893.20/4–645

The Consul General at Kunming (Langdon) to the Secretary of State

No. 171

Sir: I have the honor to set forth, as I understand them, the recent reorganization of the Chinese Armies and the relationship toward each other of the American and Chinese military establishments.

Chinese Military Establishment.

The new reorganized Chinese national army, under General Ho Ying-chin, will consist of twelve army groups made up of thirty-six [Page 85] full strength divisions. The best troops available from all over unoccupied China owing allegiance to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, including the Yunnan provincial troops of General Lung Yun, chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Government, who is also concurrently deputy-Commander-in-Chief of the new army, are presently being regrouped and redistributed to make up the thirty-six divisions. All other troops owing allegiance, real or nominal, to the Chungking Government will continue to be under the control of the Military Affairs Commission.

The new army is the only one that will be trained and equipped by and leavened with American forces. It is to be the combat, striking force of China. As the present weapons of the units comprising the thirty-six divisions are replaced with American weapons, they will be distributed to the units outside the new army, which will be utilized for protecting supply lines and other auxiliary service.

The crack force of the new army is the Sixth Army Group. This will take in all the remnants and units of the veteran, battle-hardened Ramgarh (India)-trained divisions and of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, viz., the Chinese forces which fought their way from Assam to the Yunnan border and the Chinese forces which drove the Japanese out of Western Yunnan. Great expectations are held for this Army Group. The other army groups are being cleansed of diseased and unfit individuals and their strength being brought up to maximum by replacements from units in the north. These replacements are generally in wretched, although reparable, physical condition and both American and Chinese establishments are taking special measures, medical and nutritional, to bring these men up to combat condition. From two to three months rest and special feeding in receiving camps are needed for such rehabilitation.

Internal politics have not been altogether absent from the selection of units to form the twelve Army groups, other than the Sixth. For instance, the Fifth Army Group (General Lung Yun’s personal troops) has been included in the new elite Army which is to get American equipment and instruction not without some concession on the part of the Generalissimo, while General Chang Fa-kwei’s command in the Fourth War Zone (Kwangsi, with headquarters at Poseh) has been left outside the pale as it were. Chang Fa-kwei’s troops, however, are getting from the Military Affairs Commission a special measure of supplies and ammunition so that they will defend as well as possible the Poseh corridor for Japanese attack on Kunming and for Chinese attack on the Japanese lines of communications to Indochina.

[Page 86]

American Military Establishment.

China Theater Headquarters are in Chungking and Rear Echelon Headquarters in Kunming. Lieutenant General Wedemeyers command comprises the 14th Air Force under Major General Chennault, which now takes in the Chinese-American Composite Wing and all air combat forces in China, a separate Services of Supply China Theater command under Major General Cheves, a China Combat Command under Major General McClure, and a China Training Command under Colonel John W. Middleton. The headquarters of all four commands are in Kunming. In addition to General Wedemeyer’s commands just mentioned there is in Kunming the headquarters of the China Wing of the India–China Division of the Air Transport Command, which is directly under Washington.

Relationship of Two Establishments.

The 14th Air Force, of course, is tactically independent. The Services of Supply, the China Combat and the China Training Commands, however, are the warp and woof so to speak of the new Chinese Army of twelve army groups mentioned above, although the Services of Supply Command also serves the American military establishment in the theater.

On February 11 last a Chinese Services of Supply was activated collateral to the new Chinese Army under the command of Major General Cheves, who was given concurrent Chinese rank of Lieutenant General. The deputy commander is a Chinese major general, Lu Tsu. This new Services of Supply Command is likewise under the jurisdiction of General Ho Ying-chin rather than under the Military Affairs Commission. It is divided into seven areas. Each area is under a Chinese commander directly under General Cheves, and each Chinese commander has an American deputy and a sizing of American personnel under him. Thus an American General is in supreme command and has direct charge of the equipping, feeding, clothing, hospitalization and general supply of the Chinese armies, both new and auxiliary. The requirements for these supply tasks are being met from local as well as from American sources.

The China Combat Command will provide the American “cadres” that will be attached to the different units of the new army. These cadres will be complete staffs of operational, infantry, artillery, engineer, transport, signal, supply, medical, veterinary and intelligence personnel. They will exercise no command over the Chinese units with which they will take the field and their functions will be purely advisory and technical.

The China Training Command presently operates an officers’ staff school and artillery and infantry training centers for the personnel [Page 87] of the new divisions. This personnel is selected from among the different units of the new divisions, given an intensive course of training and reassigned to key positions in the new Army.

Comments.

As has been already stated, the new Army is being rebuilt and revitalized with a definite purpose in view: the mounting in proper time of an offensive against the Japanese. The Generalissimo has approved the whole program and this purpose. Skeptics may wonder whether, when the reequipping and training program has been completed and the time for the offensive is at hand, the Generalissimo may not stall, may not balk at the prospect of this new Army being cut up by the Japanese, preferring to preserve it for post-war internal purposes. Informed Chinese do not believe that he will hold back. They have the feeling that as Commander-in-Chief he is on probation as it were vis-à-vis the American Government, that since the Stilwell crisis this is his last chance to show he is a worthy national war leader, and that being on his honor he will try to come up to American expectations. Another practical answer to any question on this score that may be in the minds of skeptics is that the new Army will be so honey-combed with American personnel who will know the exact condition at a given moment of every unit almost down to a platoon that, when the American high command decides on the basis of reports from this personnel that the Chinese Army is ready to start offensive operations, it will not be possible for the Chinese high command to plead unreadiness without risking a serious breach in the relations of the two Governments. In other words, while the American personnel in the new Chinese Army cannot exercise command, it can report that from every standpoint that Army is equipped to fight but will not do so.

There has been very little publicity of the preparations discussed in this despatch. In particular, the activation of the Sixth Army Group of North Burma and Salween Valley veterans is a military secret. Of course, the Japanese know of these preparations. Why, then, one may ask, are the Japanese sitting idly while this force that is to strike them is being built. The answer is that their logistics problems in any campaign to break up our program are as difficult as our own logistics problems is completing this program. It is a race for time on both sides. If and when the Japanese are ready logistically to attack us, they will do so. Our air base at Chihkiang (east of Kweiyang) will no doubt be their first objective. Then they will no doubt march on Poseh to block any designs we may have on their communications between Kwangsi and Indochina.

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon