There are two points in particular about this matter that trouble me. The
first is the advisability of approaching the Russians in the detail this
set of instructions contemplates, in view of our experience with them to
date in these matters and particularly in view of the lack of Chinese
reactions to the scheme. The second point is the possible effect on our
military plans and operations. This reasonably requires an analysis by
the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before we
proceed to the point of anything approximating military commitments.
Particularly I have in mind the instructions which set up a specific
type of military organization by the Supreme War Council. I feel sure
that the form of this organization and its composition require careful
consideration on military levels before we put so specific a plan
forward. I think the attached comments cover the points we would wish to
make.
[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum Concerning State Department Study
of U. S. Attitude Toward Soviet Russia
in the Far East
The unification of China is most desirable from a military as well as
a political standpoint.
It is noted that many of the points raised require Chinese and
possibly British agreement, which may not readily be forthcoming. It
is believed that at least in so far as the military aspects of the
problem are concerned, the discussions with Stalin should initially
be exploratory and general. If Marshal Stalin’s reaction invites
[Page 885]
presentation of definite
proposals, these proposals should contain sufficient flexibility so
that they can be made to fit whatever agreements can actually be
worked out with the Chinese. Details such as the designation of
liaison officers and technical experts might well be withheld until
after Chinese agreement has been obtained. We should avoid making
proposals or commitments to the Russians concerning the Chinese on
which there is a doubt that Chinese acceptance can be obtained. As
to the British, it is considered that they should not be approached,
at least on the military matters involved, until the Russian and
Chinese aspects of the problem are clarified and considered
further.
The problem of unifying the Chinese military forces should be
approached with the understanding that whatever organization is
initially adopted, the intent is to eliminate the separate identity
of National Government armies and Communist armies, amalgamating all
forces into one army of China.
As to the proposal for an American commander, there is a definite
question as to whether this would be acceptable to the Chinese and
also a question as to whether it is the soundest action. If this
idea is presented to the Russians, it is believed it should be
merely as a suggestion that perhaps for an interim period an
American might be either the commander or chief of staff for the
amalgamated Chinese forces.
As to the proposal for a combined staff, there is nothing in our
experience which indicates this is a workable solution with the
Russians or would be acceptable to them. A more practicable answer
from the military standpoint and also probably more acceptable to
the Russians, would be the establishment of very adequate Russian
liaison mission with the commander of all the Chinese forces, the
functions of this mission to include the coordination required in
North China and Manchuria by the entrance of Russia into the
Japanese war.
The experience of our commander in China to date and the many
political problems existing between the Chinese and the British make
it doubtful that inclusion of the British in the military
organization in China would be politically advantageous. It
definitely would not be militarily advantageous. It is felt,
however, that so far as the British are concerned, the military
disadvantages of their participation in any
U.S.-U.S.S.R.-British-Chinese undertaking can be accepted, if
political considerations require their participation.
In regard to the proposal to guarantee Chinese military forces all
possible supplies, the capacity of the line of communications,
rather than the availability of supplies, is the present limitation
on the quantity that can be furnished. When and if the Russians
contact the Chinese Communists, another supply line to China will be
open. However, its capacity may also be extremely limited.
Eventually, of course, a port on the China Coast will give us better
access to the
[Page 886]
Chinese
forces, but this may occur late in the war. Therefore, it is
believed that the guarantee of supplies should recognize the
limitations on the line of communications both to and within China,
with the understanding that at the present time we are already doing
all within our power. It is further believed that furnishing any
supplies should be contingent upon equitable and effective
utilization in furtherance of the war effort.
A suggested revision of the paragraphs concerning the military
factors is attached; this revision, however, to be considered always
in light of the preceding paragraphs of this memorandum.
[Enclosure 2]
Recommended Amendments To Be Used as a Basis
for Exploratory Conversations and in Light of Accompanying
Memorandum
China
Military
- (a)
- To bring about the unification of all Chinese military forces
by:
- (1)
- The establishment of a military advisory body
initially in the nature of a supreme war council in
which the Chinese Communists and other non-Kuomintang
military groups would have fair representation and equal
responsibility.
- (2)
- To incorporate all Chinese forces, Kuomintang,
Communist or other military groups into one Chinese
army, probably initially with an American as Chief of
Staff or possibly as commander. There should be adequate
representation at the headquarters of the Chinese High
Command of Russian, U. S., British and other forces
whose operations are related to those of the Chinese
armies.
- (3)
- The commitment to such a unified Chinese military
force by the U. S. and Russia of available supplies
which can be delivered to China and can be distributed
within China equitably to all units able to utilize
these supplies in furtherance of the war effort.
II. The United States desires the active cooperation and support of
the Soviet Union not only to achieve the political and military
unification of China but also to insure the development and
recognition of China as one of the principal powers of the Pacific
and a bulwark of peace and security in the Far East.
- (a)
- In our efforts to effect the political and military
unification of China we seek the active cooperation of the
Soviet Government by agreement to the following:
- (1)
- Undertaking to persuade the Chinese Communists to
accept reasonable Kuomintang proposals for a genuinely
representative and unified Chinese Government and to
continue the very commendable efforts made through
negotiation with the Kuomintang to achieve such
unity.
- (2)
- Undertaking to persuade the Chinese Communists to
agree to the incorporation of their forces into a
unified Chinese army.
- (3)
- Undertaking not to form or support Chinese units
except those which are incorporated into the unified
Chinese army after it is formed.
- (4)
- Undertaking, in common with the United States and
Great Britain to withdraw all forces, including air and
naval forces from Manchuria and North China and to
terminate such temporary administration as may have been
established in liberated areas during the period of
military operations, within six months after the
cessation of hostilities in China, Japan, and Korea, and
furthermore, undertaking to return, at that time, its
liberated areas to the full control of the Chinese
National Government.
- (5)
- Agree to the designation of Soviet officers to serve
as a liaison mission with the Chinese High Command in
numbers adequate to coordinate Sino-Russian military
operations and other military matters.
- (6)
- Agree to the designation of Soviet economic and
technical advisers to assist the Chinese Government in
the formulation and integration of its plans for
post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction.
- (7)
- Agree to supply such military equipment and supplies
as the Soviet Government may have available, and as can
be transported and distributed to the unified Chinese
army.
Korea
IV. Upon the establishment of Trusteeship Administration by the four
powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain
will withdraw all their respective armed forces, including ground
forces, air forces and naval forces from the territories or
territorial waters of Korea, except for a token force not to exceed
10,000 men from each of the four powers above named.
