501.BC/5–2946: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Stettinius ) to the Secretary of State

secret

251. There follows the substance of a memorandum of conversation regarding voting in the Security Council, which took place on May 28, 1946, between Cadogan, accompanied by Lawford and Gore-Booth,40 [Page 275] and myself, accompanied by Noyes, H. V. Johnson41 and J. E. Johnson.

“Following discussion of the Iranian question (which is recorded in a separate memorandum from Mr. Noyes), Sir Alexander raised the question of rules relating to voting in the Security Council. This had been one of his objectives in requesting a meeting. In the ensuing discussion the following points were brought out:

1. Determination of Procedural and Substantive Decisions.

With respect to the Soviet proposal for a rule providing that the decision as to whether a question is substantive or procedural should be taken by a qualified vote, J. E. Johnson restated, at Cadogan’s request, the position which he had taken in the Committee of Experts. This was that the Soviet proposal only covered the last paragraph of the statement by the four sponsoring governments at San Francisco, and that it should be read only in context of the previous paragraphs of that statement. J. E. Johnson suggested that an attempt might be made to define those decisions which are clearly procedural and those which are clearly substantive either by means of separate lists or by an indication in each relevant rule as to the manner which the decision is to be taken. Only after this is done, would such a rule as the Soviets have proposed be at all acceptable. Mr. Noyes emphasized this last point by stating that we do not consider that, if a question is raised as to the kind of vote to be taken, the decision must always be a substantive one. There was complete agreement on this point, Sir Alexander remarking that from paragraph 2 of the four power statement itself it is clear that certain decisions will unquestionably be procedural.

There seemed to be, however, considerable doubts as to whether such a solution, as proposed by Mr. J. E. Johnson would be sufficient. Sir Alexander doubted whether it would be possible to induce the Soviets to accept the idea of stating in each rule the nature of the vote to be taken, and it was pointed out that, even if this were done or a list of decisions agreed upon, there still might be too broad an area in which doubt might arise. It was remarked, for example, that however complete the list might be, there would still be room to question, whether that part of the Iranian resolution of April 4, which requested reports from the Soviet Union and Iran, was procedural or substantive.

There was general agreement that this question requires further study.

2. Disputes, Situations and Parties to a Dispute.

[Page 276]

It was pointed out to Sir Alexander that the US feels that a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, the determination as to whether the Council is dealing with a situation or dispute within the meaning of Chapter VI and, on the other, the determination as to who should be considered parties to a dispute within the meaning of Article 27(3). The proposal, which had been informally submitted earlier to the representatives on the Committee of Experts of the other permanent members,42 was again shown to Cadogan and the reason for proposing that the determination of parties to a dispute should be made by a ruling of the President was explained. Cadogan indicated that he felt the acceptance of such a rule would be a very happy solution, but he did not believe that the Soviets could be induced to accept it. He recognized that the history of the Yalta Formula gave grounds for endeavoring to interpret “parties to a dispute” as meaning “parties in interest”. He, nevertheless, felt that it would be hard to speak of “a party to a situation” and expressed serious doubt as to whether the Soviets would accept such a modification of the letter of the charter.

Cadogan then raised the question of the Foreign Office’s proposal for the definition of a dispute.43 It was agreed that the text proposed by the Foreign Office is not satisfactory, and that some attempt should be made to revise it. There seemed to be general agreement, however, that, while it would probably be impossible to formulate a definition of a dispute which would take care of all possible contingencies, a carefully drafted definition might be useful in working toward the desired end of preventing a permanent member from blocking its own exclusion from voting. In the course of this discussion, Gore-Booth, who was familiar with the Foreign Office background of this paper, remarked that he understood one of the purposes of the proposed definition to have been to wipe away the distinction between “situations” and “disputes” and to include all matters in the latter category.

The British representatives having stressed the Foreign Office’s interest in this approach, and requested US criticisms of the paper, they were informed that: (a) the draft did not adequately take care of frivolous claims; (b) it confused the definition of a dispute with that of a party to a dispute; and (c) paragraph (2) dealt only with disputes of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the charter.

It was agreed that Lawford and J. E. Johnson should get together with a view to drafting a new paper which the UK delegation might send to the Foreign Office for comment.

[Page 277]

It was agreed that the two approaches mentioned above—that suggested by the US and that advanced by the Foreign Office—are not mutually exclusive and that both avenues should be pursued.

3. Future Discussions of Voting Rules.

In answer to an inquiry from Cadogan, the US representatives stated that their Government does not favor forcing the issue if agreement cannot be reached in the Committee of Experts. The US believes that this issue should be dealt with very cautiously and that the matter should be allowed to simmer. It was further stated by the US representatives that, in their personal opinions, no good would be served by pushing this issue very hard while the Iranian case is still before the Council. Cadogan and his advisers appeared to agree with both points, although they gave the impression that the Foreign Office may have been leaning toward forcing the issue in open meetings of the Security Council.

There was some discussion of the advisability of informal five-power conversations at the expert level. There was tentative agreement that such discussions should not in any case be held until after the matter had been given further study both by the two delegations in New York and by their respective governments.”

Stettinius
  1. Paul H. Gore-Booth, British Foreign Office expert on United Nations affairs.
  2. Herschel V. Johnson, newly-appointed Deputy Representative of the United States on the Security Council. Mr. Johnson assumed his position on May 8, and upon the resignation of Mr. Stettinius in early June became Acting United States Representative at the United Nations and head of the Permanent Delegation.
  3. Refers to Rule C in telegram 18, to New York, April 13, p. 262.
  4. See attachment in telegram 12, from New York, March 28, p. 253.