893.00/11–1945
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)41
Our Military Position in China
It is urgent that we reach a decision with regard to our present and future military position in China. Four principal courses of action are open to us: (a) withdraw our Marines from north China and deactivate the U.S. China theater; (b) leave the Marines in north China without altering the mission of the U.S. China theater command; (c) enlarge the theater’s mission to provide for assistance to the Chinese National Government in stabilizing conditions in north China and Manchuria; and (d) enlarge the theater’s mission to provide for more effective and speedy surrender, demobilization, and repatriation of Japanese.
Present Situation. Marines were sent to north China “to seize and hold” certain port areas, to assist in effecting the surrender and demobilization of Japanese forces, and to secure the ports and airfields, thereby making it feasible for the U.S.–China theater commander “to assist the Central Government in a rapid transport of Chinese Government forces to key areas in China” where they could assume the responsibility for demobilization of Japanese forces.
The U.S. Commanding General (Wedemeyer) states that the American forces, including Marines, have completed their assigned mission of assisting in the redisposition of Chinese Central Government [Page 640] forces to facilitate in disarming and repatriating Japanese. He recommends that the entire Marine force be evacuated from China.
There are an estimated million Japanese soldiers in north China, of whom possibly ⅓ have not yet been disarmed and demobilized. Virtually none have been repatriated. Many are still located in inland points.
There are about 160,000 National Government troops and an estimated 450,000 Communist troops in north China.
General Wedemeyer states that he has “placed sufficient Chinese Government troops in north China to disarm the Japanese and facilitate their repatriation were it not for Communist opposition”. He points out that “open civil war may break out once the Marines are removed” but that “it may break out even though the Marines are not evacuated”. He concludes that developments in north China “inevitably will involve our troops in incidents of increasingly serious nature”.
(Alternative solutions on separate following pages.42)
[First Alternative]
(A) Withdrawal of Marines.
Advantages: By withdrawing the Marines (1) we would avoid, as General Wedemeyer has pointed out, involvement of our forces in incident of increasing serious nature arising from Chinese civil warfare; (2) we would silence widespread criticism that we were interfering in the internal affairs of China by supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communists; (3) we would allay possible suspicion on the part of our allies that we were seeking to establish for ourselves a special military position in China; and (4) we might cause Chiang, unsupported by us, to work more earnestly and sincerely to broaden the base of the Chinese Government by bringing in the Communists and other dissident elements.
Disadvantages: Withdrawal (1) would be interpreted by the Chinese Communists as complete success of their propaganda (Wedemeyer); (2) might cause a cessation of vitally needed coal shipments to Shanghai from northern China (Wedemeyer); (3) might cause a widening of the area of civil conflict; and (4) might cause Chiang to utilize Japanese forces to assist him in fighting the Communists.
Implementing Action: Notification to Chiang that the Marines are being withdrawn and the theater being deactivated by “X” date.
[Page 641][Second Alternative]
(B) Leave the Marines in north China without enlarging the mission of the U. S. China theater.
Advantages: The advantages of this course would be that (1) civil war would be kept away from vital port and railroad areas; (2) American citizens and property in the area could be adequately protected; (3) coal exports to Shanghai could be continued; and (4) limited assistance in disarming and arranging for the repatriation of Japanese could be continued.
Disadvantages would arise from continued criticism of our interference in China’s internal affairs on the side of Chiang and from the inevitable involvement of Marines in armed conflicts while we would not be able, because of civil warfare, to make any considerable contribution toward completing the all important task of getting Japanese disarmed and out of China.
Implementing Action: Notify Chiang that the Marines are being kept in north China for a limited period solely to assist in the demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops, that civil warfare is making it both dangerous and difficult for the Marines to be effective in their mission, and urge Chiang to reform his government at an early date to give fair and effective representation to all political elements in the nation, thereby putting a stop to civil warfare and making possible the discharge of his responsibilities in connection with Japanese surrender.
[Third Alternative]
(C) Enlarge the U. S. China theater mission, and retain the Marines, to provide assistance to the Chinese National Government in stabilizing conditions in north China and Manchuria.
Arguments in favor of this action are (1) possible intervention in China by Russia would be avoided; (2) utilization by the National Government of Japanese troops to fight Communists could be prevented; (3) the United States would be able “to capitalize upon the advantages gained in China” during the war (JCS); and (4) in the event of future disturbance in Asia we would have in China a friendly power.
Arguments against this action are (1) we would be intervening unilaterally, contrary to national policy, in the internal affairs of China in a direct and large way; (2) we would be backing a Government which, as General Wedemeyer states, is already showing itself politically inept in reestablishing itself in north China; (3) our intervention in assisting the Chinese National Government to reestablish itself by force in Manchuria would probably be resented by Russia; [Page 642] (4) there is small likelihood that Chiang, even with our assistance, can by military methods bring about stability in north China and Manchuria of a lasting character; (5) American public reaction to intervention or assistance on a scale that would hold any promise of even temporary success would very likely be unfavorable; (6) any hope of persuading Chiang to settle his internal difficulties by political methods would vanish.
Implementing Action: Inform Chiang that we are prepared to transport additional Chinese troops to north China, to assist in transportation of troops to Manchuria, to attach U. S. Army liaison personnel to American trained units transferred to Manchuria; and at the same time inform the Chinese Communists that any interference offered by them to our plans for aiding Chiang will be met with force.
[Fourth Alternative]
(D) Enlarge the theater’s mission to provide for more effective and speedy demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops, especially from north China.
Arguments in favor of this action are (1) prolonged presence of Japanese in north China would have a very unhealthy effect on political developments in China; (2) the National Government might utilize Japanese troops as mercenaries to defeat the Chinese Communists; (3) our actions could be justified both nationally and internationally and, if carried out properly, could avoid criticism as constituting interference in Chinese internal affairs.
Arguments against this action are (1) in spite of careful handling we might become more deeply involved in internal affairs in north China; (2) actual difficulties of carrying out such a program because it would require cooperation on the part of Chinese Communists as well as the National Government and sympathetic understanding on the part of our allies; and (3) unfavorable public reaction to an extended stay in north China of Marines and a possible augmentation in their numbers.
Implementing Action: Inform Chiang (1) that we consider it advisable for us to act more directly and effectively in disarming and getting Japanese troops back to Japan; (2) that, in order for us to do this, it is essential that there be at least a truce between the National Government and the Chinese Communist forces providing for a temporary fixing of troop disposition in north China; (3) that we intend to communicate these views to the Chinese Communists in north China as well as to the Chinese Government; (4) that we expect Chiang and the Communists to utilize this period of truce to negotiate a firm and realistic agreement providing for fair representation of all [Page 643] political elements in the Chinese Government and for cessation of hostilities; (5) that we or Chiang, as he chooses, will notify the other signatories to the Potsdam Declaration43 of our plans to act directly and effectively to bring about the early disarming and repatriation of Japanese troops in north China; (6) that we shall in so far as possible speed up plans for shipping facilities out of north China and may, if necessary, augment our Marine forces in north China; (7) that care will be taken in carrying out our plan to avoid benefit to either National Government or Communist forces in so far as territorial occupation is concerned; (8) that upon completion of the plan we shall withdraw in the hope that a political settlement, if not already reached, will be speedily effected; and finally (9) that, if agreement is not obtained to our proposal, we shall withdraw the Marines from north China, deactivate the U. S. China theater and suspend any action on contemplated military, economic, or financial assistance to China until a solution of its internal difficulties has been achieved.
- Submitted on November 19 to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson); for discussion by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy on November 20 of the problems presented in this memorandum, see p. 646.↩
- Infra. ↩
- Issued July 26, 1945, Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1945 p. 137 or Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1474.↩