The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, has indicated that he
considers it possible to commence withdrawal of U.S. Marines from China on
15 November 1945, and that the China Theater can be deactivated on 1 January
1946, at which time all U.S. Army Forces can have been withdrawn. He further
recommends that the Chinese Government be so advised. (paragraph 2,
Enclosure)
The present directive to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater,
issued on 10 August 1945,20
provides for the continuance of U.S. military assistance to the Central
Government only so long as necessary “for the purpose of supporting Chinese
military operations essential to the reoccupation by Central Government
forces of all areas in the China Theater now held by the Japanese …”21 Under this directive three Chinese armies have
already been moved to North China—some of which are destined for Manchuria.
The estimates on which these plans were based considered that the task of
these Chinese forces would be to disarm the Japanese, and the strength of
forces to be moved was calculated accordingly. It now appears, however, that
the major immediate task of these forces will be to insure that the control
of the liberated areas is secured by the National Government and is not
usurped by the Communists, and the forces already moved are being utilized
accordingly.
There is a definite question in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
under present directives and arrangements, the disarmament and repatriation
of the large number of Japanese in China, including Manchuria, will be
completed. There is also a definite question that the Central Government
will in fact gain control of Manchuria in consonance with various
international commitments. In view of the present situation with reference
to U.S. assistance to China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
Secretary of State should be apprised of the situation and that the State
Department should be given an opportunity to review the matter from a
political standpoint before the final orders are issued by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
If the threat of civil strife in North China and Manchuria has not been
overcome by the time U.S. forces are withdrawn, it may be that stability in
that area can be attained only by outside intervention. This might be
through intervention of Russia, whose special interest in Manchuria has been
recently recognized in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, or by the utilization by the
Central Government of the armed Japanese forces remaining in the area to
insure Central Government control of the area. Either the use of Japanese or
Russian forces in this area, or the likely alternative—full-fledged civil
war—might well jeopardize the attainment of U.S. objectives in China. In
either of these events the United States would be failing to capitalize upon
the advantages gained in China during this war in which huge amounts of
American money, resources and manpower have been devoted during the war.
In any case, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it undesirable to deactivate
the China Theater until the U.S. Military Advisory Group has been
established in China, and are so informing the Commanding
[Page 621]
General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, and the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore urgently require political guidance on
the following matters:
enclosure
1. The pertinent part of message CM–IN 10698 from Commanding General,
U.S. Forces, China Theater (ComGenChina) to War Department on 23 October
1945 is:
“China Theater can be inactivated as of 15 December provided Mr.
McCloy’s message (CM–IN 9091, 19 Oct 45) is approved and
provided our requisitions for shipping for redeploying United
States troops from Shanghai to United States are met.”
2. The pertinent parts of message CM–IN 12147 of 26 October 1945 from
ComGenChina to War Department are:
“The mission assigned to the Marine forces by China Theater will
have been completed when Central Government forces have occupied
the areas held by the Marines, and have taken over from them
responsibility for the Japanese forces in the areas
involved.
“To retain U.S. forces in areas of possible conflict between
Chinese Central Government and Communist forces would, (if) such
possible conflict becomes a reality, inextricably involve U.S.
personnel and result in injury and loss of life to Americans.
Involvement of Americans in fratricidal warfare in China cannot
be justified under our interpretation of the presently assigned
mission of the China Theater.
“In view of the above, unless our mission is changed, it is
recommended therefore that the Marine forces be removed from
China commencing 15 November and that the Chinese Government be
notified by the U.S. Government that the Marine forces will be
withdrawn commencing that date.”
3. In General Order No. 1, Instruments for the Surrender of Japan, the
Japanese in China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China
north of 16 degrees north latitude were directed to surrender to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
[Page 622]
4. a. Warx 52593 [51593]
(25 [24] October 1944)23 contains the
original mission assigned the China Theater by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff:
“3. Mission.
-
a.
- Your primary mission with respect to Chinese forces is to
advise and assist the Generalissimo in the conduct of
military operations against the Japanese.
-
b.
- Your primary mission as to U.S. combat forces under your
command is to carry out air operations from China. In
addition you will continue to assist the Chinese air and
ground forces in operations, training and in logistical
support.
-
c.
- You will not employ United States resources for
suppression of civil strife except in so far as necessary to
protect United States lives and property.”
b. In Warx 47513 (10 August 1945) the Joint
Chiefs of Staff supplemented the original directive to ComGenChina, in
part, as follows:
“1. a. This directive supplements that
contained in Warx 51593 of 24 October 1944, and becomes effective at
the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform you of the capitulation of
the Japanese National Government.
b. All of its provisions apply only in so far
as action in accordance therewith does not prejudice the basic U.S.
principle that the United States will not support the Central
Government of China in fratricidal war.
“2. It is not proposed to involve U.S. ground forces in a major land
campaign in any part of the China Theater. However, U.S. Pacific
theater forces are preparing to secure control of key ports and
communication points in the China Theater for the purpose of
assisting China Theater forces. Command or operational control of
U.S. forces entering the China Theater will pass to ComGenChina in
accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon by the
commanders concerned. ComGenChina is responsible for coordination
with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the planning and execution of
all operations in the China Theater.
“3. In case Japanese forces in China continue resistance after
capitulation of the Japanese home government, you will continue your
present mission with reference to the Generalissimo and to U.S.
forces under your command. Your action on Japanese capitulation will
be on the basis that military assistance will be continued for the
present for the purpose of supporting Chinese military operations
essential to the re-occupation by Central Government forces of all
areas in the China Theater now held by the Japanese, and the placing
of Chinese occupation forces in Japan proper, Formosa, and
Korea.24
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Page 623]
“6. You will assist the Central Government in the rapid transport of
Chinese Central Government forces to key areas in China. Other
indicated U.S. support of these Chinese forces will be given as now
normal to your mission.”
c. In Warx 77563 (20 October 1945) the Joint
Chiefs of Staff further supplement the original directive to
ComGenChina, in part, as follows:
“In addition to Mission given in Warx 51593, 24 October 1944, and
Warx 47513, 10 August 1945, the following directive is approved
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You are directed:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. To administer to the needs of
recovered U.S. military personnel and to give appropriate
assistance to the State Department representatives in
administering U.S. displaced persons in accordance with Warx
54719 …
c. To make plans and preparations for
such U.S. military advisory group to China as may be established
…
d. To close out all U.S. Army
installations, commands and activities in the China Theater at
the earliest practicable date consistent with your presently
assigned mission.
“Based on the above, desire estimated date on which the Theater
mission as herein stated can be accomplished and headquarters,
U.S. Forces, China Theater, can be deactivated. Request also
recommend schedule for withdrawal of Marine forces from
China.”
5. CM–IN 22159 (27 September 1945), from ComGenChina, contains the
mission assigned the U.S. Marines by the China Theater.
“The Generalissimo, the Combined Staff and the ComGenChina concur
in the following revised directive to the Commanding General,
Third Amphibious Corps:
“The mission of the Commanding General, Third Corps, is to seize
and hold the Tientsin–Taku, Tsingtao and Chefoo areas. He will,
for the security of his own forces and of the areas stated,
occupy such intermediate and adjacent areas as he deems
necessary.”
6. In CM–IN 12976 of 27 October 1945 ComGenChina advised the War
Department that:
“If all U.S. surplus Army equipment and supplies are disposed of
to the Chinese by a bulk sale on a where is, as is basis as we
have recommended and which is now under consideration between
the two governments, no personnel will be required by the
theater for this purpose after 1 January 1946.
“In summary, no personnel will be required in China to implement
our mission after 1 January 1946 except those required for the
Advisory Group, provided our surplus supplies and equipment are
disposed of to the Chinese by a bulk sale.”
[Page 624]
7. Warx 80362 (1 November 1945), from the War Department to ComGenChina,
states, in part, as follows:
“Neither Joint Chiefs of Staff nor War Department have set a
definite date for inactivation of China Theater. While theater
can probably be evacuated by 31 December, based on shipping
alone, other requirements may necessitate theater remaining
active after that date or other arrangements made to handle
responsibilities of this nature. Accordingly your plans and
recommendations to the War Department should take cognizance of
such a possibility.”
8. By J. C. S. 1330/1025 (U.S. Military
Advisory Group to China) (SWNCC 83/8), approved 23 October 1945, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan for a United States Advisory Group
to China and requested the State Department to negotiate with the
Chinese Government for its establishment.
