Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/C.1/43

United States Delegation Position Paper

confidential

[New York,] November 12, 1946.

United States Position on Voting in the Security Council With Special Reference to the General Assembly Items on This Subject

The United States position may be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States regards the principle of unanimity as of the highest importance for the success of the United Nations and the reflection of this principle in the Yalta voting formula (Article 27 of the Charter) as valid.

(2) The United States considers that hasty amendment of constitutional documents on the basis of inadequate experience is unwise and may be harmful.

(3) Accordingly, the United States is neither proposing nor supporting an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter.

(4) Likewise the United States is opposed to the calling of a general conference to amend the Charter in respect to the so-called “veto”.

(5) The United States hopes that the five permanent members may find it desirable at some time in the future in full agreement among themselves and with other members to support modification of the unanimity requirement in its application to matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter relating to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

(6) The United States believes that the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree upon important issues before the Council frustrates the carrying out of the principle of unanimity and leaves unsettled questions, the settlement of which is required in the interest of peace and security; and that the responsibilities imposed upon the permanent members of the Security Council under the Charter require them to make every effort to reach agreement on substantive questions before the Security Council.

(7) The United States considers that the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree upon any substantive question before the Council must not and cannot be construed to relieve any state, large or small, of its obligations under the Charter and under the law of nations.

(8) The United States believes that many of the difficulties encountered in the Security Council during the first year of its operations have been due to lack of certainty and differences of opinion regarding the practical application of the voting formula adopted at the San Francisco Conference. Consequently, the United States hopes that the voting formula may be clarified in the light of experience and practical need. In this connection the United States suggests that it would be helpful to implement Article 27 of the Charter and the Four-Power statement through the adoption by the Security Council of appropriate rules of procedure.

(9) Specifically the United States believes that the Security Council should give most careful attention to the development of practices and procedures that will carry out the assurances contained in the statement made by the Four Powers at San Francisco that under the Yalta formula decisions of the Security Council not involving the taking of “direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to peace, removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace,” will be governed by a procedural vote under Article 27(2). This should make it easier for the Council to arrive at satisfactory decisions relating to the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

(10) The United States believes that the consideration in the General Assembly of the question of voting in the Security Council should be directed toward focusing the issue on the general objectives set forth above, and that the discussion of specific proposals for clarification of the procedures and practices of the Security Council should as far as possible be avoided. It may be that at a later stage of the Assembly debates the United States may wish to support a Resolution containing the substance of paragraphs (6) through (9).

(11) The United States position with respect to voting in the Security Council does not affect the position taken by the U.S. Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission on the problem of the application of the “veto” in the international control of atomic energy. The United States has already made clear that its proposals do not affect the general requirement for unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.