the Draft Convention

The United States should abstain from discussing or voting upon any of the provisions of the Draft Convention for the following reasons:

1. It would be inappropriate for the United States as one of the parties to the Convention to place itself in a dual position by participating in the framing of a draft as a United Nations member.

2. The United States would run a serious risk of committing itself to the draft in advance of negotiations if it took any part in the discussions. Any argument against unsatisfactory provisions might be held to imply acceptance of provisions against which no objections were taken. No formal statement of reservation would be sufficient to dissipate this risk.

For these reasons, it is recommended that the United States representatives in Committee 6 and its subcommittee should, at the outset of discussion of the Draft, make a statement along the following lines:

“Since the proposed Convention will become the subject of negotiation between the United Nations and the United States, the delegation of the United States wishes it to be understood that it will take no part in the discussion of the provisions of this draft and will abstain from any voting with respect to it. This position is taken because it would clearly be inappropriate for the United States to occupy a dual position in these negotiations and attempt to sit on both sides of the table. It should also be clearly understood that in abstaining from discussion and voting, the United States does not commit itself to any provision of this draft or with respect to any provision to be contained in any agreement or agreements which may eventually be concluded with the authorities of the United States or of any state or municipality thereof.”²³

(It should be understood that this policy of abstention²⁴ with respect to the Draft Convention regarding the Site does not apply to the Draft General Convention on Privileges and Immunities. The United States position with respect to the latter is set forth in USGA/Ia/LECom/4.)²⁵

21. For the draft convention and the draft resolution, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings, p. 650, appendix II of annex 22 (hereafter cited as GA(I/1), Plenary). These drafts accompanied a report submitted by the sub-committee on privileges and immunities to the Sixth Committee on February 7 (GA(I/1), Sixth Committee, p. 45, annex 3a).
22. It would be preferable from the standpoint of the United States if the draft convention were not transmitted at all, since it would give us a freer hand in the negotiations, but the sentiment among other delegations in favor of a draft convention is so strong that there is no possibility of securing a different result. The argument made in favor of the convention is that the Secretary-General must have some guidance from the Assembly in his negotiations. [Footnote in the original.]
22. Report of the Preparatory Commission, p. 75.
23. For the statement made by Mr. Abe Feller to the Sixth Committee on February 8 see GA(I/1), Sixth Committee, p. 30. Apparently no explicit reservation was made of the position of the United States vis-à-vis the provisions of the draft convention as proposed here.
24. At this time there was frequent discussion within the United States Delegation whether the policy of neutrality should be continued (particularly in the Delegation’s meetings on February 5, 6 and 8), the Delegation being considerably agitated over the high cost factor implicit in the report and recommendations of an interim inspection group that the permanent site be located in the North Stamford-Greenwich (Connecticut) district (for the report see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, I—Permanent Headquarters Committee; II—Interim Committee for the Selection of a Site for the Permanent Headquarters of the United Nations, pp. 31 ff., annex 1 [hereafter cited as GA(I/1), Headquarters Committee]). Senator Vandenberg obliquely gave voice to the Delegation’s feelings in a meeting of the Fifth Committee on February 7, when, during the Committee’s consideration of the Organization’s budget, he said in pertinent part: “When initiating policies, delegations should always think of the bill which would have to be paid. The United States had deliberately refrained from taking any part in the discussions as to the site, but when the Inspection Group returned [from the United States where it had been examining sites from January 5 to February 2] with the proposal that a site of 45 square miles should be acquired in a most expensive area, such an idea could only be described as fantastic.” (GA(I/1), Fifth Committee, p. 49) For the legislative history of the site question in the Interim Committee appointed by the Preparatory Commission on December 22, 1945 and the ad hoc Permanent Headquarters Committee established by the General Assembly on January 26, 1946, see GA(I/1). Headquarters Committee; see bracketed note, p. 76, for subsequent developments.
25. United States Delegation working paper of January 19, p. 60.