501.BC/3–2846: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Stettinius ) to the Secretary of State

urgent
restricted

12. For Ross90 and Blaisdell91 from Johnson.92 There is set forth below a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Lawford,93 U.K. Delegation and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson:

I called on Mr. Lawford at the Savoy Plaza on the evening of March 26 at his suggestion to discuss the work of the Committee of Experts.

He began by saying that Sir Alexander’s94 instructions in general envisaged close cooperation with the United States Delegation, and in the course of the discussion, he made this even clearer by reading an instruction relative to the proposed Soviet amendments.

[Here follows discussion of the Russian proposals for Rules 19, 32, and 33, which are not being considered here.]

On the third Soviet proposal,95 Mr. Lawford said that they had requested instructions and legal opinion. He read to me extracts from the legal opinion, which he commented did not help a great deal. He indicated that he thought that Section II (2) of the Four Power statement at San Francisco96 put us in a rather difficult position on [Page 254] this matter. He then read a three point attempt to define the dispute prepared in the Foreign Office which he said he would give me a copy of as soon as he could because on this point particularly they had been instructed to work very closely with the U.S. (No mention had been made of working with anybody else!) Copy attached.

I commented that one idea we had was that it might be possible to get agreement on lumping disputes and situations so that neither the party who brought a dispute or situation to the attention of the Council nor any member or members named as being involved, could vote. This would, of course, have to be adopted by general agreement, presumably by unanimity.

As to procedure for handling this matter, Mr. Lawford said that Cadogan had told him that he thought it important for the committee to discuss the question first and that any high level or Big Five negotiations should only be held after committee discussions. Indicating general agreement with this, I said that while I had not taken this up with Mr. Stettinius yet, I thought the best procedure might be to have a general discussion in the committee, of this issue, and that I was prepared to say that in my opinion such a rule as paragraph 3 of rule 31 would be a violation of the spirit of the Yalta formula.97

Mr. Lawford and I both agreed that it was most important, in dealing with rules which either incorporated or expanded articles of the Charter, to make sure that no violation of the Charter occurred in dealing with them.

(Attachment)

United Kingdom suggestions for rules dealing with the definition of a dispute (prepared in Foreign Office and handed to J. E. Johnson by Mr. Lawford under instructions March 27; see memorandum of conversation between Mr. Lawford and Mr. Johnson on March 26.)

Begins:

(A) Definition of a “dispute”.

In deciding under Chapter VI of the Charter whether a matter brought before the Security Council by a state is a dispute, or a situation, the Security Council shall hold that a dispute arises:

(1)
If state or states bringing the matter before the Security Council, and the state or states whose conduct is impugned, agree that there is a dispute;
(2)
Whenever the state or states bringing the matter before the Council allege actions or intentions of another state are endangering, or are likely to endanger, the maintenance of international peace and security, and state or states which are subject to these allegations contest some or all of the facts or inferences to be drawn from the facts;
(3)
Further, if a state bringing a matter before the Council alleges that another state is violating the rights of a third state and the latter supports the contention of the first state, then the third state shall also be deemed to be a party to the dispute.

(B) Submission of cases in writing.

Any state bringing a dispute or situation before the Security Council shall furnish a full written statement of the grounds of fact and law on which its case is based, for circulation to members of the Council before the discussion is opened. Ends. [Johnson.]

Stettinius
  1. John C. Ross, Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
  2. Donald C. Blaisdell, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs.
  3. Joseph E. Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, detailed to the Permanent United States Delegation to the United Nations as a general technical advisor, and at this time representing the United States on the Committee of Experts.
  4. Nicholas V. Lawford, officer in the United Kingdom mission at the United Nations.
  5. Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative on the Security Council.
  6. Proposed Rule 31.
  7. For the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, June 7, 1945, issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China at the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, and subscribed to by the Delegation of France, see Department of State Bulletin. June 10, 1945, p. 1047. For documentation concerning the San Francisco Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.

    The two parts of Section II of the Four Power Statement read:

    • “1. In the opinion of the delegations of the sponsoring governments, the draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council.
    • 2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”

  8. For the “Yalta voting formula” agreed upon by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at the Crimea Conference on February 7, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 682, or Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1945, p. 394; references in this text are to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference Draft of the United Nations Charter. This formula was incorporated into the United Nations Charter as Article 27.