FW 501.BB/10–3146
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)
| Participants: | Mr. John Foster Dulles—Gadel |
| Mr. John C. Ross—Gadel | |
| Mr. Alger Hiss |
After the morning meeting in Mr. Acheson’s office I called Mr. Dulles and Mr. Gerig and told them of the decisions which had been reached as a result of consideration of New York’s telegram 741 of October 31, 9 p.m.49 I explained that it was the Department’s position that in the event our proposal is not accepted that claims to be states directly concerned in trusteeship agreements be waived by all other interested member states for the purposes of the present Assembly, we should take the position that the Assembly should refuse to designate any except the respective mandatories as being states directly concerned. I added that this meant we would vote against any proposal for a general formula which included additional states directly concerned and against any motions recognizing individual states as directly concerned. I explained that the Department felt that this was a justifiable interpretation of the ambiguous language of the Charter and I pointed out that neither at San Francisco nor at London had it been possible to arrive at an agreement of what states should be regarded as directly concerned or upon any principles for determining this question. I pointed out that it can be argued that under Article 77 (1)(c) a sovereign voluntarily agreeing to place some of its territory under trusteeship would presumably be the only state directly concerned. If the general language of the Charter can mean this in such a case it can mean it also also in the case of mandates. I said that the Department felt that if a number of states, including the Soviet Union, were to be recognized as states directly concerned there was every likelihood that no agreements would be approved certainly at this Assembly and that the trusteeship system would be further indefinitely delayed. I added that the Department felt that there would probably be widespread [Page 669] support among the smaller powers in as much as our proposal meant resistance against extension of the veto power in the trusteeship field and in the General Assembly. We thought that the mandatory states should be able to accept our point of view for the reason that by the power they unquestionably have to refuse to adopt inacceptable suggestions of the Assembly they can by their own commitments to states they consider directly concerned give these other states all the protection they would have if they were so designated by the Assembly itself. I added that no decision had been reached by the Department as to the position we would take if despite our opposition one or more states were to be designated as directly concerned in any particular agreement. We might at that time decide to assert our own claims in view of the decision of the Assembly, a decision which we would regard as unwise but as necessarily changing the situation confronting us. Of course, if despite our opposition a general formula was passed which included us, and we doubt the likelihood of any formula which would exclude us being adopted, then we would accept the decision of the Assembly and regard ourselves as being a state directly concerned.
Mr. Dulles told me that he found himself substantially in agreement with the Department’s point of view. He feels that the Russians are planning a campaign of obstruction to the proposed agreements. They have indicated they will emphasize the need for provisions looking toward early independence which would be inacceptable to the mandatory powers. If the Russians have a veto right they would then be able to prevent the establishment of the trusteeship system. Mr. Dulles said that he was inclined to feel that although the establishment of the trusteeship system is important, that establishment is really of less substantive importance than is the propaganda issue which the Russians are raising about what states are really the defenders of the dependent peoples. He said that once the trusteeship agreements were approved there will be relatively little of substance which the Trusteeship Council will itself accomplish and, as in the case of the mandate system, the administering powers will be responsible in fact for what goes on in their territories. He regards Chapter 11, which relates to dependent territories generally and of course covers a far greater area of the world’s surface and a far greater population group than does the trusteeship system, as more important than the trusteeship system itself. He indicated that he was anxious that we not get in a position of appearing to rush through the Assembly against Russian opposition agreements which are satisfactory to colonial powers. He said he thought the Russians would try to class us with the colonial powers.
Mr. Dulles said that as a lawyer he cannot conscientiously argue strongly for the Department’s interpretation of the Charter. In his [Page 670] opinion the language, by using the phrase “the states directly concerned, including the mandatory powers in the case of territories held under mandate”, means at least a group larger than the respective mandatory states. However, he agrees with the practicable reasons for urging the Assembly to avoid determining that any state other than the respective mandatories are directly concerned. He said that he would wish promptly to talk to the Russians and the mandatory states on the basis of the Department’s views and that perhaps after that had been completed he might wish to come down to confer on the whole matter with the Department. I pointed out that Mr. Cohen would be in New York by Sunday or Monday and suggested that Mr. Dulles and Mr. Gerig keep in touch with him.
Mr. Gerig told me that in recent talks with the British the British have indicated more sympathy than heretofore with our suggestion that the Charter be interpreted as including only the mandatory with respect to each trust territory. He thought that in view of these recent indications it might be possible to get the British to go along with us. Mr. Dulles doubted this and was not at all sure that we could avoid having a number of states designated. He said that the possibilities for logrolling in this connection are evident and said that he was sure that the Russian group of states and the Arab states would oppose our position. He thought it possible also that Chile and perhaps some other Latin American states would do the same. If the mandatories also opposed us, the possibilities for action contrary to our views would be considerable. Moreover it takes only one-third plus one to block the approval of a trusteeship agreement itself.
- See footnote 48, above.↩