Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes on General Marshall’s First Conference With the Democratic League, 1600, 26 December 1945
M: Who is your spokesman?
S:61 I will interpret for the League. First we want to hear from the Ambassador.
M: I am very glad to have this opportunity to meet with you here today. I appreciate your coming. You will, of course, understand that having just arrived out here I have a great deal to learn before I can have much to say. I have read a great deal of facts and details of what has occurred during the past few years and particularly the past three or four months, but I have only read—I have not listened. I repeat again that at the present time I am engaged in listening to the presentation from the various interested groups and envoys such as yourself. You must understand, of course, that I am the Special Envoy from the President of the United States to the Central Government, but that does not mean that I am not here to listen to everyone who has a genuine interest in the settlement of the various complications of this matter. That is what I am doing this afternoon with this particular group. I would like to make several comments regarding the point of view of the United States. There is no necessity, there is no particular point to my repeating the statement of policy of the U. S. Government made by Mr. Truman, so I will not recite his statements again. I do wish to say this, however, in reading the various suggestions and comments and criticisms, I am impressed with the impression that there is on the part of many a considerable misunderstanding of the situation so far as the U. S. Government is concerned. I am talking particularly with regard to the place of the U. S. Government and the feeling of the people of the U. S. during the past five years. With the people of the United States, it has not been as with you a desperate fight to maintain your homes and to maintain your livelihood in the vicinity of your homes. On the contrary, the U. S. Government and directly its people, has made a prodigious effort in the Pacific in the air and on the ground and on the sea, to destroy the power of the Japanese Government and actually did destroy that power at a great sacrifice of lives and a tremendous expenditure of money. Now that has all occurred many thousands of miles away from any American home and was the effort of the American people to secure peace in the world and particularly in the Pacific. So at the present time, not forgetting the friendship and admiration, I may say affection, through the years for the Chinese people, the primary thought, the [Page 817] primary purpose on the part of the U. S. Government is to secure that peace and see that it is not destroyed by war in Asia and in that connection I hope you have in mind and particularly in connection with the criticisms of the American troops in China that our primary purpose, our great purpose has been peace in Asia. We have no objectives of any kind whatsoever in the way of land or in the way of ground or in the way of privileges in China. So you could say, I think, that what we are doing puts us in a rather thankless position in view of our efforts and expenditures and in view of the intense desire of our people in the demobilization of our troops and in view of the things we do so many miles from home—it puts us in a rather thankless position. It is our desire for peace in Asia. Now I think we recognize the extreme difficulties of the situation, but our purpose, the purpose of President Truman, of the U. S. Government is peace in the Pacific. Otherwise, all of our great effort, and it was a very great effort and it was a determined effort, was wasted. Now I repeat again we recognize the extreme complications, the difficulties in composing the situation in China. It would seem to require a very generous attitude on the part of all and I am here to learn as much as I can of the various factors, political and otherwise in the situation. At the present time I have no opinions, I have just a directive from the President in the policy that he announced to the world. But please keep in mind in all of our discussions, and I imagine that will not be confined to this single discussion today that the concern of the U. S. Government is peace. Our efforts, our maintenance of our people here is a very difficult and a very expensive thing for us. I say again I have no opinions and I would be very glad to listen to you. I do not want to have any misunderstanding of the U. S. Government and the people and our purpose.
S: A member expresses the opinion that we fully understand the policy of the U. S. Government and also the opinion of the United States people. We fully realize that the difficulty in China arises, not in any sense from America, but from China and we take the full responsibility of the complicated situation in China. We realize that the situation at present is very complicated. We represent the opinion of the Chinese people. The Democratic League is apart from the two big parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist party and it includes various parties so this organization attempts to reflect the general opinion outside of the Kuomintang and Communist parties.
The Chairman is not here. He is an elder man and could not come.
M: I have this letter from Chang Lan and later I want to ask some questions.
S: Mr. Shang [Chang?] wants to express thanks to the United States for help in the past to China to defeat Japan and now in the [Page 818] help to disarm Japanese for the best interests of the world, but especially for China and we understand the policy of the late President Roosevelt and at present President Truman.
We know that the General comes here with a great responsibility and we wish you all success and we wish to offer whatever information or reference we can.
The primary wish of the Chinese people as a whole is peace. It is how to avoid civil war in China. This is just the start. The U. S. people want to have peace in the world as do the Chinese, but we want not to have civil war in China. We are against the Kuomintang or Communist party who started civil war. No matter which party we were against before the war of resistance. Already we had 10 years of civil war62 and the people have suffered a great deal. The people were all against that civil war.
That is the primary wish of the Democratic League which includes all the parties. That is how to stop civil war in China. The first problem is how to stop the civil war. Certain of the problems should be solved by means of political methods. We must stop the civil war first.
Professor Chan says that the first important thing is how to reduce the number of troops of China. We are looking for a way to reduce the troops in China. The best approach to the problem is to have a small committee with a small number of experts, military experts, and if possible with American experts, to solve the problem of reducing the number of troops.
M: Ask him to explain experts. I don’t understand its application.
S. His idea is to organize a National Army requires a special knowledge, military knowledge, so that use a small committee for planning a National Army. In that sense, he hopes that some American experts will help China to solve the problem not only with expert knowledge, but with moral support. Reducing the number of troops in China.
M: It would seem to me not [to] be so much of the military experts’ view as it was a political question of the control of the troops.
S: We quite agree with you that we must have a political way to control military force, but also we can control the force, but still reduce the number of military forces. A large part of our income is spent in maintaining an Army and as long as this situation continues it is impossible for China to recover.
M: I understand that. Where does the military expert make his contribution.
S: His idea is, of course, we want peace in China, but at the same time, we must have a national defense force—modern Army. The [Page 819] troops at present that we have are not good enough. We must reorganize the Chinese army with military experts.
The Chinese people as a whole don’t want war and the reason why we have continued civil war is because the military leaders are not well educated. So we have to reorganize the troops so that we will have financial support so we can spend the part of finance in other construction work.
M: Wasn’t he talking more about demobilization than reorganization.
S: His ideas included demobilization and reorganization, but after demobilization, Chinese troops have to be reorganized. At present the Kuomintang has two million troops and Communists have one million troops and two million guerrillas. This Army is not good for national defense—only good for civil war.
There seem to be three points. The first point is how we can control the Army with political control. United and democratic Army. Second point is, we ought to have a national defense force and train all these men for the service so that the standing troop number shall not be so great. Third point is, we must develop our science and industry. That is really, first of all for national defense. Modern national defense, not depending on number of the soldiers, but depending on the industry of the country, national resources and the science of the country.
Woman Delegate: May I say a few words. What I would like to say, first of all is that on behalf of the women of China, I wish to extend a warm welcome. Another thing is for the relationship between America and China—it has been a beautiful one. Especially the war just past has brought us much closer than before. You mentioned that we had misunderstood. I did misunderstand for awhile, we [but] since the U. S. policy was stated by President Truman, we understand now very perfectly, but there is one thing I would like to ask the Ambassador. Your President has said that our government must be democratic. Now we have our idea, but we would like to know your idea of a democratic government.
M: I must be frank to admit that there are many definitions of democracy. I assume that the Russian Government feels that it has its form of government with which we do not agree. The British democracy is more like ours and ours is more like theirs possibly than any other. Democracy in governmental form seems to take various characters, but for me and I think for the United States Government and the American people, the elemental, the fundamental requirements of democracy are free speech and freedom of peaceable assembly and a governmental structure that permits a genuine will of the people to be given effect. Now there are many practical differences which relate [Page 820] to the matter of particular people and which relate to the degree of development. Your question has involved me in a discussion on which I am not a professor, nevertheless, I think I have a fair practical idea. I have been sitting in the middle of a democracy in the middle of the war and that was a very severe test. The conduct of a global war in the setting of a democracy with great political freedom and freedom of the press is a very difficult task. So to me it is a very practical proposition and its application has a great deal to do with the education of the people. Speaking frankly, I would say here in China you have a great problem in the fact that the Chinese people, as a whole when it comes to voting, have not the degree of education to make the most intelligent use of the ballot box. How you accommodate that situation to the present condition is a practical proposition. As I see it, you are in effect completing what has happened in a period of 100 years or more in a period of less than a year, or at the present moment almost months. There are roughly three steps and you have taken one and are on the verge of taking the second and on the stage on the third. We have an expression for meeting in the United States which is “off the record”. Now what I am saying now is off the record and I ask you not to quote me because I never intended to enter into a discussion of the operation of democracies. I am not a professor of that, but I don’t mind giving you some of my own reactions to it.
S: General, it may interest you to know that I am a Professor of Political Science. Of course, we fully appreciate your statement that a democracy can not be worked out in one day, but we must make a start. We have a lot to learn. We want to [apparent omission]. We must start on the right elementals. Free press is one of them. China has a big portion of educated people and American trained. If we have a free press, for example, we can work out a workable democracy in China, but the problem of present Chinese merely amounts to a vast group, no freedom of the press, no freedom of assembly and also we want a democracy that we can keep, so that we won’t have to repeat the same experience again. We are not demanding too much, we are demanding only elementary conditions.
M: In all that I have heard since my coming from members of the various groups, in all that I have read, regarding the situation in China, it has seemed to me that in the statement of the particular desires of the general principles all say the same thing. So the problem is, what is the practical method of doing this. That is where all the disagreement arises. All say there should be but one Army and that will be the servant of the state. I find no disagreement regarding that and certainly that is a fundamental requirement if it is going to be a unified government of China. But the problem is how to accomplish that. I would say that if you had complete confidence [Page 821] in the other fellow, the solution could be arrived at in the same day. We are having the same difficulties now with Russia. Half the difficulty is lack of understanding and lack of confidence. When I say we, and this is most confidential, I mean the United States. So my interest is centered on the practical proposition with these various antagonisms, these various desires for power or continued power. These various lacks of confidence or trust. How you bring about the practical proposition of unifying the Army and making it the servant of the state. The situation seems to be one of hard realities which we find so often in so many international dealings. It is very difficult in international agreement because of suspicions and of the local interest and maybe of the individual, maybe the nation, maybe the group. So my interest, at the present time is to see what the proposals are as to a practical proposition for making a fair beginning and that I think is the view of the U. S. Government. I am giving my own interpretation now, but I am quite certain now that they don’t expect you to achieve the millennium in perfection in a few months, but under the present circumstances it is of imperative importance that an interim solution be found immediately. Now what is the practical method.
S: Perhaps that is the plan the PCC conference is going to follow. Stop the fighting and if we can stop fighting then we can talk. If we demand the two parties to stop military action then leave all the problems to be handled by the PCC conference, then I think each side to the conference can compromise. Give and take. The U.S. can help in stopping the war a great deal morally. They supported a great effort in the Pacific and we all know that the civil war will affect the peace in the world. You have a moral right to demand the cessation of the civil war and the Chinese people have a right to demand peace and not another civil strife. No party has any reason to continue the civil war.
M: To what importance do you attach to the PCC.
S: From our point of view really the government has more responsibility than the Communist side for we see all sides, we see how much the Communists really make. We have exchanged views with all sides including the Communist and Kuomintang and it seems to us that the Kuomintang has more responsibility in this. The failure or success of the PCC depends on how much concession the government is ready to give. If the government is so sincere in that we will have no longer a one-party dictatorship.
M: I repeat the question again how much political importance do you attach to PCC.
S: On the basis that if the government is sincere, we could make this as a machinery to solve the problem. If the government is ready [Page 822] to really make use of this Consultative Council, then we attach importance to it. If it is just like the PCC then I don’t think it can solve anything. This is a new one. It all depends on the government. First, stop the war, second start reorganizing to make a temporary coalition govery [government] and nationalize the Army and then together with the Kuomintang and all the members, plan for a national assembly which will be a prelude for a constitutional government. A lot depends we feel that there are two forces outside from the government. One is the people in the country demanding that this conference will make these things possible, and second is outside opinion, especially American. Mr. Chang attachés a great deal of importance to the PCC. Also this conference meets with the public support of China with the hope that it may accomplish something. If the PCC fails there are only two consequences, one is civil war—long civil war. If another civil war as a consequence, will lead to completions [complications?] in the international situation. So in view of further consequence, the Chinese people try their best to make the PCC a success.
Robertson:63 You asked General Marshall what was his definition of democracy. I would like to ask you what is your definition of democracy as to its practical application to the Chinese people, where they vote and so forth. What kind of application do you want to make.
S: The question of how can China have election when such a large part are uneducated is complex. I tell you that the Communists have an answer in northern China. They actually carried on an election where part of the people could not even write their names. They gave a brief historical background of each individual and they would drop beans in the barrels behind the candidates then they count the number of beans in each barrel. Democracy itself is an education. At present the Kuomintang want to call a national assembly of delegates elected 10 years ago when they had only one party that was allowed to participate in election.
M: You are describing the Democratic party in the United States in the south.
S: Now, we want something in the genuine sense of democracy—freedom of the press, freedom of assembly. There is no need of definition in that.
R: I don’t think you get my point. You speak as the people of China. To me the people of China is not a group of people in China. Would you take 400 million people as an election of the people—that is 400 million people vote.
[Page 823]S: We should have universal election.
M: Is that a practical proposition?
S: It may not work so well, but at least it is a start. We may not have a democracy in China for 50 years. Democracy itself is an education.
M: We have a political machine where you no [can?] or cannot vote according to a poll tax. That is the practical side. Now assuming that within this year everybody will cast a vote. I am not saying he shouldn’t, but I am looking for the practical side.
S: The detail of the system is a matter we will discuss, we are talking elementary requirements.
M: We have been talking about the Chinese people. We have been talking about the practical problem of what to do here in the next few months. The practical, not the idealistic. We are trying to find what is the practical proposition.
S: Mr. Chang says we have been talking for a practical solution, not idealistic. Our idea is first the PCC conference will work out a plan for a coalition government and a coalition will carry out from the practical side for a national assembly and through the national assembly adopt a constitution. Our idea of coalition is a practical one. We don’t expect the Kuomintang to keep up their supreme power, Kuomintang should reorganize to allow representation of different parties participating in the government. That is not very idealistic, it is a practical solution. We must have some organization that the people can have voice in and now we are seeking such an organization.
M: I think I understand that. That was my understanding when you came this afternoon. I have looked on this group as representing probably as high a knowledge of philosophies and governmental understanding as you have in China. Certainly it is the first time I have had a professor of political science work as an interpreter for me, so I am trying to penetrate the fog to find what is the practical proposition. Goes down to the province, the city, the town. It is a practical proposition, that is why I wanted to get your conception of how you are going to do that. You must have some concrete steps, I have certainly got to acquire some ideas.
S: We have been thinking of this problem for the past six months and we want to find some practical solution ourselves. We feel that if elections are possible we should have elections. If elections are impossible we have a government constituted by agreement of the parties.
R: That wouldn’t represent the people. I imagine there are millions of Chinese represented by no one of the three parties. Speaking of elections, I might speak of the election held in Outer Mongolia. Do [Page 824] you know how that election was run. Nobody was allowed to vote except between the ages of 18 and 45, irregardless of your condition, your intellectual ability. I wouldn’t have been allowed to vote and I don’t know how many here would have been allowed to vote. They voted for autonomy 100%. You call that a democratic election—I don’t.
M: How many people in China does the PCC represent.
S: We represent the people as a whole. Many parties coming within one party is better than a one-man regime.
M: It would seem to me that PCC group is a very important step at the present moment. That is the impression that I have gotten so I have been much impressed to learn your reactions regarding the PCC and that is the reason I have asked so many questions.
S: The point that we are really concerned with, we expect a government that will lead to a development of a democracy, but the present government is a hindrance to the future democracy of China.
M: But on the other side, I am very much interested in hearing the practical proposition to carry out your proposition. I appreciate very much your frankness in talking to me and I must ask you again not to be quoting me as an authority on the technical definition of democracy. I am familiar with a great many of its perversions, but I think I have derived much advantage from your discussion, and I would like you to feel that I would be glad to talk to you one at time or as a group, so I appreciate very much your coming.