501.AA/8–1446: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
urgent
[Received August 14—2:36 p.m.]
491. I had a conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan in my office this morning, at which Lawford (UK) and Raynor and Popper (USdel) were present.
Sir Alexander said that he regarded Albania and the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) as clearly unsuited for membership at this time. He told me that his instructions were to oppose the admission of these two states. He felt that if the Russians in retaliation vetoes other candidates, it should be left to them to explain the reason for their actions in the Security Council. Cadogan said that he was not prepared to approve any attempt to make a deal with the Russians. He thought that if any horse-trading was to be done, Gromyko should start it. He had no objection to our talking with the Russians, however, and asked to be informed of the results.
I told Sir Alexander that, in previous conversations with Gromyko, the latter had agreed that political considerations were in fact involved in this matter. I argued that we were desirous that the four European neutrals—Sweden, Iceland, Portugal, and Ireland—should be admitted to the United Nations at this time, and that we would be willing to agree to the admission of Albania and the MPR in order to facilitate the admission of the neutrals. I said that if the neutrals were not admitted now, it might be more difficult to bring them in [Page 425] later, especially since the Soviets might couple their admission with a demand for admission of the Baltic Soviet republics or other unacceptable conditions.
Cadogan reiterated that his present instructions did not permit him to agree to the admission of Albania and the MPR. He thought that the odds were 100 to 1 that the Soviets would not agree to our proposal. Replying to my argument that we might have to pay a higher price in the future, he said he felt he could not yield to that kind of blackmail.
It was his personal opinion that possibly the British might agree to postpone consideration of the Albanian application for one year, but that it would probably be many years before conditions in Outer Mongolia were sufficiently advanced and sufficiently clear to the outside world to permit the admission of the MPR. He said that it was obvious that the Soviets were prepared to link together the applications of Mongolia and Trans-Jordan, and appeared to feel certain that the Soviets had now closed the door to their approval of Trans-Jordan.
We then discussed the procedures to be followed by the Committee. The British feel that it will be impossible to reach decisions on the attitude of the Committee as a whole on the various applications. They would favor a report in which each applicant was considered separately, and in which the various opinions held with regard to each were set forth.
As Sir Alexander prepared to leave, I pressed him as to what his attitude would be if the Russians agreed to admit all the applicants on the basis I had suggested. He replied that in that case he would leave it to London to make the decision and that he could not honestly say that he liked the position we were taking. However, it is my impression that in the last analysis he would reluctantly agree to a settlement on the basis which I proposed to him.