Office of the Historian

501.AA/6–2846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

secret
Washington, June 28, 1946—7 p.m.

115. In view of the imminence of your talks with the representatives of the Soviet Union, China, and France on membership, we are outlining below certain suggestions for your guidance and on which we would welcome your comments or other suggestions.

1.
The major objective is to find out if vetoes must be expected on specific applications. In this connection, the Soviet Union is probably the key. Hence, we suggest talking first with Gromyko.
2.
The result of that talk will indicate the line to take with others and our comments are made with special reference to your talk with Gromyko.
3.
We feel it is very important that the impression of a concerted U.S.–U.K. approach be avoided. It would follow that you and Cadogan should not call together for the talks. We believe preferable for you to persuade Cadogan that it would be wise for you to handle the first round of talks by yourself seeing each representative separately but as nearly simultaneously as possible.
4.
You should lay on the table Sweden, Iceland, Afghanistan, Switzerland, Portugal, Eire, Italy, and Austria as states in our opinion eligible and well qualified for admission at this time. You would have to admit that we do not know whether or not all of these states will apply but indicate we are confident at least some of them will.
5.
We think the conversation initially should be pitched on a discussion as to the qualifications of the states as to eligibility and should descend to a bargaining level only as last resort.
6.
We think it would be wise as to above neutrals to refer to Potsdam and assume blandly that they are well qualified to assume obligations of Charter and become members.
7.
Incidentally in mentioning name of Sweden you should, in view of assurance given Eriksson,91 make very clear we are not speaking in any way on behalf of Sweden.
8.
On Italy you should stress cobelligerency and assistance rendered United Nations in war and you could refer to recent liberal revision of Armistice terms.92
9.
On Austria the strongest argument would be that she was a victim of aggression. Reference should of course be made to the Moscow Declaration on Austria.93 You should attempt to avoid a detailed legalistic discussion as to whether Austria under military occupancy has sufficient control over its foreign relations to carry out obligations of membership. You should stress that if occupying powers agree on membership this could be worked out.
10.
During discussion our position on Siam should be outlined. This obviously will present difficulties in French talk. A separate telegram contains our suggestions.94
11.
When Gromyko mentions Albania we feel you should reply at first that while we would like to vote for Albania it is difficult for us to reconcile her failure to give us requested assurances on treaties with willingness to carry out obligations of Charter. If we received the assurances [Page 400] we would have no difficulty. We feel that by taking this line there is a bare possibility it may result in Soviets persuading; Albanians to give requested assurances. If possible, therefore, in first conversation you should avoid conceding on Albania. A separate telegram gives information on types of treaties involved which should be mentioned to Gromyko with the explanation that they are of a type beneficial rather than detrimental to Albania in its foreign relations.
12.
Likewise, we think it desirable to defer conceding on Mongolia until after Gromyko is thoroughly “smoked out” and you can evaluate the situation. In Chinese talk you should make a special point of ascertaining their reaction on Mongolia and on Siam.
13.
We leave entirely to your discretion when you should indicate we are willing to go along on satellites if raised by Gromyko.
14.
If Gromyko or others inquire with whom we are talking, you should reply first with the permanent members and later with other members of Council in order to avoid possible suspicion of Big Five deal. If he asks why, it would probably be appropriate to explain that we have indications that some states which would like to apply are holding back because of fear of a veto but this should be left up to your discretion to be determined on spot in light of tone of conversation.
15.
Material in your membership book will provide you with argumentation on the countries we consider presently qualified.
16.
In answering questions on other countries, you should follow information in our 108 of June 24.
17.
If you desire Raynor to assist in conversations Dept. will make him available.
18.
You will note these comments assume agreement with British on Italy, Austria and satellites and if such agreement not reached would of course be changed accordingly.
Acheson
  1. Herman Eriksson, Swedish Minister to the United States.↩
  2. For documentation regarding this subject, see vol. v, pp. 825 ff.↩
  3. For text see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 761.↩
  4. Telegram 114, June 28, not printed.↩