Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

740.0011 P. W./5–2145: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to President Truman ^45a

[Chungking,] 20 May, 1945.

201118. Lord Louis Mountbatten and the diplomatic, commercial and military representatives of the other nations with colonial interests in Asia are endeavoring to obtain the appointment of Lord Louis as Commander under the Generalissimo of all the United Nations Forces in China. Should Lord Louis or any other British Admiral or General receive this appointment in preference to an American it would constitute an overwhelming victory for the hegemony of the imperialist nations and the principles of colonial imperialism in Asia. Such an appointment would also be a distinct setback for America and democracy in Asia.

In dealing with this new development the United States is not in an altogether fortunate position. President Roosevelt definitely refused to appoint an American commander or to assume responsibility when the situation in China appeared to be approaching a collapse. At this point it would be appropriate to read the following messages: President Roosevelt’s messages through me to Chiang Kai-shek dated October 6 [5] and October 18, 1944^45b and my message to the President dated October 13, 1944.^45c The Generalissimo finally declined to appoint Stilwell commander under him of all forces in the Chinese Theater.

I then advised the President that the only issue between him and Chiang Kai-shek was Stilwell, the Generalissimo looked upon Roosevelt as his own personal friend, as China’s greatest supporter and as the world’s greatest leader of the forces of liberty and democracy. The Generalissimo said he would appoint any other American General whom the President would select. The President declined to offer the Generalissimo an American General for this position in his message of October 6, 1944, in the following words: “The current [ground] situation in China has so deteriorated since my original proposal that I am now inclined to feel that the United States should not assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of your ground forces throughout China.”

On October 13, 1944, I said in part to the President: “If you are not going to appoint some other American officer, we should withdraw from China. I do not agree with what you have said in your telegram to Chiang Kai-shek to the effect that America declines to take responsibility in China because we fear a collapse. It is because there is danger of a collapse that America should assume responsibility.” In the same telegram I said to the President, “I recommend that you appoint an American General who will be acceptable to the Generalissimo” and again, “We should accept the responsibility which the Generalissimo wishes to give for an American commander of all ground and air forces in China; for the reorganization of his service of supply, for the training of his army and every other responsibility that he will give American officers with adequate authority.” In that same telegram I advised the President: “If we permit China to collapse, if we fail to keep the Chinese Army in the war all the angels in Heaven swearing we were right in sustaining Stilwell will not change the verdict of history. America will have failed in China. I am convinced that we can keep China in the war and that we can reorganize the Chinese Army through the Generalissimo.”

The President, however, reiterated his position in his message of October 18 in the following words: “As stated in my October 6 message, I do not feel that an American should in the present situation assume responsibility in a command position for the operation of Chinese forces in China. However, I will furnish a qualified officer to serve as your Chief of Staff.” In the same telegram the President went on to separate the India-Burma Theater from China and to establish a separate China Theater. This latter action I consider sound. It simplified command processes by making China a separate theater. In view of existing conditions it is proper to continue China as a separate theater. You will note that the President made a number of other requirements which the Generalissimo freely accepted and expedited.

I pause here, Mr. President, to make a personal statement. The correspondence above quoted shows the great tolerance of President Roosevelt and the latitude he gave me to express my opinions when they were in complete conflict with his own, he knew of course that once he announced his decision I would make it my own and implement it effectively. This is the attitude, Sir, that I now assume toward you.

In the President’s message you can read that while he was against taking responsibility for an American commander in the chaotic condition that then prevailed in China he still placed in the Generalissimo’s hands what I believe to be sufficient American support to prevent the collapse of the Government and to stop the Japanese attack. The action of the President also stimulated the endeavors of Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders in their efforts to work out their own salvation. The President as you will note also advised the Generalissimo that I would remain with the Generalissimo as the President’s personal representative in military affairs. At that time I advised the Generalissimo that with an American Chief of Staff who would also be commander of all American forces in China and an American commander of the Air Forces and an American commander of the Service of Supply and American officers in charge of training and in various other positions of responsibility and with myself near the Generalissimo as representative of the President we could in cooperation with the Chinese still stop the Japanese attack and prevent the collapse of the Chinese National Government and its military establishment. I convinced him that we could also harmonize the relations between the American military establishment and the Generalissimo and between the American Government and the Government of China. The Generalissimo accepted this advice.

After Stilwell had been relieved and the resignation of Gauss had been accepted, many American Army and diplomatic officials returned with them or after them to Washington. About that time there began an inspired attack in the American press and radio against the National Government of China. To some extent this attack had the support of American officials who had been removed in China. The attack was also supported by ideological propagandists and crusaders against the American ideology, some few of whom had been serving as war correspondents in China. Because of this onslaught the American public seemed to have been convinced that the Chinese National Government must collapse. The extent to which this opinion was held is indicated by the fact that two distinguished United States Senators, Chandler and Brewster, who had visited China, issued a statement expressing the opinion that nothing short of a miracle could prevent the collapse of the National Government of China.

While the President refused to appoint an American commander, his policy was still to sustain the National Government of China. Incidentally that has been the policy of the United States since before Pearl Harbor. In Secretary Hull’s statement to the Japanese and in the President’s statement to the Japanese immediately before Pearl Harbor, it was strongly asserted that America was committed to support economically, politically, and militarily the National Government of the Republic of China.^45d This same policy was continued in America’s mutual aid pact–Lend-Lease agreement with China. America has from the beginning until now recognized both as de facto and de jure the National Government of the Republic of China.

Before my first visit to China, President Roosevelt briefed me on all of these matters and directed me to prevent the collapse of the National Government and to harmonize the relations between the Chinese Government and military establishment and the American Government and military establishment, the President was fully advised of all the imperfections and shortcomings of the National Government and of all the difficulties encountered by American officials in their relations with Chiang Kai-shek. In face of all these facts the President said he knew of no other regime or government or of any other leader in China from whom we could expect more support and cooperation than we were receiving from the National Government and from Chiang Kai-shek. During the Stilwell controversy and before the arrival of General Wedemeyer, owing to the disastrous military situation in China I recommended (1) that we remove the B–29 strategical bombers from this area and base them where they could be supplied from the sea thereby relieving over the Hump tonnage which could be used to supply tactical air and ground forces; (2) that the United States use so much of the American and Chinese resources then in India and Burma as would be necessary to stop the Japanese drive in China.

At this time General Wedemeyer who had been selected by President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer was immediately appointed Chief of Staff by the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer was also appointed commander of the American Forces in China. At the time Wedemeyer took command the Chinese Army was in full retreat. Both Chungking the Capital and Kunming the American base were in immediate danger of being captured by the Japanese. Wedemeyer made a number of correct decisions. He implemented his decisions quickly and successfully. He used American and Chinese resources from India and Burma carefully and with due consideration for existing conditions in the India–Burma Theater. He used only so much of the Chinese-American resources as was necessary to stop the Japanese drive on Kunming and Chungking.

Wedemeyer is working in complete confidence and cooperation with the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer has harmonized and integrated the American and Chinese staffs so that they are now working as one team with the objective—the defeat of Japan. Wedemeyer is training and reorganizing the Chinese Army through the Generalissimo. In at least 36 divisions he is exchanging the Chinese antiquated weapons for American equipment and training Chinese in the use of American equipment. To say the least, Wedemeyer has stopped Japan in this Theater. He has stabilized the military situation in China. In this he has had the unlimited support and cooperation of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No one realizes more fully than Wedemeyer and myself the tremendous effect that American victories in the Pacific had in bringing about the change in the military situation in China. It should be apparent to the most skeptical that America has succeeded in preventing the collapse of the National Government of China, in harmonizing relations between America and China and in keeping the Chinese Army in the field and in contact with the enemy. The Chinese Army every place is now stabilized and holding. In some places it has resumed the offensive.

In addition to this we have been instrumental in bringing about closer and more harmonious relations between Russia and China. For this purpose at the direction of President Roosevelt I made two visits to Moscow. We have obtained the approval of Britain and Russia for the unification of the armed forces of China. We have obtained an agreement by Britain and Russia for the support of the American policy in China which is to endorse and support the aspirations of the Chinese people to create for themselves free united democratic government. We have been instrumental if not the prime movers of having Chiang Kai-shek make beneficial personnel changes in the National Government. We have urged the Generalissimo and the National Government to inaugurate the action now taking place for the adoption of a democratic constitution, the liberalization of government and the inauguration of democratic processes.

We have succeeded in having the National Government recognize the Chinese Communist armed party as a political party by appointing a Chinese Communist as a delegate to represent the National Government at San Francisco. The Communists recognized the National Government by accepting the appointment. We have visited with the Communist leaders in their own territory. We have brought about conferences between the Communist and National leaders in which they seem to have eliminated some of their conflicts. In the controversy between the Government and the Communist Party we had two major objectives, (1) to avoid what appeared to be an immediately impending civil war, (2) to unite the Communist and National Government armies under one commander to fight Japan. Russia’s approval for unification of the armed forces of China and the fact that Chiang Kai-shek is now working for unification indicates the possibility of a satisfactory solution. The Communist armed party, however, still contends and in my opinion with some degree of reasonableness that they will not submit their troops to the command of the Chinese National Government unless an American or other Allied officer is placed in command under the National Government of all the armed forces of China.

All the foregoing has been achieved by vigorously implementing America’s policy to support the National Government changing as far as possible what we conceived to be unworthy objectives of that Government. What we have recited here could never have been accomplished by the individuals who mistakenly opposed and weakened the National Government, who desired to have America recognize the Chinese Communist armed party as a belligerent and unite our forces with the Communist Party, thereby eliminating the National Government. If these well meaning but misguided Americans who seemed not to understand America’s true policy in China had succeeded, the Chinese National Government would have collapsed. Chaos and civil war in my opinion would have ensued and America would have failed in China.

The foregoing recitation of facts is intended to give you a picture of the events that led to the present stabilized position of the Chinese National Government. Throughout this period Great Britain had no troops in contact with Japan in the China Theater. Great Britain did not contribute to the prevention of the collapse of the Chinese National Government. At a time when the stability of the Chinese Government was questionable and it appeared that the Chinese Army might not continue in the war, Great Britain was not seeking the command nor assuming any responsibility in China. Great Britain has avoided any responsibility in the controversy between the Communist armed party and the National Government. In fact we have found evidence that some of Great Britain’s agents were actually endeavoring to keep China divided against herself. Now that the Chinese with the leadership and support of America have recovered and are fighting, the British would not be averse to stepping into a position where they could claim credit for what has been achieved as well as credit for the final defeat of Japan and thereby reestablish the prestige of imperialism.

The personal representative of Prime Minister Churchill, the British Embassy, the British War Mission and other British commercial, propaganda and espionage missions, the Canadian Embassy, the Australian Embassy, the Netherlands Embassy and the French members maintain staffs in China. No troops of any of these nations participated in any combat contacts against Japan in the Chinese Theater. The French claim that French troops and guerillas have fought Japan during that period in Indochina. The fact remains, however, that there are no British, French, Dutch, Canadians or Australian troops in China. Notwithstanding this, I was advised under date of May 15 that the British Major General Hayes had been appointed by the British Chiefs of Staff as “General Officer Commanding British Forces in China”.

If Lord Mountbatten or any other British Admiral or General is appointed to the position of commander in China, the resources he will use to complete the defeat of Japan will be more than 95 percent American. It will be another clear case of the use of American resources to defeat American principles and American policies. It is also claimed that Lord Louis has a well organized headquarters which could move immediately into the Chinese theater. It is true that he has a modern military headquarters. It is true that Lord Louis has an American deputy commander and other able American officers on his staff, but Lord Louis and his staff do not have the knowledge of China and the experience with the enemy in China now possessed by Wedemeyer and the American and Chinese staffs at Chungking, So far as the American commanders or deputy commanders are concerned, you, Mr. President, have at your disposal American generals whose combat experience and achievements are far superior even to the record that Lord Louis’ public relations officers claim for him.

The paramount political issue in Asia for many years has been the issue between democracy and imperialism. We supported Chinese democratic aspirations against the imperialism of Japan. The question is will we now permit British, French and Dutch imperialists to use the resources of the American democracy to reestablish imperialism in Asia. It is the old conflict between the aspirations of people to be free and the desire of predatory nations to rule. I have omitted any discussion in regard to the position of Russia for reasons that will be well known to you. The appointment of Lord Louis or any other imperialist as Commander in China would constitute nullification of American principles and achievements in China. We are not opposed to giving the British more credit than they deserve in this war against Japan, but we are opposed to the surrender of the principles of democracy that led America into the war for the purpose of destroying Japanese imperialism.

America has fought Japan practically alone on the sea and on the land. All the imperialistic nations have done has been in an endeavor to recover their colonial possessions, largely by the use of American and Chinese resources, and reestablish the prestige of imperialism. The defeat administered to Japan on the sea and on the land and the present attack on the homeland of Japan should indicate even to the casual observer that all the Southeast Asia colonial or imperial areas must fall like ripe apples as America approaches the heart of Japan. The command of Lord Louis in Southeast Asia has been at most a holding job. Its mission as a holding force was made easy by American victories in the Pacific. Because of American victories in the Pacific, the Japanese are now in full retreat from Lord Louis’ area and his job now is one of easy and leisurely mopping up.

I recommend (1) that you oppose the appointment of any General other than an American as Commander of all the forces in the Chinese Theater, (2) that you authorize me to approach the Generalissimo with the suggestion that you might now consider the assignment of an American General to be appointed by the Generalissimo to command all forces in the Chinese Theater.

[Hurley]

1. Notation on the original: “Copy to General Marshall and to Admiral King.” Copy obtained from former President Harry S. Truman.
2. For telegram dated October 5, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 165. Telegram of October 18 not found in Department files.
3. See Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 2879.
4. See point 4 of Section II of outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, dated November 26, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 768, 769.