Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

761.93/9–445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 4, 1945—9 a.m.
[Received September 4—8:25 a.m.]

3157. Character of American press comment on Chinese-Russian pact leads us to feel that there are certain points on which American press, at any rate, is entertaining misconceptions. With this in mind, the following comments may be useful (sent to Department as 3157; repeated Chungking as 143):

1. Soviet Union did not require pact for achievement of any of immediate objectives now being attained by Red Army advance. These objectives, including military occupation of Manchuria and of Liaotung Peninsula, obviously could and would have been achieved regardless of existence of pact. For Soviet Government, pact has advantage of lending legality to situations which might otherwise have led later to undesirable disputes and complaints against Soviet Union.

2. “Independence” of Outer Mongolia will, of course, change nothing in internal regime of that area. Its effect will be to eliminate Outer Mongolia as a possible source of future Chinese irredentism and to increase its usefulness as a disguised weapon for bringing under Soviet influence further adjacent territories.

3. There should be no illusions as to effect of agreements with respect to Manchuria. Soviet readiness to admit Chinese to civil affairs control and to withdraw Soviet forces does indeed reflect mature statesmanship on the part of Stalin and his Moscow advisers. But initial Soviet position as occupying power, together with greater proximity and far greater scope and discipline of Soviet power, should make it easy for Russians, even after Soviet forces have withdrawn, to remain masters of situation in all essential respects. It was tacitly understood by both parties to Moscow negotiations that Chinese officials in Manchuria would have to be, in the main, ones amenable to Russian influence. Yenan forces, according to Yenan broadcasts, have already been ordered to enter Manchuria and accept Japanese surrender there in cooperation with Red Army. Soviet authorities, and elements friendly to Soviet Union, may be expected to encourage the use of members of these Communist-trained forces in playing prominent part in civil and military administration of Manchuria after Red Army has gone. In addition to this, it must be realized that local Soviet authorities, particularly those connected with the secret police, do not always show the same restraint with respect to the internal affairs of neighboring countries as is evidenced by the Kremlin itself.

4. Assurances of Soviet Govt that it will support Chinese Govt and not interfere in Chinese internal affairs constitute reaffirmation of a state of affairs which has existed for some years. If Kremlin has exerted control over Yenan, it has probably been through the party apparatus and not through govt channels. And if Kremlin influences Yenan now and in future, it will be through the Party.

While Soviet Govt assurances to Chinese Govt undoubtedly prejudice Yenan’s ability to bargain on basis of implied Soviet military support, at same time they (a) dispel to considerable extent general suspicion of Soviet intentions in China and so disarm average critics of Soviet role there; (b) remove any excuse for a Chungking-American crusade against Yenan as a spear head of Soviet penetration of China; and (c) place Soviet Govt policy in China on a disinterested and high moral plane. Meanwhile Communist party in USSR through its agencies in Soviet Union and elsewhere can continue to give quiet but effective support to Yenan’s program of “democratization” and to exert political pressure on Chungking to compromise with Yenan.

5. Outward Soviet moderation with respect to Manchuria should not lead to any misunderstanding of Soviet intentions with respect to Korea and Japan proper. It is natural tendency, if not a deliberately conceived policy, for Soviets to endeavor to obtain maximum internal influence in such nearby areas through judicious use of persons trained to share their ideology and to accept their discipline. These Korean forces formerly fighting with Chinese Communists have now, according to Yenan radio, already been ordered into Manchuria; and in Soviet-occupied zone of Korea, Communist-trained Korean elements are obviously being entrusted with responsibility for civil affairs.

Harriman