IO Files: US/A/154
Memorandum by George Wadsworth, Minister to Syria and Lebanon and Adviser on the United States Delegation Staff 65
Subject: Turkey’s Candidacy for Economic and Social Council
The Turkish Ambassador,66 after calling by special appointment this morning on Senator Austin regarding the subject noted above, called on me with a view to asking that I make careful memorandum of his views in the matter.
It was, he said, a matter to which he attached “much importance”; he had spoken “frankly and in all sincerity” with Senator Austin. He had marshalled his ideas clearly and presented them substantially as follows:
“Turkey appreciates highly American support for a seat on ECOSOC; but, in all frankness, there appears to be a contradiction between principle and practice in extending such support. In practice two [Page 236] wrongs have been done Turkey, one before the elections of last Tuesday and the other during the balloting.
“The result of the second wrong was that Turkey was not elected. It had received 30 votes on the first ballot, 33 on the second. Only 3 more were needed for the election. It was American action and only American action which prevented Turkey receiving on the third ballot well over the 36 votes needed for election.
“To explain these two wrongs:
“The first was when in the thinking of the American Delegation, the seat held by Greece was considered to be a European seat. The elections in London had given two seats to Near Eastern countries, Greece and Lebanon. Turkey posed its candidature for the Greek seat. This was told the Department of State several weeks ago. We thought at the time, as apparently did the Department, that Egypt would be the Arab candidate to replace Lebanon.
“What later happened seems to have been that the American Delegation decided not to support Lebanon for reelection and, consequently, to support Turkey for the Lebanese seat and the Netherlands for the Greek seat. But we were supporting an Arab state and the Arab states were supporting us. Obviously this could not be for the same seat. What the American Delegation did in fact do was to support us for a seat which did not exist. It was clear some time ago that an Arab state (Lebanon by choice of the Arab states) would hold that one seat. The American Delegation, in reality though not by intention, voted for two seats, Turkey and the Netherlands, for the Greek seat.
“What then should be American action in the face of the resulting situation? The essence of solution appears to lie in returning the Greek seat to its original setting. If this be done, the American and an ample number of other Delegations will support Turkey. This involves, of course, “dropping” the Netherlands; but, when a wrong is to be righted, the best approach is to return to first truths.
“Senator Austin has said that he will vote for Turkey on the next ballot; but he appears to feel that further than that he cannot commit himself. I feel that, if he adopts my premise, we shall be elected on that ballot; but I do not agree that, if there be need for further balloting, he should not support us all the way through.
“Elsewise, the American Delegation would simply be saving appearances: One vote for us, then a shift to Netherlands. If this were to become known, as these things do become known, the Netherlands election would be assured.
“Let us assume that Byelorussia is elected on the next ballot, with Turkey and Netherlands running a close second and third and Yugoslavia a poor fourth. Then, for the next balloting, Yugoslavia would have to drop out of the race; and it would be between Turkey and Netherlands. That is just the moment when support for Turkey would be most needed; when the issue as to Turkey’s succession to the Greek seat would have to be faced most squarely.
“Now for the second wrong. That was when, after the first two votes, members of the American Delegation spread the word—and I have it from several Latin-American colleagues—that it would vote for Netherlands and Byelorussia on the ground that Lebanon, a Near Eastern State having been elected, it felt it need no longer support Turkey.
[Page 237]“Fortunately, the wrong was partially righted by Mr. Villard’s twelfth-hour intercession;67 but it came too late to do more than bring about the stalemate with which the Assembly was faced. We were saved, but not elected as would assuredly have been the case had the third vote not been prejudiced by the earlier circulated word of American renunciation of support for Turkey.
“What now should be done? The answer would seem to be the same as to the first question, i.e., support Turkey to the end and let it be known that that is to be done. Elsewise, an odd sort of conclusion would seem to be forced on us, i.e., that we would have a better chance of election were we to become a Soviet satellite.
“As a last comment, remember that the Russians asked you to support their satellite candidate. Did you ask that in return they support your candidate Turkey? We do not ask for the Russian vote, nor do we ask you to ask for it; but, were they to give it, it would prove that they can be amiable towards us, and that would be all to the good. We simply submit these thoughts for your consideration.”
I assured the Ambassador that I had taken careful notes of his exposition and would prepare a memorandum thereof for Senator Austin and Mr. Henderson, as he had requested.
- Addressed to Senator Austin, Mr. Ross, and the Political Officers.↩
- Mr. Huseyin Ragip Baydur, Head of the Turkish Delegation.↩
- No documentation is provided here on a sharp disagreement that arose at this time within the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers as to whether Mr. Henry S. Villard (Adviser, Political Officer, and within the Department the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs) was consulted in the Delegation’s decision to drop Turkey from the United States slate on November 19 between the second and third ballots (memorandum by Mr. Popper, November 21, 501.BB/11–2146, and memorandum by Mr. Villard, November 25, 501.BB/11–2546). It is stated in Mr. Villard’s memorandum that Senator Austin’s decision to consult with the Secretary of State by telephone at that time was due to an intervention in the situation by Mr. Villard after he had had a talk with the Turkish Ambassador, a successful intercession in the event as the Secretary directed that Turkey’s name be restored to the United States slate; see telegram 828, November 19, from New York, p. 226.↩