Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

Nanking Embassy Files, Lot F–73: Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower)

[Shanghai,] November 23, 1945.

[CFB 15452.] The retention of the Marines in North China to facilitate disarmament and deportation of the Japanese Forces in that area should be contingent upon projected United States policy. The disarming and repatriation of the Japanese in the area could have been accomplished in an orderly manner if the Chinese Communists, with their apparent outside aid, had not injected themselves into the situation. In this connection, the Chinese Central Government Forces that were moved to the north with United States assistance, in conjunction with the Marine Corps now present, would comprise adequate and sufficient forces to handle the Japanese effectively. In fact approximately 30% of the Japanese in the area have been disarmed and their deportation to the Japanese homeland would have been limited only by the availability of shipping. As the situation has now developed however the continued and effective disarming of Japanese by Chinese Central Government Forces is impossible for three reasons:

a. Chinese Central Government Forces are being diverted to the task of opposing Chinese Communist Forces.

b. Japanese Armed Forces are being employed by the Chinese Central Government to protect lines of communications and installations against depredation and attack by Chinese Communists.

c. If the Japanese are disarmed in certain areas where Chinese Communist Forces exist in strength, the latter will move in and take over not only the areas vacated by the Japanese but also the arms and equipment of such Japanese thus increasing their relative combat strength as opposed to the Central Government.

Assuming that the Marines and Chinese Central Government Forces in North China could proceed without restriction or interference and that the shipping required for the implementation of an orderly deportation plan could be made available, it would require 6 to 8 months to complete the repatriation of the approximately 500,000 Japanese in North China. Obviously, with the restrictions now imposed by Chinese Communists’ action, the repatriation of the Japanese may extend over a period of several years.

The implications of leaving the Marines or any other American Forces in the North China area under the present conditions of political strife, approaching civil war, are obvious. It will be absolutely impossible to avoid involvement in fratricidal warfare and to avoid direct support of National Government Forces against the Communists because the latter are determined apparently to accomplish the following:

a. Obtain Japanese arms and equipment.

b. Create incidents involving Americans and thus strengthen the demand of certain elements in the United States to withdraw our forces.

c. Secure control of food-producing and industrial areas, as well as ports and lines of communications.

I wish to comment on the State Department premise that “it is recognized that U. S. activities designed to assure the removal of Japanese from North China will result in some collateral aid or prestige in favor of the National Government vis-à-vis the Communists”. Comment: Manifestly United States assistance the past few years has given collateral aid or prestige in favor of the Chinese Central Government vis-à-vis the Communists. Under existing circumstances United States assistance will do much more than that. It is my considered opinion that continued assistance to the Central Government in North China and the retention of the Marines in that area will result in definite participation in fratricidal warfare. We can not expect our forces to remain in an area or to be employed in operations that daily endanger American lives and property without resorting to appropriate retaliatory military measures. Such measures will undoubtedly result in armed conflicts between Americans and Chinese and may expand in extent and severity as the Chinese Communists press to accomplish their aims as outlined above.

Comments on State Department’s premise “in meantime, it is (Changed—is it) not desirable that Marines or other forces be maintained in port areas to assure availability of these areas for the movement”. Comment: I deem the retention of Chinwangtao–Taku–Tientsin–Tsingtao with interlocking land LOC vital for the supply and evacuation of the Marine Forces. I did not visualize holding other ports and have expected the Chinese Central Government Forces to secure and maintain additional ports required for repatriation of Japanese.

The Generalissimo has asked the United States to move five more armies to North China. I feel that this would not give him sufficient strength to cope with the Communists and concurrently undertake the program of disarming the Japanese in the area. Further I question the ability of the Chinese Central Government to support logistically an additional five armies in that area. I am constantly being asked for assistance to support the five Central Government Armies presently in the area.

Following comments are submitted concerning the State Department premise “conversely withdrawal now may mean substantial frustration of a policy we have long supported which contemplated unifying China and Manchuria under Chinese National Forces”. Comment: This is correct but incomplete. I should like to add the following:

a. It has been 3 months since Japanese capitulation. Continued postponement may render the disarming of the Japanese in the area very difficult, for the Japanese may take advantage of such opportunity to turn over or sell their arms to Chinese Communists. They may become an arrogant, independent armed force no longer amenable to Allied plans for their complete demilitarization. There is also the possibility, if U. S. Marines are withdrawn, that they will assume control in the area for they would hold the “balance of power” between the Chinese Central Government vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists.

b. The Communists will interpret our withdrawal as complete victory for their invidious propaganda program and acts of intimidation, thus lowering our prestige not only with the Central Government but with the Chinese and Soviet Communists.

c. The presence of the Marine Force has a strong stabilizing influence in that a modicum of protection to other nationals in North China is provided and ports and vital lines of communications are protected. Some observers report that the removal of the Marines would result in civil war, while others state that even if retained a widespread revolution in the area is inevitable.

Comments follow on the State Department statement “as to the matter of more Chinese armies for Manchuria, the United States will not transport any more troops to that area”. Comment: An attempt was made to debark two Chinese armies at Manchurian ports but was frustrated by the Chinese Communists’ action with apparent Soviet Communists’ connivance. American personnel were accompanying these two armies to facilitate only in their debarkation. American personnel has not been permitted to enter Manchuria and my explicit instructions to that effect remain in force. Interpreting my directives I have felt that the arrangements for the recovery of Manchuria and for the repatriation of Japanese in that area were matters subject to negotiations and agreements reached between the Chinese Central Government and the Soviet Government and therefore have permitted no American participation. As the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff I have assisted in planning for the reoccupation of Manchuria.

My general comment on State Department proposed public stand follows: No mention is made of involvement in fratricidal warfare. By implication the American Commander is admonished that the United States will not support the National Government vis-à-vis the Communists, except insofar as necessary to get the Japanese disarmed and out of China. As pointed out above, such United States support to the National Government will definitely involve American Forces in fratricidal warfare. There can be no mistake about this. Frankly the State Department must in my opinion assume full responsibility for the acts of armed forces faithfully employed in the implementation of United States policies. I accept responsibility for the conduct and employment of the forces under my command when such employment is clearly supported by the policies of my Government. If the unification of China and Manchuria under Chinese National Forces is to be a United States policy, involvement in fratricidal warfare and possibly in war with the Soviet Union must be accepted and would definitely require additional United States Forces far beyond those presently available in the Theater to implement the policy. (Obviously this would require a change in my existing directives.) General Rockey, Commanding Third Phib Corps of Marines, has read this message and heartily concurs.

Replies to the specific questions of the State Department appearing in War 84094⁶² will be forwarded promptly in another message.⁶³

62. Telegram of November 19 from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater, p. 644.
63. Telegram CFB 15639 of November 25 from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater, to the Chief of Staff, p. 669.