Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

761.93/11–2645

Memorandum by the Secretaries of War (Patterson) and Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

Washington, 26 Nov 1945.

In accordance with the understanding reached at the meeting of the Committee of Three on 20 November 1945, this memorandum contains the views of the War and Navy Departments on the situation in China and, specifically, views on problems of evacuating the Japanese from China, particularly North China.

General Wedemeyer has stated that he has completed his mission under his present directive. In accordance with that directive, he has assisted in the rapid transport by the National Government of its forces to key areas in China. His directive, dated 10 August 1945,^70a also includes a statement that he will continue “military assistance for the present for the purpose of supporting Chinese military operations essential to the re-occupation by National Government forces of all areas in the China Theater now held by the Japanese, and the placing of Chinese occupation forces in Japan proper, Formosa, and Korea.” This portion of the directive logically continues until changed or until the China Theater, which includes Manchuria within its boundaries, is terminated. National Government forces have been placed in substantially all key areas on the Mainland, exclusive of Manchuria. They have been placed in Formosa. As to Korea and Japan, any action must await determinations of the State Department.

The forces already transported General Wedemeyer considers sufficient under normal circumstances to secure these key areas. The War and Navy Departments agree that General Wedemeyer’s view is substantially correct as to North China and that, but for internecine strife, the measures which General Wedemeyer has taken should be approximately adequate to carry out his basic directive. In all probability, even under optimum conditions, some United States assistance, particularly in the ports, would be required to assure repatriation of the Japanese by the Chinese.

Part One of General Wedemeyer’s estimate^70b passed to the State Department, creates the impression that the achievement by the Chinese Government now recognized by the United States, of control of North China and Manchuria is remote. The War and Navy Departments consider that this should not be accepted as a basis for United States action without the most serious consideration and further exploration to determine whether further steps are practicable. The stated objectives of the United States, which have also been expressed at times by the other great powers during this war, have included a unified China and particularly the return of Japanese-held areas including Manchuria, to the Chinese. It appears undesirable, now that the war has been won at considerable cost, to retreat from any of the stated objectives without the most careful examination. This approach to the problem is believed to be particularly pertinent since General Wedemeyer’s estimate may have been made in the light of his present directive as well as the present situation in China. With more definitive United States policy guidance and some clarification of the international aspects, such as the U. S. S. R. element, his estimate may change in some particulars to indicate more probability of the achievement of expressed United States aims in China, including Manchuria, throughout this war.

As to Manchuria, General Wedemeyer has interpreted the wording of his directive to mean that “China” does not include “Manchuria” and, hence, that his mission is accomplished without providing aid and assistance to the Chinese National Government with reference to Manchuria. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has been asked for their views on General Wedemeyer’s interpretation of his directive, this being a political matter at this time although at the time of issuance, the War and Navy Departments considered Manchuria an integral part of China. No action has been taken to date on this request of General Wedemeyer’s for verification of his interpretation.

The War and Navy Departments consider that continued aid and support for the National Government amounts to at least indirect support of Chiang Kai-shek’s activities against the dissident forces in China. This situation, however, is in no way any change from that existent during the past few years. If this aid is to be continued through the medium of the military, by such means as repatriation of Japanese from North China, the directives to commanders concerned must be changed to make them realistic.

The War and Navy Departments consider that the National Government will be able to stabilize the situation in South China but that the situation in North China may remain unstable for at least several months and, perhaps, for a much longer time. Only the National Government appears to have a chance of unifying China, including Manchuria, in the near future. The delivery of Manchuria to Chinese control, as well as the unification of China, appears to be primarily dependent on political, rather than military factors. Soviet policy, as far as known, does not appear to oppose at this time this unification.

From the short-range military standpoint, U. S. objectives have been practically accomplished in China. Japan has surrendered. The Japanese are no longer in control of any important areas in China. A considerable proportion of them have been disarmed and for the time being the entire force has been amenable to Allied plans for demilitarization, but this attitude may change due to ineffective action in repatriation. The military necessity, from the U. S. standpoint, of repatriating these Japanese forces is dependent on the likely solution of the larger problem of achieving order in North China and the unification of China. A reasonable chance of achieving these two latter objectives seems to be dependent primarily on U. S. political and economic policy, the implementation of which, it is true, will need to include military aid of the sort contemplated under the programs for military assistance and a Military Advisory Group, already forwarded to the State Department by the JCS. If positive and definitive steps are to be taken by the U. S. to aid in Chinese unification, then, from the military standpoint, the clearing of Japanese from China is one of the essentials. If, on the other hand, the U. S. is not going to take definitive action in support of the National Government, then there is only slight possibility that China will emerge from chaos, and there is a question as to whether the cost to the U. S. of repatriating the Japanese would be justified, since their presence in China would at the worst merely accentuate an already chaotic situation.

From the long-range military standpoint, the War and Navy Departments consider that the most important military element in the Far East favorable to the U. S. is a unified China, including Manchuria, friendly to the U. S. This is the best assurance against turmoil and outbreak of war in the Far East. In this connection, the War and Navy Departments consider that the long-range analysis contained in Part Two of General Wedemeyer’s message is a balanced evaluation of the problem of Russia and China in the Far East. As to the long-range course of action to be adopted, this is a matter for political decision, taking into account, if it is decided to continue assistance to the National Government, the material cost of that assistance which may include extension of the stay overseas of U. S. manpower, the difficulties which may arise from Chinese internecine strife, public criticism in the United States of seeming United States military involvement in the internal affairs of a friendly power, and possible difficulties with Russia. On the other hand, if it is decided to change the long-term United States policy which is the support of the National Government with a view to unification of China, the United States must consider the adverse factors indicated by General Wedemeyer in Part Two of his message, the impact on United States and world opinion of what will appear to be desertion of an Ally, the probable loss of the support of one of the so-called great Powers in international affairs, the dwindling stature of China as a great power, the possible development of several sovereign states in what is now called China, the continued existence of an area of armed conflict with the resultant threat to world peace, and other adverse factors.

As to the military strength of the Communists vis-à-vis the National Government, the reliable information available indicates that the strength and activity of Communist forces are considerably exaggerated in newspaper accounts and Chinese Communist releases. The only incident where an accurate check has been possible on newspaper and Communist reports as compared to the actual incident on the ground, is the so-called Battle of Shan-kai-kuan, which was advertised as a great battle and which, in reality, was the passage of the Great Wall by a National Government Army without any Communist resistance worthy of the name.

The problem of control of North China by the National Government appears to be primarily dependent on the number of National Government forces available and capable of being moved into that area and supported there. In case more than sufficient are moved to control the important Tientsin–Peking Area, it would appear logical that National Government forces would be moved by the Generalissimo into Manchuria, extending his control into that area.

It is probable that delay in National Government assumption of control in North China and Manchuria will permit the Chinese Communists to strengthen materially their positions in these areas. Such delay will also influence Soviet reaction to the problem which will involve moral support for the Communists at all times and may involve material assistance. There is also the question as to how long the Soviets will consider their present agreements with the Chinese binding if Manchuria with its railroads, important to the U. S. S. R., continues without a stabilized government.

The ready answer to the problem from the National Government’s standpoint is more forces for North China and Manchuria. Providing these are available, United States assistance to an extent not yet estimated would be required to transport and perhaps to support these forces.

On the specific problem of repatriation of Japanese from China General Wedemeyer’s directive authorized U. S. Commanders to accept temporarily, for the Generalissimo, the surrender of Japanese forces, but stated the principle that such Japanese forces would be turned over to the Chinese National Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Wedemeyer have been proceeding on the basis that repatriation of Japanese surrendered in China is the responsibility of the Chinese National Government, the details as to transportation and receipt in Japan being arranged directly between Chinese National Government and the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers. The policy that contemplates U. S. forces turning surrendered Japanese over to the Chinese is set forth in an approved State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee paper (SWNCC 58/9).⁷¹

It has been the understanding of the War and Navy Departments that transportation for the repatriation of the Japanese would be provided from Japanese shipping plus any excess Allied shipping which happened to be available.

Consistent with the understanding of the War and Navy Departments that each nation would be responsible for arranging with SCAP the repatriation of the Japanese surrendered to its commanders, the U. S. commanders concerned have been going forward with such repatriation. The latest report as of 18 November shows the status of repatriation of Japanese to be as follows:

	Army	Navy	Civilian	Total
South Korea	165243	10865	227056	403164
From Philippines	11267	1626	19944	32837
From Pacific Ocean Areas	18640	7421	1897	27958
From Ryukyus	5577	4727	888	11192
From islands adjacent to Japanese home islands	39412	1311	213	40936
From China	397	nil	6484	6881
From Hongkong	600	701	100	1401
Totals	241136	26651	256582	524369

Out of over a half million repatriated from all areas, it will be noted that only some 7,000 Japanese have been repatriated from China.

The best information available to the War and Navy Departments indicates that there are some 6,000,000 (approximately half military and half civilian) Japanese at present outside Japan. Of these, the following are in the China Theater:

	Military	Civilian	Total
Manchuria–North Korea	680,000	1,450,000	2,130,000
North China	350,000	220,000	570,000
South and Central China and North Indo China	775,000	145,000	920,000
Formosa	254,000	90,000	344,000
Totals	2,059,000	1,905,000	3,964,000

If as indicated by the Secretary of State in his statement to the press, the United States is to assume responsibility for repatriation of Japanese in North China which the Chinese for various reasons are unable to undertake, this action may mean the collection and movement to Japan of about 570,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians in addition to those from U. S. occupied areas. If the assistance is to extend to all of China including Manchuria, the number of Japanese involved may be somewhere between approximately 2,000,000 and 3,500,000 dependent upon the disposition the Russians have already made of the Japanese in Manchuria, The foregoing task, even for North China, involves a very considerable commitment of shipping and of U. S. manpower, and special arrangements above and beyond those contemplated to date would need to be made in order to accomplish it.

General Wedemeyer estimates that China is incapable of repatriating the millions of enemy troops and civilians within her borders and also solving her political and economic problems. It therefore appears that if the Japanese are to be repatriated, part or all of the task will have to be accomplished by the U. S. with such aid from other nations as can be arranged. The magnitude of the task is dependent upon the extent of stability achieved in China during the next year, which factor is partially dependent on U. S. political, economic and military support. In carrying out this task, which involves extricating the Japanese from both the ports and the hinterland of China, it must be recognized that the U. S. might be associated with and might at times become involved in internal Chinese strife.

A factor for consideration which has not yet been evaluated is the impact on the Japanese people and U. S. military requirements in Japan to implement the surrender in case the published promise to repatriate Japanese from North China is not carried out. The Japanese will logically extend this commitment to all areas and consideration must be given to this factor. There is a serious question that the U. S. should allow any impression to be established that the United States and SCAP are alone responsible for this enormous task of repatriation. It would be most desirable to have it understood as a quadripartite commitment.

In the light of the foregoing and after considering General Wedemeyer’s estimate, the War and Navy Departments consider that:

a. The present situation in China including Manchuria is a problem which must be solved primarily on the political aspects of the matter leather than on the basis of immediate military necessity.

b. In view of the succession of events, the Marines should remain in North China for the present pending clarification of U. S. political policy.

c. In view of the specific statement made in the press, the U. S. should press repatriation of the approximately 570,000 Japanese in North China, making every effort to obtain maximum National Government assistance in this project and every effort to place complete responsibility on the National Government for this task at the earliest practicable date, thus permitting withdrawal of U. S. Forces from the area.

d. U. S. policy on responsibility for repatriation of Japanese in those areas not occupied by the U. S., particularly China, should be clarified in detail at once by the State Department.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should amend General Wedemeyers directive to provide for continuation of U. S. forces in North China for the present, assistance to Chinese in repatriation of Japanese in North China, and the fact that such action will probably involve at least incidental aid to the National Government in the controversy with the Communists. Political guidance should be provided by the Secretary of State.

f. The State Department should enunciate at once its policy on the implementation of the Cairo Declaration⁷² and other statements with reference to the return of Manchuria to China.

g. On the specific problem raised by General Wedemeyer concerning his position as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, the War and Navy Departments consider from the military standpoint, that the justification for this arrangement ceased to exist with the completion of movement of Chinese forces which assured that the Japanese would lose the control in all areas of China. Hence, from the military standpoint the arrangement should be terminated. The determination as to the desirability of continuing the arrangement from a political standpoint depends on the future U. S. political policy toward China and is for the Secretary of State and the President to decide. If the Secretary of State considers there is no political reason for continuing the arrangement, the Secretary of War will initiate the action which the President will need to take with the Generalissimo to relieve General Wedemeyer as the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff. Some substitute arrangements would need to be made in order to assure best use of U. S. resources turned over to the Chinese.

h. On the specific matter of the American Military Advisory Group to China concerning which General Wedemeyer has been told to continue the China Theater until the Advisory Group’s establishment, the Secretary of State should enunciate U. S. policy. If U. S. policy is to be one of “wait and see” or of withdrawal of support for China, then the establishment should be deferred. If, on the other hand, U. S. policy is to be continuance of the decision to leave the Marines in China for the time being and is to include active support of the National Government in attaining unity in China and in attaining control of Manchuria, then the State Department should proceed with negotiations necessary to the establishment of the Advisory Group without delay. In either case, General Wedemeyer should be informed at once.

i. The State Department should provide a definitive policy to cover the period of the next few years in China.

j. Since the other great powers particularly U. S. S. R. are essential participants in the final solution to be achieved in the Far East whatever that may be, the U. S. should give serious consideration to approaching, after preliminary consultations with China, the other great powers particularly the U. S. S. R. with a view to expediting the solution of specific problems such as control of Manchuria by political means rather than continuing to lean on unilateral U. S. action and on military necessity as a reason for U. S. actions.

In connection with the above estimate and the problems set forth in the conclusions, the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy request State Department guidance in the near future in order that action may be initiated to implement U. S. policy. This action may include changes in instructions given to General Wedemeyer by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and material shifts in the employment of manpower and other resources in the Far East. A definitive reply is requested before the first of December in view of the fact that all arrangements have been proceeding on the basis that the Marines would be withdrawn from China at an early date, the China Theater inactivated, all personnel returned at an early date except those required for the Advisory Group, and that the U. S. will not assume responsibility for repatriation of Japanese from China.

Since preparing the above estimate, General Wedemeyer’s CFB 15452⁷³ has been received and passed to the Secretary of State. The War and Navy Departments consider this message gives a further sound analysis of the problem. Particular attention is invited to General Wedemeyer’s statement that leaving American forces in North China means that it will be absolutely impossible to avoid involvement in fratricidal warfare and to avoid direct support of National Government forces against the Communists. This message emphasizes the need for some international understanding as to the disposition of Manchuria and perhaps also North China. It appears that if Manchuria and perhaps North China are not to pass to Chinese control but rather pass to Soviet control or separate states under its domination by a progression of circumstances, then Russia will have achieved in the Far East approximately the objectives Japan initially set out to accomplish. The impact of such piecemeal action, uncoordinated internationally, on the U. S. and the world at large would, in the long run, probably be at least as grave militarily as any situation likely to arise due to continued U. S. support of the National Government, also uncoordinated internationally. Whatever U. S. action is determined upon, it appears serious consideration should be given to consultation with other powers concerned.

• James Forrestal
• Robert P. Patterson

1. Telegram Warx 47513 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer), p. 527.
2. See General Wedemeyer’s telegram CFBX 15120, November 20, to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower), p. 650.
71. Paper concerning disarmament, demobilization, and disposition of enemy arms, ammunition and implements of war (Japan), September 5; not printed.
72. See White House press release of December 1, 1943, Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 393, or Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, p. 448.
73. Telegram of November 23, p. 662.