Nanking Embassy Files, Lot F–73: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower), to the Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer)

[War 84094.] Reurad CFBX 14735.44 During conversation on the secretarial level this morning, Secretary of State developed the following line of approach with reference to your CFBX 14735, stating he intended to check his proposed line of action with the President:

1.
The Marines should remain in North China for the time being on the assumption they will play an effective role in the completion of disarmament and deportation of the Japanese forces in that area and who might but for their presence remain there. State Department understands that Wedemeyer contemplates that responsibility of disarming and deporting Japanese is a matter for Chinese but raises the question that Chinese may need considerable assistance and stimulation from U. S. Forces if deportation is actually to be accomplished. In meantime, it is not (Change: is it not) desirable that Marines or other forces be maintained in port areas to assure availability of these [Page 645] areas for the movement. While the U. S. does not wish to support the National Government directly against the Communists, it is recognized that U. S. activities designed to assure the removal of Japanese from North China will result in some collateral aid of prestige in favor of the National Government vis-à-vis the Communists. Conversely withdrawal now may mean substantial frustration of a policy we have long supported which contemplated unifying China and Manchuria under Chinese National Forces. As to the matter of more Chinese armies for Manchuria, the U.S. will not transport any more troops to that area and the U. S. will not support the National Government vis-à-vis the Communists except in so far as necessary to get the Japanese disarmed and out of China. This ends State Department proposed public stand as understood in the War Department.
2.
Secretary of State has requested that War Department obtain your appraisal of foregoing and ascertain whether you consider it reasonable to state that presence of U. S. Forces in North China is required or desirable in connection with eliminating Japanese from North China and Manchuria. Specifically, do you consider that without further U. S. assistance the Chinese will be able to clear the Japanese first from North China and second from Manchuria. Further, do you believe National Government intends to deport from North China and Manchuria such civilian Japanese as have been left there by Russians.
3.
Further question occasioned by the foregoing is the extent of assistance, including shipping, that you consider must be given in order to expedite the deportation of the Japanese from the area and impact on your plans for the inactivation of Theater.
4.
State Department has raised question of long range impact from military standpoint of repercussions likely to result from
a.
immediate withdrawal of U.S. Forces from North China,
b.
continuance of U. S. Forces in the North China area for the present. Request your view.
5.
State Department desires an urgent answer to paragraph 2 above so you may desire to furnish answers to other questions herein in a second message. Other reference messages to this are Warx 8393845 and Warx 82254.46

  1. Telegram of November 16 from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater, to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Marshall), p. 635.
  2. Not found in Department files.
  3. Telegram of November 9 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, p. 611.