Nanking Embassy Files, Lot F–73: Telegram
The Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)
[Chungking, November 14, 1945.]
[CLO 672.] Answers to five questions in your Warx 8097531 follow (lettering of paragraphs correspond to lettering of questions in subject message):
- a.
- ODD refer to CACX 007832 from ComGenThirdPhibCorps which states that no advance of Marines north of Chinwangtao has been made except for a small party who conferred with Communist leaders. Marines have been meticulous in adhering to assigned mission of “occupying key areas and such adjacent areas as necessary for the security of their own force”. Patrols and train guards operate between Chinwangtao and Tientsin. This is essential for security of vital LOC.33
- b.
- At present in the general area Peiping–Tientsin–Taku–Chinwangtao there are four specially selected Chinese Armies, the 13th, 52d, 92d and 94th. These four armies should be sufficient to occupy at once the key installations now held by the Marines and to control the limited area originally secured for them by the Marines. However, if the Generalissimo insists upon UBPTNDING [sic] (defending) (expanding) the area with the Chinese troops in hand, particularly into Manchuria, the presence of the Marines would be required indefinitely. In Tsingtao area Marines could be relieved about 25 November upon assumption of control by Chinese Eighth Army now afloat and en route. Obviously the Chinese desire to employ U.S. Forces to stabilize important strategic situation created by the Chinese Communists. It is my conviction that the Americans have assisted the Chinese to redeploy adequate forces for the repatriation of the Japanese, this in accordance with Theater Directive. The Americans have not authority under existing Directive to provide assistance in moving additional Chinese Forces to the north for their unquestioned projected employment against Chinese Communists.
- c.
- The plan up to the present visualizes movements north from the Peiping–Tientsin area and dispositions in UEY ATEDA (key areas) in Manchuria by air and/or sea, such areas are not dominated by Chinese Communist Forces. American evaluation of situation indicates that the Chinese Central Government is completely unprepared for occupation of Manchuria against Communist opposition. Americans recommended to Generalissimo that the Chinese should adopt the immediate objective of consolidating the area south of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze, particularly, and initially of securing overland line of communications in that area, prior to entry into Manchuria.
- d.
- Communists strongly dispute North China area, threatening all lines of communication. Communist sympathy exists in Tsingtao, Peking, Tientsin, Tangshao, Tangku and Chinwangtao due to dissatisfaction of local populace with corruption and inefficiency of Kuomintang administration in those areas. Presence of Marines is definite deterrent to major disorders through [though] it is believed the Central Government can maintain control of these areas if available Chinese troops are not dispersed or diverted to Manchuria.
- e.
- Communist strategy is designed to arouse public opinion, Chinese and American, against retention of Marines and against provision of more U.S. assistance in any form to the Central Government. Their current allegations, concerning Marine attacks in conjunction with minor advances of Central Government has been accepted by some Chinese to a limited extent. Investigation indicates these allegations are false or badly distorted and exaggerated reports of minor incidents. Communist efforts are being directed toward provoking of armed conflict upon part of Marines, thereby lending credence to their accusation of armed intervention of U.S. in Chinese internal affairs. Inept and corrupt administration of Kuomintang officials newly arrived in North China is gaining support for Communists. The victories and power of the Soviet system remain a major Chinese Communist propaganda theme despite the repudiation of Chinese Communism implied by Soviet relations and negotiations with Central Government. Soviet efforts appear directed toward outward show of cooperation with Chiang’s representatives but Soviet definitely appears to be creating favorable conditions for the acquisition by Chinese Communists of key areas in North China and Manchuria. Concurrently the Soviet is placing obstacles in the way to preclude consummation of Chinese Central Government plans for the recovery of these areas.