Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/C.1/20

United States Delegation Working Paper

secret

[New York,] November 4, 1946.

U.S. Position on General, Assembly Agenda Items Relating to Voting in the Security Council⁸⁹

(Draft of Memorandum Which It Is Proposed To Hand to the Delegations to the General Assembly of the Other Four Permanent Members of the Security Council)

The U. S. Government attributes importance to the discussion in the General Assembly of the agenda items proposed by the Governments of Australia and Cuba dealing with the voting procedure in the Security Council.

For this reason and because these items necessarily have a special significance for the five permanent members of the Security Council the U.S. Government desires to outline its position on this subject to each of the other permanent members prior to the discussion in the General Assembly.⁹⁰

The U.S. position may be summarized as follows:

(1) The U. S. regards the principle of unanimity as of the highest importance for the success of the United Nations and the reflection of this principle in the Yalta voting formula (Article 27 of the Charter) as valid.

(2) Accordingly, the U.S. does not at the present time favor an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter.

(3) The United States is opposed to the calling of a general conference to amend the Charter in respect to the so-called “veto”.

(4) The United States hopes that the five permanent members may find it desirable at some time in the future in full agreement among themselves and with other Members to support modifications of the unanimity requirement in its application to matters arising under Chapter VI.

(5) The United States recognizes that some of the difficulties encountered in the Security Council during the first year of its operations were due to lack of certainty regarding the meaning of the voting formula adopted at the San Francisco Conference. Consequently, the United States favors the clarification of ambiguities in that voting formula and suggests that a more detailed interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter and of the Four Power statement might be agreed upon along lines set forth below.

(a) Agreement should be reached on a list of procedural matters, which should be as exhaustive as possible, for the purpose of increasing to a maximum the occasions when the question of whether a matter is procedural may be decided by a simple reference to such a list and without a vote. Such an interpretation will eliminate most of the debate over what is a procedural question which now occupies a great part of the Security Council’s time and energy.

(b) In accordance with the clear intent of the Charter, the abstention clause of Article 27 (3) should be interpreted to ensure that a State be unable to serve as a judge in its own cause in any decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52. This would require a State party to a dispute or involved in a situation to abstain from voting on non-procedural decisions in connection with the particular dispute or situation. It would eliminate the distinction between disputes and situations in connection with the Charter injunction of abstention from voting. It would also prevent a permanent member of the Council from rendering that injunction inoperative by casting its vote against a Council determination that a particular state was in fact a party to a dispute or involved in a situation.

(c) The permanent members of the Council should be permitted to abstain from voting on any decision without having such abstention regarded as a negative vote. Thus the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members on a non-procedural decision will be satisfied if all of the permanent members actually voting on the decision, vote in the affirmative. This will enable the Council to reach a decision in cases where one or more permanent members do not choose to exercise the right to vote.

(6) The United States is proposing the texts of three rules of procedure for the Security Council, copies of which, together with brief comments, are submitted herewith.⁹¹ Since the United States Government regards it as inappropriate for the General Assembly to consider or pass upon the texts of rules of procedure of the Security Council, it does not intend to introduce its proposed rules before the General Assembly. It does desire, however, to have them considered by the Committee of Experts of the Security Council at an early date.⁹²

(7) The U.S. position with respect to voting in the Security Council does not affect the position taken by the U.S. Representative on Atomic Energy Commission on the problem of the application of the “veto” in the international control of atomic energy. It has already been made clear that the United States proposals do not attack the general requirement for unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The U.S. will welcome the opportunity for further consultation on this question with the Delegations to the General Assembly of the other states which are permanent members of the Security Council.⁹³

89. In a revision of this paper (document US/A/C.1/20 (Rev.a), November 5, not printed) this title was changed to read: “United States Position on Voting in the Security Council with Special Reference to the General Asssembly Items on This Subject”; the parenthetical statement which follows was eliminated.
90. This paragraph was omitted in the November 5 revision.
91. See document US/A/C.1/18, November 4, p. 322.
92. In the November 5 revised paper this section was changed to read: “The United States is proposing to the Security Council the texts of three draft rules of procedure which embody these concepts and which it hopes can form the basis for constructive action by the Council. Since the United States Government does not believe that the General Assembly should consider or pass upon the texts of rules of procedure for the Security Council, it does not intend to submit its proposed rules to the General Assembly. It does hope, however, that the Security Council will request its Committee of Experts to consider them at an early date.”
93. This paragraph was eliminated in the November 5 revision.