501.BC/4–1646: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Stettinius ) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]
secret
urgent

[via Courier]

81. Daily Secret Summary. …

Committee of Experts. …

Discussion on the Soviet proposal (S/Procedure/17) was then resumed and dealt with paragraph three of item three.29 Liang pointed out that this paragraph actually consisted of three parts:

1.
Whether the question under consideration by the Council is one of procedure shall be approved by a vote of seven members of the Council including concurring votes of all the permanent members;
2.
Whether the question under consideration is a dispute or a situation shall be approved by a vote of seven members of the Council including concurring votes of all the permanent members;
3.
Whether the dispute is of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be approved by a vote of seven members of the Council including concurring votes of all the permanent members.

General agreement was reached on point one, since it stemmed directly from the San Francisco declaration by the Big Five.30 However, several members contended that it was not necessary to spell out such a rule since the San Francisco declaration existed to guide the Council.

The Polish representative pointed out that some questions were obviously procedural and others obviously substantive, therefore a rule stating exactly which questions were procedural should be drawn up. Johnson (U.S.) declared he would like to see each question labeled as to whether it was procedural or substantive and the rules of procedure drawn up accordingly. Lawford (U.K.) agreed with this, saying [Page 268] his government would like clear, comprehensive and automatic decisions as to whether voting should be on a procedural basis or not. Hasluck (Australia) said everyone recognized that there was a clear division on most questions as to whether they required substantive or procedural vote, but that the committee should try to reduce the middle ground of doubtful questions to an area as small as possible. These would have to be settled by ad hoc decisions.

The committee then proceeded to the second part of the problem. Hasluck questioned what the political effects of rules drafted on this problem would be, since a party to a dispute, if unscrupulous, could remove a future ban on its participation in voting by using the veto in the early stages of the question. Chairman Liang, speaking as the Chinese representative, reminded the committee that the Yalta formula was set up only with the Dumbarton Oaks documents as a basis. Thus, he cautioned, when the Yalta formula mentions “disputes” it also means “situations.” He added that any widening of the veto power should be guarded against, since the sponsoring powers who made the San Francisco declaration pledged to the smaller nations only limited use of the veto. Adoption of the Soviet proposal’s interpretation could hardly be considered consonant with such a pledge, he reasoned. Johnson subscribed to Liang’s remarks and pointed out that two points were involved: 1) Decision as to whether a dispute or situation exists; and 2) Decision as to who, under Article 27(3) are parties to a dispute. 1) is clearly substantive, but he could not accept such a rule unless it also included a rule on 2).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Stettinius
  1. Paragraph 3 reads: “The decision of whether the question under consideration by the Security Council is of procedural nature and also of whether the question under consideration is a dispute or situation and whether this dispute is of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be regarded as accepted if it is voted for by seven members of the Security Council including the concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Security Council.”
  2. i.e., the June 7, 1945, Statement by the Four Sponsoring Powers; see footnote 96, p. 253.