Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/69B

Department of State Position Paper

confidential

[Washington, October 22, 1946.]

United States Position on General Assembly Agenda Items Dealing With Voting in Security Council

I. The Problem^*

The Problem is to determine the United States position with respect to

(1) the following item placed on the agenda of the General Assembly by the Australian Government: “the application of Article 27 of the Charter (dealing with the methods of voting in the Security Council) in the proceedings of the Security Council during 1946, and including exercise and the purported exercise of the right of veto upon Security Council decisions conferred by Article 27 and the circumstances connected therewith;” and

(2) an item for the consideration of the General Assembly proposed by the Cuban Government, which has been placed on the Supplementary List by the Secretary-General, as follows: “A convocatory for a general conference of the Members of the United Nations Organization in accordance with Article 109 of the Charter in order to modify Paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter to eliminate the so-called veto privilege.^†

II. Possible Objectives of Proponents of Veto Discussion

Discussions in the General Assembly may be expected to be directed toward any or all of the four following objectives:

A. An attack on the interpretation of Article 27 contained in the Statement on Voting Procedure issued at San Francisco by the United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, and United States, and agreed to by France, with a view to one or more of the following: (1) the adoption of a resolution denying its validity and binding character, (2) requesting the International Court of Justice to interpret Article 27 of the Charter, (3) inducing the permanent members of the Security Council to modify or abandon the Statement.

B. Charter amendment to eliminate or curtail the veto right in certain limited respects, most probably in relation to (1) pacific settlement under Chapter VI and Article 52(3), and (2) election of the Secretary-General and admission of new members.

C. Charter amendment to eliminate the veto right in its entirety.

D. Convocation of a General Conference to initiate amendments for either total or partial elimination of the veto.

III. Recommended United States Position^‡

A. General Considerations.

The position of the United States Delegation in the Assembly debate on voting in the Security Council should be based on the determination of the United States to make the United Nations an effective international organization and to promote its growth toward greater effectiveness as an instrument of international cooperation. This is the position which President Truman and Secretary Byrnes have repeatedly proclaimed and which the latter again enunciated at Stuttgart⁷⁰ in these words:

“We intend to support the United Nations organization with all the power and resources we possess.”

In carrying out this objective, the United States must continue to recognize that the principle of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council is inseverably linked with one of the basic forces which made possible the establishment of the United Nations,—the coordinated action of the great powers during the last war and in preparation of the organization of the United Nations.

It is believed that the requirement that important decisions of the Security Council shall have the concurrence of all of the permanent members tends to discourage the assumption by the major powers of intransigent positions and to encourage the achievement of unanimity through compromise, the alternative being no decision at all. While the requirement of unanimity tends to increase the difficulties of adopting a clearcut decision by forcing the great powers to endeavor to find a solution acceptable to all of them, it probably produces better results than would a voting formula that permitted an important decision unacceptable to any one of them. In any event, it prevents any tendency for the Security Council on issues of major importance to the Great Powers to become progressively committed to a course of action inconsistent with the continued collaboration of one or more of those Powers in the Security Council.

Therefore, the United States should seek to direct the Assembly debate on the veto toward carefully considered and feasible objectives which will strengthen the United Nations as much as present circumstances permit. Four general factors serve as guide posts in determining the objectives which are feasible:

1. The highest possible degree of unanimity among the permanent members is not only a desirable objective, but is considered essential to the effective operation of the Security Council. Therefore, even if all the other great powers were ready and willing to consent to a voting formula in the Security Council which would permit substantive decisions^§ where the great powers were not unanimous, it is not at all certain that the United States should favor such a formula, since it would be likely to retard the achievement of unanimity. In situations where the principle of unanimity should be maintained, the voting formula itself should be changed to permit decisions which are not arrived at unanimously only if extended experience shows that such change is necessary for the successful operation of the Council.

It is pointed out in the Four Power Statement (Part I, Paragraphs 6 and 7)⁷¹ that the voting formula in the Security Council is in itself a relaxation of the stricter conception of unanimity contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

It can be argued that much of the current criticisms of the veto stem not so much from the legitimate use of the privilege but primarily from its abuse. This abuse has fostered confusion about the primary interests involved.

2. The unanimity rule was meant to be confined in the United Nations to the most vital decisions affecting war and peace. It is important to keep in correct perspective the significance and influence of the requirement of unanimity among the great powers. It does not apply to voting in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council or the Trusteeship Council. It has not been incorporated into the rules or practices of the several Commissions which have been established, including the Atomic Energy Commission, nor into the constitution of any of the specialized agencies.

The approach, therefore, towards a solution of the problem raised by the requirement of unanimity is a gradual extension of the areas wherein the probability of obtaining unanimity, or effective action without it, is high enough to eliminate or diminish substantially the need for a unanimity rule. This extension will be based largely upon experience gained through the operations of the United Nations in fields where unanimity is required.

Article 27 of the Charter which establishes the voting procedure in the Security Council was the result of thorough and carefully planned study in the United States and of extended and difficult negotiation. This has also been the case only to a slightly lesser degree with regard to other Articles incorporating the unanimity rule, such as those relating to amendments, (Articles 108, 109 (2)).⁷² It would appear to be undesirable to alter the Charter in this respect before the advantages and disadvantages of the present provisions had been tested both from the point of view of the interest of the United States and from that of the effectiveness of the United Nations.

3. In accomplishing its objectives, the United States must constantly hear in mind the viewpoint of other nations and particularly of the Soviet Union towards the unanimity principle and avoid action which tends to drive them into grudging, half-hearted partnership or even out of the Organization. All the evidence at hand indicates that the Soviet Union is, if anything, even more devoted to the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council than it was when the Charter was signed. It is clear that the Soviet Union feels that it cannot be assured that the fundamental principle of unanimity will be observed and that it will not be subject to the direction of an opposing majority, in the absence of a voting formula permitting a veto by a permanent member. This being so, the Soviet Government can be expected to resist to the utmost any proposal for even partial elimination of the veto from the United Nations Charter, at least at the present time. The United States position, therefore, should be along lines which will insure the maximum accomplishment with the greatest cooperation from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. The successful functioning of the United Nations requires that all members uphold the Charter in good faith and a spirit of conciliation, and be ever alert to live up to and to defend the purposes and principles of the organization, both within the organization and in all their other international relations. The special responsibilities of the great powers as permanent members of the Security Council impose on them a particularly heavy obligation in this regard. In view of its great responsibilities, the United States, while seeking to understand the views of other states and to obtain maximum cooperation from them, must use its full influence to ensure adherence by all members of the United Nations, and particularly by the other permanent members of the Security Council, to the principles and purposes of the organization and to the spirit of the Charter. No member of the United Nations can be permitted to ignore the fact that, as Secretary Byrnes said on February 28, 1946, “the mere legal veto by one of the permanent members of the Council does not in fact relieve any state, large or small, of its moral obligations to act in accordance with those purposes and principles.”⁷³ Nor does the failure of any organ of the United Nations to take a decision relieve any member of that obligation.

The United States position has been formulated with regard to these general considerations.

B. Preferred Position: Liberalized Interpretation of Article 27 and Four Power Statement.

In view of the general considerations outlined above, the United States Delegation to the General Assembly should take a position designed primarily to promote a liberal interpretation by the Security Council of Article 27 and the Four Power Statement. Concretely it should (1) demonstrate what can be accomplished in this direction and the technique by which this may be done, and (2) endeavor to persuade the Soviet Union and the other permanent members of the Security Council on the one hand, and the lesser powers on the other, to accept such a liberalized interpretation. It should of course be remembered that this objective cannot be achieved by a resolution of the Assembly alone but requires action by the Security Council as well.

This course of action has the great advantage from the point of view of negotiations with the Soviet Union of making previous agreements the point of departure and of expanding gradually therefrom the areas of agreement. It would be a mistake to assume that even with this approach it will be easy to secure the consent of the Soviet Union to a liberalized interpretation of the voting formula. Discussions which have already taken place, particularly in the Security Council Committee of Experts, have demonstrated that not only will the Soviet Government resist liberalization along the lines proposed, but that it actually desires Rules of Procedure which will interpret Article 27 so as to expand the field of decision requiring the concurrence of the permanent members. Also it will remain possible, as long as the Four Power Statement remains in effect, for a permanent member to attempt to invoke Part II, Paragraph 2, of that Declaration in connection with any decision not previously determined to be procedural and thus to attempt to assert a veto in patently unjustifiable cases.^║

In this connection, it should be noted that in the Four Power Statement the four governments expressed their belief that the permanent members would not “use their ‘veto’ power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.” If all permanent members had lived up to this principle, it seems likely that there would have been very little criticism of the voting formula. Criticism has been mainly directed at the abuse rather than the use by the permanent members of their privileged voting position.^¶

In a general way it is possible through a liberalized interpretation of Article 27 and the Four Power Statement to eliminate most of the abuses of the voting formula that have handicapped the operations of the Security Council to date. While the United States is probably not legally bound by the Four Power Statement, almost as much can be accomplished in the direction of improving the operations of the Security Council through interpretation of both Article 27 and the Four Power Statement, as through interpretation of Article 27 without the Four Power Statement. In this connection it should be noted that the Four Power Statement was regarded at San Francisco as a liberalization of the original Yalta Formula even by Mr. Evatt who was its bitterest opponent.

It is believed that the advantages of this method of approach far outweigh any possible disadvantages. Further experience as a result of the operations of the Security Council, however, may open new avenues of approach. The proposed liberalized interpretation of Article 27(3) and the Four Power Statement should, if possible, include all the following points:

(1) Agreement that the abstention clause of Article 27(3) shall be interpreted to prevent a state from being a judge in its own cause in any decisions under Chapter VI and under Paragraph 3 of Article 52.⁷⁴ This would require a party to a dispute or involved in a situation to abstain from voting on decisions in connection with the particular dispute or situation, not only in connection with recommendations and other substantive decisions, but also in voting on any preliminary questions which may be necessary to determine whether a dispute or situation exists and whether the particular state is a party in interest. This was the clear intent of the Charter. It is true that several Articles of Chapter VI distinguish between disputes and situations, while Article 27(3) refers only to a dispute. Nevertheless, there are sound historical and logical grounds for assimilating disputes to situations in so far as Article 27(3) is concerned. Moreover, the spirit of the Charter would be seriously violated if it remains possible for a permanent member to block its own exclusion from voting by insisting either that no dispute exists or that it is not a party, and by vetoing any attempt to decide the contrary.

(2) Agreement that the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members on a non-procedural decision will be satisfied if all of the permanent members actually voting on the decision, vote in the affirmative (i.e., that voluntary abstention from voting by a permanent member—as opposed to the abstention required of a party to a dispute under Article 27(3)—shall not be the equivalent of a negative vote). This will enable the Council to reach a decision in cases where one or more permanent members do not approve of a decision but nevertheless are not prepared to vote against it.^**

(3) Agreement on a clear and exhaustive definition of procedural matters for the purpose of increasing to a maximum the occasions when the question of whether a matter is procedural may be decided without a vote. (Under Paragraph 2 of Part II of the Four Power Statement such decision requires the concurrence of the permanent members). Such an interpretation will not only eliminate most of the debate over procedural questions which now occupies a great part of the Security Council’s time and energy but will reduce to a minimum the opportunities for a permanent member to veto a motion before the Council which it does not like merely by invoking Paragraph 2 of Part II of the Four Power Statement.

It will probably be desirable to secure most, if not all, of the above interpretations through Rules of Procedure. In some instances, however, it might be adequate and more feasible to accomplish the results through the establishment of precedents in the Security Council as a first step rather than through the immediate adoption of Rules of Procedure.

A detailed exposition of the nature and limitations of this approach to the problem of voting in the Security Council, as well as a detailed statement of reasons for believing that the U.S.S.R. consent might be secured to the specific suggestions is contained in the paper on technical aspects of proposals for liberalized interpretation of the Four Power Statement and Article 27, (Doc. SD/S/668A).

C. Position on Possible Objectives of Proponents of Discussion.

1. Modification of Four Power Statement.

The United States, from the viewpoint of logic and without prejudicing its national interests, could not only agree to, but should welcome an interpretation of Article 27 which would restrict more than does the Four Power Statement both the areas to which the veto applies and the possibilities of its abuse. Such an interpretation might provide, for example, that decisions under Articles 33, 36 and 52 (3) of the Charter and decisions to investigate (but not subsequent determinations) under Article 34, should be taken by procedural vote, on the ground that such decisions deal only with procedures of pacific settlement and not with the substance of disputes and situations.

Under the present circumstances, however, the United States should not favor discarding the Four Power Statement. While the Statement does not bind this country legally, it does constitute a moral commitment towards other nations which should not be unilaterally renounced without the most careful consideration.^†† Any statement in the General Assembly by the U.S. of a desire to secure modification would certainly arouse the resentment of the U.S.S.R. and doubtless lead the Soviet Government to question the sincerity of U.S. support of the principle of unanimity, thus increasing the difficulty of achieving that degree of liberalization possible within the framework of Article 27 and of the Statement. It would probably be unfavorably received by some other permanent members of the Security Council.

The United States should therefore publicly declare its intention to stand on the Four Power Statement and should discourage the introduction of any General Assembly resolution attacking it, as this would weaken our tactical position in securing any modification through direct negotiations with the other four powers. It should, if necessary, affirm that its actions in the Security Council will be based on the Statement as the United States interprets that document, regardless of any such resolution unless the statement is modified by agreement of the five powers.

There are a number of indications that the Australian Delegation will probably train its heaviest guns on the Four Power Statement, endeavoring to obtain acceptance as a minimum, of the following positions:

(a) That decisions as to whether a matter is procedural or substantive shall be taken by procedural vote;

(b) That a procedural vote shall govern decisions of the Security Council generally under Chapter VI.

Unless the United States, by strong and effective leadership, keeps the debate properly focussed, there is considerable likelihood that a good many Delegations will rally to the support of any resolution designed to challenge the Four Power Statement on these, and perhaps other, points. Three further points should be borne in mind in this connection. In the first place, the Statement does not contain as restrictive an interpretation of Article 27 as could be devised, or even as the Soviet Delegation desired at San Francisco when they undertook to limit the procedural vote to matters coming within Articles 28 to 32 inclusive and even to contend that discussion of a question should be subject to the veto.

In the second place, the U.S. is not in a position to argue that the Four Power Statement is an unreasonable interpretation of Article 27. While it is true that nearly all members of the U.S. Delegation at San Francisco, including Senators Connally and Vandenberg, expressed themselves in Delegation meetings as opposed to the application of the unanimity rule to pacific settlement, the only point of interpretation of Article 27 insisted on by that Delegation in meetings of the Big Five related to Paragraph 1 of Article 35.⁷⁵ In accordance with the view expressed in the State Department release of March 24.⁷⁶ the American Delegation insisted, in the words eventually incorporated in the Four Power Statement, that “no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention. …”

Thirdly, it must not be forgotten that this Government proposed the formula adopted at Yalta and that the Four Power Statement conforms to all prior public interpretations which the U.S. had made of Article 27.

2. Partial Elimination of Veto through Charter Amendment.

It is quite probable that suggestions will be made in the General Assembly for amendments to the Charter which would eliminate the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent Members in connection with the following types of decisions by the Council:

(a) Election of the Secretary General.

(b) Admission of new members to the United Nations.

(c) Decisions relating to pacific settlement of disputes. (Chapter VI and Article 52 (3)).

In connection with any of such proposals, it must be stressed that no amendment could be adopted without the concurrence of all the permanent members of the Security Council which has been shown to be unlikely. In the absence of previous agreement by all these states, support of proposals for amendment would serve no useful purpose and would probably hamper the attainment of the principal objectives of the U.S. with respect to the United Nations.

The following analysis of such proposals is concerned solely with their relation to U.S. policy objectives and does not deal with their political feasibility. It is quite possible that some of the proposed Charter amendments considered below would not be ratified by the U.S.

As regards the election of the Secretary General, unquestionably the prestige of the office is increased if the incumbent has the support of all permanent members. This is one instance where observance of the unanimity principle is clearly helpful. It does not follow, however that the voting formula should make unanimous action mandatory in this type of matter. The U.S. could readily forego its special voting privilege in this instance in the interest of building up the Security Council, if such a course should meet the tests set forth in the general considerations described in III A above.

The considerations with respect to admission of new members are somewhat similar. It is probably desirable that there should be unanimity among the permanent members on this matter. However, in this instance the requirement of unanimity in the voting formula has resulted in the exclusion from membership of certain applicants in total disregard of the standards for membership set forth in Article 4 of the Charter. Here too, there is no serious reason why the U. S. should not forego its special voting privilege especially since there was far less reason for the Charter to provide for the concurrence of the permanent members on this matter than in other cases.

The objectives of U. S. foreign policy would probably be served by removal of the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council in questions of pacific settlement, possibly including even decisions recommending terms of settlement under Article 37 (2).⁷⁷ One of the grounds on which the U. S. agreed to the requirement of unanimity of the permanent members in this instance was that it would have the effect of forcing the great powers to compromise and harmonize their views. The full measure of the anticipated results has not thus far been achieved.

Another reason was the belief that proposals relating to pacific settlement which did not have the support of all the permanent members would lack the weight necessary to be fully effective and might encourage failure to adhere to recommendations of the Security Council.

The U. S. also took the position which is embodied in the Four Power Statement that “decisions and actions by the Security Council” (under Chapter VI) may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events that might in the end require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of “enforcement” under Chapter VII. The basis of this argument was that effective enforcement action would probably not be possible unless the permanent members of the Security Council had all been in agreement on the decisions taken by the Council prior to the time when enforcement action became necessary. The weakness of this argument is that it will probably be applicable to extremely few cases since the great majority of cases brought before the Council will be disposed of before any question of possible enforcement action arises. On the other hand, a voting formula that requires the concurrence of permanent members may prevent the Council from utilizing fully its machinery for effecting peaceful settlements in a large number of cases, and therefore it is important to strengthen the Council’s powers in this field.

The elimination of the unanimity requirement from the operations of Articles 33, 34, 36, 38, and 52 (3) would not, it is believed, remove any protection from vital United States interests which the veto now affords. The only decisions which the Security Council can take under these articles relate to (1) calling upon states to settle their disputes by peaceful means of their own choice; (2) the finding of facts as the basis for possible Security Council recommendations; and (3) recommendations of procedures and methods of settling disputes. While technical and legalistic changes in the voting procedure of the Council cannot be a really satisfactory substitute for effective reconciliation of conflicting interests, particularly of the permanent members, it should be to the real advantage of this Government, which has taken a position of leadership in the United Nations, if the Security Council were able to arrive with greater ease and dignity at decisions relating to investigation and recommendations of procedure of settlement.

The U. S. can suffer no real injury through elimination of the unanimity requirement from decisions under the articles listed above. Enforcement action under Chapter VII will still require the concurrence of the permanent members.

Article 37 (2) which provides that the Security Council may in certain circumstances “recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate” raises serious questions and it is not clear whether the U. S. would wish to agree to the abandonment of the unanimity requirement with respect to such recommendations. It is conceivable that a majority of the Security Council might recommend terms of settlement in cases in which the U. S. is not a party, which the U. S. did not regard as consonant with its fundamental interests. While there may be no legal obligation under Article 25 to accept and carry out “recommendations” of the Security Council in contrast to “decisions,” nevertheless the moral opprobrium in failing to carry out suggested terms of settlement is considerable.

On the other hand, as previously stated, the highest possible degree of unanimity among the permanent members is considered essential to the effective operation of the Security Council. This is extremely important in connection with the recommendations under Chapter VI, not only for the reasons previously set forth, but also because a recommendation in which only two or three of the Great Powers concurred, even though favored by the smaller states, would not have the force and effect of one supported by all five major powers.

In summary, then, it would appear that the advantages of changing the voting formula with respect to election of the Secretary General, election of members, and pacific settlement of disputes, probably somewhat outweigh the disadvantages. The decisive factors which make it undesirable for the U. S. to favor at this time an amendment of the Charter along these lines are: (1) that it would be impossible to accomplish the desired result in view of the fact that amendments to the Charter require the concurrence of all permanent members of the Security Council; (2) that it would minimize the chances for obtaining concurrence of the Soviet Union in liberalized interpretations of the Charter; and (3) that it might jeopardize the objectives which the principle of unanimity is designed to serve.

3. Elimination of Veto in its entirety through Charter Amendment.

In the event that such an amendment were to be proposed at the forthcoming General Assembly, the United States should oppose it, and should endeavor to concert its efforts to this end with those of the other four permanent members of the Security Council. There are several grounds on which the United States should oppose under present circumstances any proposal for the abandonment of the unanimity rule in its entirety:

(a) The most fundamental ground is the importance of great power unity, which is recognized to be vital to the maintenance of international peace and security. The U.S. had advocated the unanimity requirement and has defended it against attack on the ground that it is an essential basis for the attainment of unity among the Great Powers and thus has a practical value more than offsetting all difficulties attaching to it. Elimination of the unanimity rule might well increase rather than diminish basic disagreement among the Great Powers.

It is also clear that if a grave conflict between the Great Powers should occur, the United Nations itself could not by enforcement measures prevent major hostilities. Consequently, the membership and voting provisions of the Security Council do not directly bear on the issue of the effectiveness of enforcement measures against a great power.

The elimination of the unanimity rule with respect to enforcement action would not alter in any real sense the special status which the Great Powers now have with respect to military matters. As Mr. Stettinius stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

“The Charter does not confer any power upon the great nations which they do not already possess in fact. Without the Charter the power of these nations to make or break the peace would still exist.”

At present the United Nations has no military forces at its disposal. Even when provision of forces is made in accordance with Article 43, these forces will not be able to carry out against one of the three Great Powers a Council decision to take enforcement action. Probably not even a decision against France or China could be enforced. While it is conceivable that the Council could enforce decisions against certain smaller states despite the refusal of one of the permanent members to agree to the decision, it is unlikely that the rest of the Council would be prepared to take the risk of carrying out enforcement action against such a state over the determined opposition of a permanent member which regarded its vital interest as adversely affected.

Even if, under such circumstances, enforcement action were not actively resisted, it might well be ineffective. It is logical to assume that the Security Council, having decided to use force, would wish to make use of the forces of the Great Power nearest at hand. It is unlikely that a great power would place its forces at the disposal of the Council to carry out a decision it did not approve. Yet, it is quite possible, that under the assumption that the Security Council would wish to use the forces of the Great Power nearest at hand, the forces of this power would be the logical, if not the only ones, that the Security Council could effectively utilize.

Some day the armaments of the Great Powers may be reduced to a level which would make possible enforcement action against any one of them. Quite aside, however, from the factor of military potential, which is independent of the size of forces in being, is the fact that effective regulation of armaments cannot be attained except as a consequence of, or as an accompaniment to, mutual confidence among the Great Powers. This in turn depends upon their ability to attain agreement on major issues. Elimination of the veto on enforcement action would doubtless lessen the chances of Great Power agreement, rather than the contrary; hence, it would render effective regulation of armaments even more remote than at present.

The unanimity rule is designed to facilitate such agreements, and should also facilitate rather than impede the development of an effective system for the regulation of armaments.

(b) The U. S. Government is not in a position to consider at the present time a change in the Charter whereby the concurring vote of the U. S. would be unnecessary to a decision of the Security Council involving enforcement measures in which U. S. forces or economic instrumentalities would be required to participate. Apart from the arguments presented in (a) is the fact that the whole course of development of this Government’s position on voting and the debates on the ratification of the Charter show that the Senate regarded the veto as essential in these respects. Moreover, it is open to question whether the American people would in the last analysis support such a step at this stage of international relations.

(c) The U. S. would not now be prepared to accept an amendment of the Charter which would modify the unanimity rule with respect to strategic areas placed under trusteeship.

(d) It is improbable that the U. S. would care to forego the requirement for concurrence among the permanent members of the Security Council in the ratification of amendments to the Charter which might increase the obligations of membership.

(e) The U.S. would have to give the most careful consideration to the effect of the elimination of the unanimity rule on the Monroe Doctrine and on the relations between the Security Council and the Inter-American system, particularly in the light of the Act of Chapultepec and its implementation in the forthcoming Rio Conference.⁷⁸

4. Cuban Proposal for General Conference To Amend or Eliminate the Veto

There is no reason why the U. S. Delegation should oppose placing the Cuban proposal on the agenda of the Assembly. The U.S. could appropriately suggest, however, that the item should be coupled with the Australian proposal so that the two may be considered at the same time. This is especially desirable since the Cuban proposal permits a consideration of only one phase of the problem, while the Australian proposal permits the discussion of all phases of the problem including the particular question raised by the Cuban proposal.

Technically also, it would be possible to amend the Charter either to limit or eliminate the veto under Article 108 without convoking a conference. There seems to be no reason to believe that more could be accomplished through a conference pursuant to Article 109 than through the procedure for amendment provided by Article 108. The U.S. should therefore oppose the holding of such a conference for this reason, as well as for the reasons set forth above applicable to all proposals to amend Article 27 of the Charter.

1. This paper deals with the question of the veto as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly in respect of voting in the Security Council. It does not touch directly on the problem of the application of the veto in the control of atomic energy. [Footnote in the original.]
2. The Cuban representative proposed an additional item to the General Assembly agenda calling for a general conference of the United Nations members to review the Charter. It is understood that this was in effect a reiteration of their original proposal and not designed to enlarge its scope. [Footnote in the original.]
3. The United States should early in the debate make its whole position known. The various points set forth in this section being interrelated, the United States position would suffer serious distortion unless stated as an integral whole. [Footnote in the original.]
70. For text of address delivered by Secretary Byrnes in Stuttgart, Germany, on September 6, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1946, pp. 496 ff.
71. Certain decisions of the Council under Chapter VI, now requiring the concurrence of all the Permanent Members might well be adopted by an unqualified majority of any seven members without affecting the objectives set forth herein. See C, 2 infra. [Footnote in the original.]

71. These paragraphs read: “6. In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to decisions of the League Council. Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by the unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of parties to a dispute under Article XV of the League Covenant. Under Article XI, under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute.

    “7. The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system, non-permanent members of the Security Council individually would have no ‘veto’. As regards the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had. The formula proposed for the taking of action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity.”

72. Article 108 deals with the amendatory process when the amendment is effected by the General Assembly; Article 109(2) when the alteration is made by a “General Conference” for which provision is made in the first section of the article; both procedures required the assent of all the permanent members of the Security Council.
73. This statement was made by the Secretary in the course of an address to the Overseas Press Club at New York, and broadcast over the radio network of the National Broadcasting System.
74. Part II, Paragraph 2 reads as follows: “In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” [Footnote in the original.]
75. For discussion of abuses of the voting formula, see paper entitled Use of Veto in the Security Council of the United Nations (Background Book), and The Unanimity Principle in Theory and Practice, pp. 8 to 14, and Annex A (Position Book). [Footnote in the original. These “books” are found in the IO Files.]
74. Paragraph 3 of Article 52 reads: “The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangement or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.”
75. This may be an extremely difficult position to maintain technically. Although the English text of Article 27(3) provides for “the concurring votes of the permanent members”, the text of the Charter in Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish translated literally requires “the concurring votes of all the permanent members”. Furthermore, at San Francisco the United States Delegation expressly interpreted the English text in the same manner, i.e., as if the word “all” were included, and hence contrary to the present proposed position. See History of the Voting Problem p. 49. [Footnote in the original.]
76. See paper on Legal Status of the Declaration of the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments. Doc. SD/A71A. [Footnote in the original.]
75. Article 35 of the United Nations Charter states: “1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. 2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter. 3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Article 11 and 12.”
76. For text of press release, a statement by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew entitled “Operation of the Proposed Voting Procedure in the Security Council,” see Department of State Bulletin, March 25, 1945, p. 479.
77. This reads: “If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.”
78. For the Act of Chapultepec and the Rio Conference, see footnote 20, p. 130.