Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

711.93/11–1745

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Drumright)³⁴

[Washington,] November 16, 1945.

The Situation in China

a discussion of united states policy with respect thereto

It will be clear that the situation in China has reached a critical stage and that the developments of the next few weeks will have a momentous bearing on the future of China, of the Far East and of the world.

It is evident that the Chinese Communists are making a supreme effort to assert control of north China. It is becoming more and more clear that the Chinese Communists are, furthermore, making a strong bid to seize control of Manchuria. It appears that in this effort to absorb Manchuria, the Chinese Communists have been aided and abetted by the U. S. S. R. which has been in control of all or parts of Manchuria since about the middle of August 1945. Without Soviet assistance, it is difficult to see how the Chinese Communists could have become so securely entrenched in Manchuria as they appear to be today. If the U. S. S. R. has assisted the Chinese Communists to entrench in Manchuria it follows that they have done so in contravention of the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 14, 1945, under the terms of which the Soviets pledged “respect for China’s full sovereignty over the three Eastern Provinces and recognizes their territorial and administrative integrity”, and agreed “to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China”.

It seems obvious that if the Chinese Communists, with or without Soviet aid, are able to entrench themselves securely in north China and in Manchuria, the prospects for a strong and united China will have been dimmed and perhaps irretrievably lost. It will mean the perpetuation in China of two hostile groups, both possessed of armed forces and of a history of political and armed antagonism almost since their inception. It will mean the extension and prolongation of the civil strife which has so unhappily beset China during the past two decades. It will mean that the war of resistance against Japan has been fought in vain; that the prospects for the early establishment of a strong and united China will have been extinguished; and that, instead of the creation of a strong and united China which could contribute materially to the stability of the Far East and the world, we shall have a divided China. A divided China will obviously further the forces of insecurity, invite foreign intervention, and may eventually bring about conditions which will plunge the world into a third world war. A divided China will render ineffective our desire to assist China in rehabilitating and reconstructing its war-torn economy, will prolong the agony of the Chinese people against their desire, and will render difficult, if not impossible, our aim to further our normal relations with that country.

In the light of the foregoing considerations and developments, what should be our position and policy towards China?

It is assumed that our primary objective in this uncertain and disordered world—certainly prior to the establishment of an effective world organization to ensure world peace—is the promotion of the security of the United States.

What policy or policies should we follow with respect to China in order to attain this primary objective—the security of the United States? It has been our traditional policy to advocate and support respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of China. As a corollary to that policy we have sought the emergence of a strong, unified, progressive government in China. Since 1928 we, in common with the great majority of the Powers, have recognized the National Government of China as the legitimate government of China and have had continuous relations with it. Since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor we have been allied with that government in waging war against Japan. Indeed, one of the prime reasons for the Japanese decision to attack us lies in our defense of the National Government of China.^* Moreover, there was incorporated in the Cairo Declaration of 1943³⁵ a pledge on the part of the United States, Great Britain and China “that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China”. At the Potsdam Conference of 1945 the Government of the U. S. S. R. signified its adherence to the terms of the Cairo Declaration.³⁶ It thus appears that we are bound under the terms of the Cairo Declaration to see to it that Manchuria and the other areas mentioned therein are restored to the Republic of China. The U. S. S. R. appears to be obligated not only by the terms of the Cairo Declaration but by the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty and related agreements of August 1945 to restore Manchuria to the National Government of the Republic of China.

As has been indicated in the opening paragraphs of this paper, the National Government of China and the Chinese Communists are locked in a struggle for political and military control of north China and Inner Mongolia. As regards Manchuria, there are strong indications that the Chinese Communists are entrenching themselves in at least the southern portion and are prepared to resist efforts on the part of the National Government to move troops into Manchuria or to attain effective control of Manchuria. The Soviets, for their part, have blocked attempts of the National Government to land forces at Dairen on the alleged grounds that Dairen is a “free port” and therefore not available for the transit of troops. According to recent press reports, the National Government has approached the Soviet Government for facilities to land troops in Manchuria by air, but judging from their past attitude, it seems likely that the Soviets will find grounds for non-compliance with this request.

The United States has since the surrender of Japan been aiding the National Government in effecting the surrender, disarming and repatriation of the Japanese armed forces in China. The United States has been particularly active in transporting Chinese armed forces for this purpose. In certain areas of north China the United States has landed United States Marines to assist the Chinese authorities in rounding up and effecting the disarmament of the Japanese armed forces. It has been announced that the Marines will be withdrawn as soon as sufficient Chinese armed forces have been transported to north China to handle the Japanese armed forces in that area. The United States also undertook to transport Chinese armed forces to Hulutao and Yingkow, in southern Manchuria, but refused to land the Chinese when it became apparent that the landings would be opposed by Chinese Communists or irregulars. The Chinese forces destined for Hulutao and Yingkow were subsequently landed at Chinwangtao and are now massed before Shanhaikuan, the overland gateway to Manchuria.

How may we best safeguard our security and interests in the light of developments in China as described above?

We appear to be faced with two major alternatives: (1) To give vigorous and sustained support to the National Government to the end that it may obtain effective control of all parts of China, including Manchuria; or (2) withdrawal of our support from the National Government and of our armed forces and facilities from China. We have accorded a large measure of support to the National Government in effecting the restoration thereto of the recovered areas in south, east, central and north China. With respect to Manchuria, however, we have refused to land Chinese troops at Dairen in the absence of a Sino-Soviet agreement to permit such a landing or at the Manchurian ports of Hulutao and Yingkow in the face of probable resistance from Chinese Communists or irregulars. Our failure to assist the National Government in landing its forces in Manchuria obviously renders difficult the occupation of that area by the National Government.

It is submitted that, in the interests of our own security and peace and stability in the Far East, we should move resolutely and effectively to assist the National Government of China to effect restoration of the recovered areas of China, including Manchuria. We appear to be on firm legal and moral grounds in pursuing such a policy, and its implementation will, it seems clear, offer the best opportunity for the unification of China and diminution of the possibility of foreign intervention. Failure to afford substantial assistance to the National Government in this respect is likely to result in the creation in Manchuria and perhaps in parts of north China and Inner Mongolia of a strongly entrenched Chinese Communist regime contiguous to the U. S. S. R. The establishment of a Communist regime in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and north China would probably result in the perpetuation in China for some time to come of two antagonistic states and would almost certainly result in a prolonged and disastrous struggle which would not terminate until one or the other of the factions was eliminated. A Communist state in north China, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria or parts thereof would, it can scarcely be doubted, receive the strong support of the U. S. S. R. Such a Communist regime could hardly be expected to regard the United States in a friendly light. The United States, bearing in mind the close ideological and other ties that exist between the Chinese Communists and the U. S. S. R. could scarcely, for its part, view the development of such a state, de facto or otherwise, with equanimity. Considering the character, the ideology and the past attitude of the Chinese Communists, it is difficult to perceive how American interests of any kind could flourish in such a Communist state. The creation of such a Communist state would seem, in effect, to bring about a situation which in many important particulars would be little different from that obtaining before the defeat of Japan. Instead of a Japanese-dominated puppet regime we should probably find in its place one dominated by the U. S. S. R. Obviously such a development is neither one that was contemplated by us when we went to war with Japan nor one that will promote the security and interests of the United States. It is rather a situation that will produce a continuation of internal strife in China and the possibility of a clash between the United States and the U. S. S. R. As the Japanese absorption of Manchuria contributed to the exacerbation of American-Japanese relations, so would Soviet control of Manchuria seem to sow the seeds for a fundamental cleavage between the United States and the U. S. S. R.

It is submitted that in the implementation of our policies towards China we should be guided primarily, as has been stated above, by considerations of our own security interests. Other considerations, such as democracy in China, questions as to the relative efficiency of the two contending factions, the question of “fratricidal strife”, et cetera, would thus seem to be of secondary concern and should accordingly be so regarded at this time.

It is submitted that in order to safeguard our own interests and security we should continue to accord support to the National Government of China; that we should continue to give it all needed assistance in demobilizing and repatriating the large numbers of Japanese who remain in China; and that we should, above all, afford it all necessary assistance in recovering all lost territories—and especially Manchuria. Steps to obtain the recovery of Manchuria should be made at all speed lest the area be irretrievably lost to the National Government. If we deem it unwise or undesirable to participate in the landing of National Government troops in Manchuria we should, as an alternative, supply the National Government with the necessary shipping to conduct its own landing operations. We can meantime proceed with plans to assist in the renovation and modernization of China’s armed forces and in the rehabilitation of her economy.

It is submitted that any policy of American withdrawal from China at this juncture or of half-hearted assistance to China will destroy what we wish to achieve—a strong, united China with close and friendly attachments to the United States. It goes without saying that a disunited China or a China that is unfriendly towards the United States will be an ever-present menace to the security of our country and inimical to the principles which we espouse.

34. In forwarding this memorandum to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) on November 17 commented: “Attached is a copy of a well-thought out and well-written memorandum.… I spoke of it to you this morning and think you will find it well worth reading. Mr. Drumright’s major thesis is that ‘we should, above all, afford it (the Chinese Government) all necessary assistance in recovering all lost territory—and especially Manchuria.’ He argues that such action by us is essential if we are to have a united China and that a united China is essential to our own security.”
35. In our note of November 26, 1941, to the Government of Japan we proposed as one step in the settling of American-Japanese differences that “The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.” [Footnote in the original; for the note of November 26, 1941, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 768.]
35. See White House press release of December 1, 1943, Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 393, or Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943, p. 448.
36. For the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1474. For Soviet adherence to the Declaration on August 8, see ibid. , footnote 1.