761.93/4–1145: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State

1130. An authoritative Chinese source in Moscow, in conversation with an Embassy officer, saw two major issues in Sino-Soviet relations at this time. One was Sinkiang about which little could be done by the Chinese Embassy here. Second was Chinese Communists which was in principle domestic Chinese problem. (Repeated to Chungking as 25.)

[Page 861]

Sinkiang revolts informant admitted to be serious. He implied Soviet instigation. Chinese could unquestionably crush insurgents if large bodies of troops were dispatched to Sinkiang. But that would, he declared, provoke open Sino-Soviet clash. He was generally pessimistic about future of Sinkiang problem.

Solution of Chinese Communist issue, according to source, lay in reform within Kuomintang. However, he did not seem to be confident that reform would be accomplished. He said Chinese Communist party, as is the case with Communist parties in other countries, is responsive to the will of the Kremlin. He has no doubt that Soviet Union would eventually for political reasons enter war against Japan.

If Soviet troops occupied Manchuria and North China, he felt the prospect of control of those areas by the Chinese [National?] Government would be dark.

Chungking please show Wedemeyer’s25 political adviser.25a

Harriman
  1. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, United States Forces in the China Theater.
  2. John Stewart Service.