501.AB/8–2946

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Director of the Office (Hiss)

Jack Thompson66 talked to you this morning about the proportion of the United States contribution to the United Nations and I understand you plan to take this up with Mr. Acheson67 at 10:30 this morning. The papers on this subject are attached but the principal points may be summarized as follows:68

[Page 462]
1.
The Committee on Contributions was opposed to establishment of any ceiling.69
2.
The Committee recommendation based on capacity to pay would call for a contribution of 49% for the United States, 11% for the United Kingdom, 9% for the U.S.S.R., 4% for France, and 2% for China.
3.
However, the Committee gave three other scales calling for contributions of 25, 30 and 35% by the United States.
4.
I understand Mr. Appleby’s position is that the United States should be prepared to pay 30 or 35% plus 5% for war damages.
5.
The OA recommendation calls for a payment of 30 or 35% including war damages.

I personally feel very strongly that our initial position should be that we would be willing to make a contribution of 25% and that we might recede to 25% plus 5% for war damages but no further, and I [Page 463] think this is the position Mr. Acheson should take in his discussion with Mr. Appleby today.70

On the matter of clearances I think we should discuss this matter with Don Russell and with or through him the Appropriation Committee Chairmen if they are in town. Subsequently the matter should, of course, be discussed with the Congressional members of the Delegation which should be given discretion to recede beyond what I suggest above as may be determined by the circumstances.

I think you understand the theory of “war damages”. This means that for a period of a few years the United States would pay a slightly higher proportion while some of the other countries recovering from the war would pay a somewhat lower percentage.

  1. Elwood N. Thompson, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
  2. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State (Acting Secretary at this time).
  3. Papers not attached. At the London session the General Assembly had appointed a standing expert Committee on Contributions of ten members and directed it to establish for the consideration of the General Assembly at the second part of the first session a contributions scale for apportionment of the expenses of the Organization amongst the Member States. This was on the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission which had met at London during November and December 1945 (see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, pp. 1433 ff.).

    The General Assembly in setting up the Committee on Contributions instructed it to base the recommended quotas on the formula set forth by the Preparatory Commission in its Report (United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Commission, December 23, 1945, p. 108):

    “The expenses of the United Nations should be apportioned broadly according to capacity to pay. It is, however, difficult to measure such capacity merely by statistical means, and impossible to arrive at any definite formula. Comparative estimates of national income would appear prima facie to be the fairest guide. Other factors which should be taken into account in order to prevent anomalous assessments include the following:

    (a)
    comparative income per head of population, e.g. in the case of populous states with low average income per head;
    (b)
    temporary dislocation of national economies arising out of the second world war;
    (c)
    the ability of Members to secure foreign currency.

    Two opposite tendencies should also be guarded against: some Members may desire unduly to minimize their contributions, whereas others may desire to increase them unduly for reasons of prestige. If a ceiling is imposed on contributions the ceiling should not be such as seriously to obscure the relation between a nation’s contributions and its capacity to pay. The Committee should be given discretion to consider all data relevant to capacity to pay and all other pertinent factors in arriving at its recommendations.”

    The Committee membership was made up of ten experts from as many states; they were not, however, representatives of the governments of those states. Mr. Paul H. Appleby was the member from the United States. For General Assembly action concerning the Committee see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings [hereafter cited as GA(I/1), Plenary], pp. 621 ff., annex 19, especially pp. 627, 640, 641, and 448.

  4. United States policy had favored the establishment not only of a “ceiling” (maximum contribution) but also a “floor” (minimum contribution). This policy was formulated in the Department during September and October 1945 for the guidance of the United States Representative on the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission (Stettinius), and was communicated to Mr. Stettinius in telegram 8786, Preco 149, October 4, 1945, to London, which telegram read in pertinent part:

    “We agree that countries should contribute on the basis of a rough approximation of their capacity to pay as indicated by their net national income, per capita income figures for the latest available pre-war year, and other pertinent factors such as the effect of the devastation of war on capacity to pay during the next few years. The capacity to pay principle should be modified by imposing both a ceiling and a floor to contributions. The minimum contribution might be fixed at $5,000 since without such a provision the smallest countries would contribute only very trivial amounts. It is thought that the membership of UNO should be worth at least $5,000 for any country. As to the ceiling, we are not prepared to make any definite suggestions before consultation with Congressional leaders. It should be noted, however, that if no ceiling provision were adopted, the United States’ share might be approximately 45 percent of the total. Although such an assessment would be equitable according to capacity to pay, it would be undesirable for any one country to have such a dominant position in the financing of UNO. …”(500.CC(PC)/10–445)

    When the Executive Committee failed to make “a positive recommendation in favor of imposing either a ceiling or a floor on contributions”, the Department cabled its disapproval to the Acting United States Representative on the Preparatory Commission (Stevenson) in telegram 10176, Preco 305, November 21, 1945, to London. Mr. Stevenson was informed that “We continue to consider it essential that the formula of capacity to pay be modified by applying both a ceiling and a floor, and we favor the recognition of this principle by Preco [the Preparatory Commission].” (500.CC(PC)/11–2145 and FW 500.CC(PC)/11–2145)

    The Committee on Contributions began its meetings in June. In May a paper had been prepared in the Department entitled “Scale of Contributions for Apportionment of United Nations Expenses”, to be transmitted informally to Mr. Appleby. This memorandum is missing in the Department’s files, but it may be presumed that it embodied the principle of a floor and a ceiling for contributions in light of previous and subsequent developments. (Memoranda, the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Associate Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Stokes), May 17, and Mr. Marion W. Boggs of the Division of International Organization Affairs to the Chief of the Division (Sandifer), June 3, both File No. 501.AB/6–346). The Committee’s work on this question was substantially done by this date (August 29), although its Report was not formally completed until September.

  5. This view had been expressed with equal emphasis by Mr. Ross in an internal SPA memorandum dated April 24 concerning informal talks being held at that time on this problem between budget officers of the Department and officers of the Bureau of the Budget at the White House. “… the contribution of the United States should be limited to a maximum of 25%. Although our share might be very considerably larger based on ‘capacity to pay’, there are two main objections to increasing our contribution above the 25% which was set for the working capital fund. First, from the international point of view it does not seem to me appropriate for the United States to carry any larger proportion. A contribution larger than 25% would give the United Nations too much of the flavor of being an American organization. Second, our Congress is already conditioned to the idea of a 25% contribution and I doubt very much whether they would take kindly to an increase.” (SPA office lot files, Lot 54–D510, Box 20013, “R” folder) Mr. Ross’ statements regarding a United States quota of 25% refers to the United States share in the provisional scale of contributions established by the General Assembly at London on the basis of the Food and Agriculture Organization quota formula (see GA(I/1), Plenary, pp. 623, 448).