IO Files: SD/A/C.1/7

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Special Political Affairs 50

Present Status of Discussions in the Committee of Experts on Voting in the Security Council

The question of voting in the Security Council has been raised in the Committee of Experts on three occasions and has been discussed among members of the Committee of Experts but not formally raised before the Committee on two other occasions. It is convenient to consider this subject by summarizing briefly the discussions that took place on each of these occasions. It must be emphasized that a number of problems arose and a number of positions were taken on collateral issues in connection with the problem of voting which cannot be adequately summarized. For a more complete discussion of the most important problems raised in the Committee of Experts relating to voting, reference is made to a document entitled Compulsory Abstention from Voting under Article 27 (3) of the Charter (SD/S/247).51

Very little progress has been made in the Committee of Experts towards interpreting Article 27. However, considerable progress was [Page 283] made in the development of techniques for interpreting that Article. In general, it was agreed by all Representatives that procedural decisions of the Security Council should be enumerated in the Rules of Procedure. It was further agreed that after as full an enumeration as possible of procedural decisions, the question of whether other decisions of the Security Council were procedural would require the concurrence of the permanent members of the Council.

Undoubtedly, very little agreement was reached in the application of these techniques. For example, no agreement was reached as to the nature of the decision approving reports from the Security Council to the General Assembly. Also while it was recognized that a permanent member of the Council a party to a dispute must abstain from voting on decisions in connection with that dispute, no agreement was reached as to whether or not the alleged party to the dispute must abstain from voting on the preliminary questions as to whether the matter was a dispute or a situation, whether the dispute endangered the maintenance of international peace and security, and whether the State was in fact a party to the dispute. As will be pointed out considerable agreement on most of these problems was achieved among the Representatives on the Committee of Experts other than the Representatives of USSR.

The chief significance of the Committee of Experts discussions is that they indicate the approaches towards consideration of the problem of voting which are most likely to secure support for the United States position. A summary of the most important discussions in the Committee of Experts follows:

I. Security Council Rule of Procedure on Voting

The Committee of Experts recommended in February 1946 and the Security Council adopted the following Rule of Procedure on voting:

“Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.” (Rule 40)

This Rule of Procedure, which is a recognition of the fact that the problem of voting cannot be dealt with summarily, was adopted provisionally by both the Committee of Experts and the Security Council without any substantial discussion.

To quote the Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly (page 47):52

[Page 284]

“There was a full and free exchange of views on this subject in the Committee. It was the view of certain of its members that the Chapter on Voting should contain detailed provisions covering both the mechanics of the vote and the majorities by which the various decisions of the Council should be taken. But since the Committee was not able to draft additional rules of procedure on this subject, it was decided to defer further consideration of the problem to a later date.”

II. “Rule 31” Proposed by Representative of the U.S.S.R.

The greater part of the discussion of voting in the Security Council has centered around the consideration of the so-called “Rule 31” proposed by the Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the Committee of Experts. This proposal, which is contained in S/Procedure/17, is as follows:

Rule 31 proposed by Soviet Representative in S/Procedure/17

Rule 31. Should the Security Council consider a dispute provided for by Article 33 of the Charter, a party to the dispute shall abstain from voting in acordance with paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter.

Should the Security Council consider a situation provided for by Article 34 or any other dispute which does not fall under Article 33, all the members of the Security Council are entitled to participate in voting.

The decision of whether a question under the consideration of the Security Council is of procedural nature and also of whether the question under consideration is a dispute or situation and whether this dispute is of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be regarded as accepted if it is voted for by seven members of the Security Council including the concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

The discussion of the problems raised by this Rule of Procedure which took place between April 15–25, 1946, was extremely extensive and in some instances went far beyond the specific provisions of the Rule. The positions taken by the respective delegates on the four main issues raised either directly or indirectly by the proposed Rule were as follows:

A. Decision of Security Council as to whether a matter is of a procedural nature.

a.
The rule proposed by the U.S.S.R. provides that the decision of whether the question under consideration by the Security Council is of procedural nature shall be by a substantive vote. In view of paragraph 2 of Part II of the Four Power Declaration it would be difficult for the United States to take a contrary position without violating the Four Power Declaration. This is recognized by the United States Representative, S/Procedure/70, page 7. Only Australia and Netherlands suggested that the determination of this question should be by procedural vote. Australia, S/Procedure/71, page 2 and 73, page 3; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4.
b.
In the Four Power Declaration it was contemplated that the area covered by such a rule should be restricted as much as possible through specifying in the Rules of Procedure the types of decisions of the Security Council requiring a procedural vote. The following Representatives have approved of such a procedure:
U.S., S/Procedure/60, page 2; Australia, S/Procedure/60, page 2; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4; Poland, S/Procedure/60, page 3; France, S/Procedure/60, page 3; U.S.S.R., S/Procedure/60, page 4 and 70, page 8; U.K., S/Procedure/60, page 5; China, S/Procedure/70, page 5.

The further enumeration of procedural decisions through Rules of Procedure was deferred in the Committee of Experts until completion of urgently required rules on subjects which were less controversial.

B. Decision of Security Council as to whether a dispute under Chapter VI is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

a.
The U.S.S.R. proposal provides that such a decision should be by a substantive vote. This is undoubtedly in accordance with the discussions at San Francisco. This position was approved by the Representative of China, S/Procedure/61, Rev. 1, page 1 and 70, page 4; U.S., S/Procedure/70, page 4.
b.
However, the U.S.S.R. proposed rule likewise provides that the parties to a dispute shall not abstain from voting unless the dispute falls under Article 33 (i.e., endangers the maintenance of international peace and security). All Representatives excepting the Representative of U.S.S.R. agreed that there is nothing in Article 27 (3) which justifies such distinction in connection with the duty to abstain from voting. The U.S.S.R. position on this question was opposed by the following Representatives:
U.S., S/Procedure/57, page 3; S/Procedure/70, page 7; China, S/Procedure/57, page 2 and 61, Rev. 1, page 3; Egypt, S/Procedure/57, page 3; U.K., S/Procedure/57, page 3; Poland, S/Procedure/57, page 4; France, S/Procedure/57, page 5; Australia, S/Procedure/70, page 5, 71, page 2, 73, page 4; Mexico, S/Procedure/70, page 6; Brazil, S/Procedure/57, page 3. U.S.S.R. defended its position in S/Procedure/57, page 4.

C. Decision of the Security Council as to whether a matter before the Council is a dispute or situation.

a.
In the discussions in the Committee of Experts it is frequently pointed out that the decision of the Council as to whether a dispute or situation exists has consequences in addition to those relating to the problem of abstention from voting. (S/Procedure/73, pages 4 and 5) for example, a State which is a Member of the United Nations may, under Article 32, participate in the discussion in the Security Council of a dispute but not of a situation. (Probably a State involved in a situation could be invited to participate in the discussion of the Security Council under the general powers of the Council or in certain circumstances under Article 35. See paper on Technical Aspects of Proposals for Liberalized Interpretation of Four Power Statement and Article 27, page 6). Likewise, under Article 33, the parties to a [Page 286] dispute are required to seek a solution by means of their own choice. This requirement does not extend to the parties involved in a situation. The U.S.S.R. position is that the determination of whether a dispute or situation exists should be by a substantive vote. The Representatives of France and the United States have tentatively acquiesced in the U.S.S.R. position except on the question of abstention from voting (France, S/Procedure/60, page 7, 61, Rev. 1, page 6; U.S., S/Procedure/70, page 7). The Representatives of Netherlands and Australia suggested that such a decision might be by a procedural vote (Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4; Australia, S/Procedure/60, page 6 and 73, page 6).
b.
The United States, however, has taken a position that in the interpretation of Article 27 (3) no distinction should be made between disputes and situations—in other words that the term “dispute” should cover “situations”. As is pointed out in the memorandum on the History of the Voting Problem (Chapter on Yalta Conference I, 4, d) and also in the memorandum on the Technical Aspects of Proposals for a Liberalized Interpretation of Article 27 (3) and the Four Power Statement (page 6) it appears that the omission of the word “situation” from Article 27 was inadvertent.53 The United States Representative therefore contended that parties involved in situations as well as parties to a dispute should be required to abstain from voting under Chapter VI of the Charter. The following Representatives have supported this position:
U.S., S/Procedure/60, page 8 and 70, page 7; Australia, S/Procedure/60, page 6, 71, page 2 and 73, page 5; China, S/Procedure/60, page 8 and 61, Rev. 1, page 4; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 3; Mexico, S/Procedure/70, page 6.

D. Decision of the Security Council as to whether a State is a party to a dispute.

This problem is not raised directly by the proposed Rule 31. However, if Rule 31 were adopted, there would be practically no occasion for a vote on the question of the parties to a dispute since an alleged party to a dispute could exercise its veto power at an earlier stage of the proceedings. However, in the event of the adoption of any rule in accordance with the position taken by the United States Representative, this problem would arise.

In the discussions in the Committee of Experts the following Representatives have indicated that the decision of this question should be by procedural vote:

Australia, S/Procedure/73, page 5; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4.

The Representative of China has indicated that the decision of this [Page 287] question should be by a substantive vote with alleged parties to the dispute abstaining from voting. S/Procedure/61, Rev. 1, page 4.

The United States has taken no definite position on this matter in the Committee of Experts except as hereinafter set forth in connection with the so-called “Rule C”.

[Here follows discussion of another aspect of the voting problem, unrelated to Article 27.]

IV. Proposed Rules B and C.

In Amdel 18 of April 13, 1946 the Department communicated to the United States Delegation two proposals for Rules of Procedure on the subject of voting. These proposals were as follows:

Rule B. “In announcing the results of a procedural vote, the President shall indicate the number of members voting in favor of the proposed action and shall state whether the proposed action has been taken.

“In announcing the results of a substantive vote, the President shall indicate the number of members voting in favor of the proposed action, and the permanent members concurring; the number of members voting against and the permanent members voting against; and the number of members abstaining and the permanent members abstaining. Unless a permanent member abstaining, affirmatively indicates that it does not concur, it shall not be deemed to have exercised its veto right, but shall be deemed to be willing to concur without voting on whatever action the Council may take by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the other permanent members.”

In Amdel 19 of April 13 the United States Representative was authorized to discuss Rule B under the following circumstances:

“We are not prepared to recommend Rule B set forth in the earlier telegram as the firm position of the U.S. Government. However, it can be used to promote discussion in the Committee of Experts or elsewhere and may be helpful in your efforts to persuade the other members to the view that a permanent member may abstain from voting in the Council without exercising a veto.”

Rule C. “In accordance with Article 27 (3) a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting on non-procedural matters, and in announcing any vote on any such matter the President shall record any member which he deems to be a party to a dispute within the meaning of Article 27 (3) as not voting. If any member of the Council appeals a ruling of the President either that a member shall abstain or shall not abstain from voting, the President’s ruling may be overruled by a procedural vote.”

In Amdel 19 the United States Representative was given the following instructions concerning the proposed Rule C:

“We suggest that Rule C be used as a first step in discussion only if the Committee determines to proceed to the immediate consideration [Page 288] of Rule 31, proposed by the Soviet Representative or another specific rule dealing with other problems set forth in Rule C.”

(Rule 31 is quoted on page 2 of this memorandum.)

The report of the United States Representative concerning these proposed rules is set forth as follows in Telegram 74 of April 15, 1946 from New York:

“In the course of Sunday, April 14, and Monday, April 15, U.S. Representative Johnson informally and confidentially presented copies of the suggested U.S. revision of Article (A)—(S/Procedure/51)—* relating to announcement of votes to his U.K., China, U.S.S.R. and French colleagues on the Committee of Experts, in the order given.

“In each case Johnson made it clear that this was a suggestion on which the U.S. would like comments. He referred specifically to the two discussions in San Francisco on this point among Representatives of the Big Five, and explained that this background was the reason for showing copies at this time only to Representatives of the permanent members. Lawford and Chaumont made no comment on the substance. Liang thought China would accept the concept of abstention. Stein, while he made clear the need to talk to Gromyko said that he personally was not in favor of forcing a State to vote if it washed to abstain. This is perhaps significant in light of the fact Johnson told Stein in detail of Lavrentiev’s position at San Francisco.

“Johnson also discussed with Lawford and Liang the proposed rule relating to parties to a dispute (Department’s Urtel 18). Both Liang and Lawford had doubts as to whether there was sound legal basis for this procedure. Johnson has not yet had time to discuss this matter with Chaumont and Stein.”

(Lavrentiev’s view at San Francisco was substantially the same as that expressed informally by Stein).

There has been no further discussion of these proposed rules.

V. U.K. Proposal to Define a Dispute

The United Kingdom Representative on instruction showed United States Representative a draft which he proposed to bring before the Committee of Experts, of a suggested Rule of Procedure defining a dispute in such a manner that every matter brought before the Security Council and alleged to be a dispute would in fact be a dispute. The United States opposed the British proposal for a number of reasons, two of which are closely linked to the general problem of voting. First, the United States has taken the position that parties involved in a situation, as well as parties to a dispute, must abstain from voting. If the term “dispute” is defined in the Rules, it would be difficult to assert this position. Second, the United States has taken the position that differentiation should be made between the meaning of “dispute” [Page 289] as used in Article 27, paragraph 3 and as used in other sections of the Charter. Any Rule defining a dispute which failed to make such a differentiation would be inconsistent with the United States position, which recognizes that for the purpose of some articles the determination requires the concurrence of the permanent members of the existence of a dispute.

The Representative of the United Kingdom informed the United States Representative that while he had instructions to bring the matter before the Committee of Experts, he did not wash to do so unless the United States agreed. In view of the United States objections which were communicated informally to the United Kingdom Representative, the proposal was never carried beyond the stage of informal discussions between the two Representatives.

  1. This document, drafted as a briefing paper for the United States Delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly under date of October 2, 1946, sums up the Committee of Experts phase of the Security Council voting question. It is being printed here for purposes of convenience.
  2. This collection of papers is identified in the IO Files as SD/S/247. It is a comprehensive survey of the subject, consisting of six units: (1) introduction, (2) positions taken at San Francisco, (3) positions taken in the Security Council, (4) positions taken before the Committee of Experts, (5) recent (to June 12) memoranda, telegrams, etc., in the Department concerning the United States position, (6) conclusion.
  3. This is an incorrect page citation which should read p. 87 (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Supplement No. 1, “Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. …”). Further, the quotation which follows is out of context; actually, it appeared in the May 13 Committee of Experts Report to the Security Council; see footnote 39, p. 274.
  4. None of these is printed. They are found in the IO Files as documents SD/S/681, SD/S/668A, and SD/A/71A, respectively. They are included also with two other documents in a collection of position papers entitled “Unanimity Rule and Related Issues” which was prepared by the Department for the United States Delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, scheduled to meet in New York in the fall of 1946.
  5. Article A was a proposed Rule of Procedure requiring the President to announce the results of voting in the Security Council. [Footnote in original]
  6. Amdel 18 of April 13, 1946—previously quoted. [Footnote in the original.]