Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: SD/A/51 (Minutes 7)

Minutes of the Seventh Meeting on General Assembly Preparations With Senator Austin, Department of State, September 11, 1946, 11 a. m.

September 11, 1946, 11 a.m.

top secret

Present:	Senator Warren R. Austin
	Bernhard B. Bechhoefer
	William Dawson
	Everett Drumright
	Charles Fahy
	Dorothy Fosdick
	Alger Hiss
	Joseph E. Johnson
	Hayden Raynor
	William Sanders
	Durward Sandifer
	Isaac Stokes
	Elwood Thompson
	George Wadsworth
	Charles Yost

General Assembly Agenda Items Dealing With Voting in Security Council

Mr. Ross stated that the purpose of this meeting was primarily to consider the approach which would be used in consideration of the problem of veto rather than the conclusions. The discussion in the meeting should center around the draft of a proposed position paper and Senator Austin’s memorandum of September 9.⁶⁰ Mr. Ross stated that two factors must constantly be borne in mind:

1. That the discussions must be centered around the two specific proposals before the General Assembly—the Australian proposal and the Cuban proposal.

2. That since the veto problem will not be settled in this session of the General Assembly, a broad approach must be made to the specific agenda items and their relation to the future development of the United Nations.

Senator Austin stressed that in public discussion of the veto question the emphasis had been wrong; that the affirmative problems of prevention of war and peaceful settlement of disputes should be stressed rather than the negative functions of the veto; that the veto merely was one aspect of the principles of voting which were in turn only phases of the broader subject of the prevention of war and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Mr. Ross indicated that the general line of Senator Austin’s approach was the same as the approach that had been taken in the Department of State.

Legal Effect of Four Power Statement

Mr. Johnson suggested that consideration of Senator Austin’s memorandum and the draft position paper raised the important problem of the legal status of the Four Power Statement. Senator Austin thought that the statement was morally but not legally binding on the Members of the United Nations that subscribed to it. Mr. Fahy suggested that the Four Power Statement, while not legally binding on the U.S., should be departed from reluctantly and should be given great weight as a statement of U. S. policy.

Senator Austin suggested that other statements of other Members of United Nations,—for example, a British statement which he quoted—should likewise be given weight as interpretations of the Charter and particularly as interpretations of problems where the Four Power Statement itself was ambiguous.

Mr. Ross summarized his impression of the views of Mr. Benjamin Cohen on the Four Power Statement and the general subject of the development of the Security Council. He stated that Mr. Cohen regarded the Four Power Statement in the nature of “dicta” concerning interpretation of the Charter which can be modified as the development of the world situation requires. Mr. Cohen did not consider the Charter as a static instrument the interpretation of which cannot be changed with development in world affairs. He believed that the Security Council would from time to time be given powers far beyond the specific limits of the Charter. An instance of such development would be the authority given to the Security Council with reference to the Government of Trieste.

Mr. Ross added his own view that future development is as important as past precedents in the interpretation of the Charter.

(It was agreed that a further paper be prepared on the specific question of the legal effect of the Four Power Statement).⁶¹

Reconciliation of Position on Veto Taken by Mr. Baruch⁶² With the Position To Be Taken Before the General Assembly

Mr. Fahy pointed out a possible conflict between the suggested position of the IS position paper and of Senator Austin’s memorandum that the Charter should not be amended, and Mr. Baruch’s position advocating abolition of the veto in connection with enforcement action in the event of violations of the proposed treaty concerning atomic energy. It was agreed that the U.S. position should be stated in such a manner that it would not be possible to claim that the U.S. opposition at this time to amendment of the Charter provisions on voting would prevent the carrying out of the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Senator Austin stated that the position to be taken before the General Assembly should not interfere with the position taken by Mr. Baruch and should not limit future exceptions to the general voting position to the specific matter of atomic energy.

Possibility of General Assembly Statement Interpreting the Veto

Mr. Thompson suggested the possibility of a General Assembly statement similar to the Four Power Statement interpreting the veto. Senator Austin was impressed with the usefulness of such a statement in magnifying the roles of smaller States in United Nations. Mr. Johnson, although impressed by the importance and usefulness of such a statement, stressed the difficulties of securing agreement on it.

Senator Austin and others felt that the important thing was to get a broad and liberal expression of the Assembly’s view, even though some Members might not agree to the statement. Senator Austin suggested and it was agreed that as a first priority the Department of State should draft a proposed text of such an interpretative resolution.⁶³

Importance of Voting Formula

Senator Austin stressed the importance of the voting formula as set forth in Article 27 of the Charter, and that without this formula, there probably would have been no Charter. He felt that the veto was the smallest element in the voting principles and that stress must be given in all publicity concerning the positive achievements with respect to voting.

Mr. Sanders cited as a parallel the situation in the Inter-American organizations where despite the non-existence of a veto, it has been found desirable to work toward unanimity in order to insure the better functioning of the system. Mr. Wadsworth contrasted the useful purposes of the veto to its abuse. Mr. Ross pointed out that the shifting of emphasis from the negative side of the veto to the possible usefulness of unanimity among United Nations Members should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the greatest accomplishments of United Nations have taken place in one of the organs where there is no veto, the Economic and Social Council.

Present Position on Elimination of the Veto

Senator Austin stated that in his opinion it would not be appropriate to eliminate the veto at this time in connection with problems arising under Chapter VII.⁶⁴ On the other hand, it would be appropriate to take some steps towards eliminating the veto in connection with recommendations under Chapter VI.⁶⁵ For the future after disarmament the number of situations where the right of veto is retained should become progressively less and less. It is to be anticipated that disputes among nations will in the future be dealt with more frequently through the methods of pacific settlement or through the use of the World Court. A tremendous step in this direction was the recent U.S. commitment to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Draft Position Paper

The most important comments concerning the proposed position paper submitted by Mr. Johnson are set forth below. Mr. Johnson requested Senator Austin’s view on the problem of U.S. policy towards elimination of the veto in connection with recommendations of the Security Council pursuant to Article 37(2).⁶⁶ He explained that there was a great deal to be said both for and against elimination of the veto in this situation.

It was agreed that all positions set forth in the paper should be specifically limited to the present time thus leaving the door open for possible future modification of positions.

Senator Austin suggested that the position paper stressed insufficiently the accomplishments of the Security Council to date and presented too pessimistic a picture of the present procedures in the Security Council.

It was agreed after discussion that a brief paper should be prepared to indicate whether or not under Article 25⁶⁷ a Member of the United Nations was under legal obligation to carry out recommendations under the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VI. There was considerable difference of opinion among those at the meeting as to proper interpretation of that Article.

60. Neither printed; the principal points in Senator Austin’s memorandum were discussed at this meeting; for the position paper that finally eventuated, see United States Delegation Position Paper SD/A/C.1/69B, October 22, p. 298.
61. The seven-page document that resulted was serialized in the IO Files as document SD/A/71A and incorporated in a book of position papers entitled “Unanimity Rule and Related Issues”.
62. Bernard M. Baruch, United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; for documentation concerning atomic energy matters, see pp. 1197 ff.
63. No paper as such seems to have eventuated.
64. Chapter VII deals with breaches of the peace, etc.
65. Chapter VI is concerned with pacific settlement of disputes.

66. Article 37 of the United Nations Charter reads: “1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council. 2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.”

    Article 36 reads: “1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties. 3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.”

67. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter reads: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” There seems to be no paper on this subject as such.