893.20 Mission/11–1245
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State
The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has before it two papers submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One of these papers (SWNCC 83/8)15 deals with a U.S. military advisory group to China and the other (SWNCC 83/7)16 with U. S. military assistance for China. Because of far-reaching policy considerations inherent in these papers, the Committee has deferred action on them pending an indication of your views.
On September 14 the President informed Dr. T. V. Soong that it appeared practicable for us to assist China in the completion of the 39 division program. He also approved “in principle” a military advisory mission to China. But he told Dr. Soong: “It should be [Page 615] clearly understood that military assistance furnished by the United States would not be diverted for use in fratricidal warfare or to support undemocratic administration.”
The “Military Assistance” paper calls for an increase in the 39 division program to 50 divisions. Decision with regard to this military assistance is closely related to, if not dependent upon, decision with regard to a military advisory group.
The “Military Advisory Group” paper provides for American personnel of approximately 1,000 Army officers and 2,600 enlisted men, and from 300 to 700 Navy personnel.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend “promptness in initiating an orderly program of military assistance to the Chinese” because it “will tend to forestall them from seeking military assistance elsewhere”. They say that “economic and political assistance (to China) should be carefully integrated at all times with the military assistance provided to China”!. They request that the State Department undertake the necessary action to negotiate the required contracts between the U.S. and China for the establishment of an Advisory Group. It is desired that the negotiations be completed by the end of the year because present plans call for the complete deactivation of the U.S. Army China Theater Command by that time. It is pointed out that Congressional authorization will be required to continue the Group in being after the President’s emergency powers have expired.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff list certain rights or concessions desired from China in return for our furnishing the Advisory Group. Important among these are: (1) complete exemption from any form of import duty or taxation on goods to be used or consumed by the personnel of the Group; (2) exemption from Chinese jurisdiction for all Group personnel, civilian as well as military; (3) China to refrain from supporting armed forces (Chinese) not sponsored by the U.S., when such support would interfere quantitatively or qualitatively with the effectiveness or efficiency of the U.S. sponsored units; (4) China may purchase military equipment from another power only after consultation with the Adivsory Group; and (5) certain preferential treatment for American commercial organizations in China.
Comment:
The size and character of the Group, the statement of concessions desired, and the general tenor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers raise a question as to whether we are not moving toward establishment of a relationship with China which has some of the characteristics of a de facto protectorate with a semi-colonial Chinese army under our direction.
[Page 616]In a paper approved on October 24 by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC 83/6—copy attached17) there is a statement that “The objectives of the United States in the Far East are: (a) To provide for the security of the United States and its territory and for the maintenance of international peace; and (b) To create a political atmosphere conducive to the establishment of mutually beneficial commercial and cultural relations between the United States and its citizens and Far Eastern Areas and their nationals.” There is also a statement that “The achievement of these objectives in China requires a friendly, unified, independent nation with a stable government resting, in so far as practicable, on the freely expressed support of the Chinese people”.
The proposal for a Military Advisory Group requires close examination in relation to these stated objectives. It obviously would be unwise to send an American Military Advisory Group to China simply because it would please Chiang Kai-shek or because we thought that if we did not do it some other nation would. If we decide that a Military Advisory Group in China would further our objective of providing for the security of the United States, then we should approve the Group. However, in this connection we should have in mind possible political and international reactions to determine whether, in seeking to provide for military security in this manner, we have not disturbed our international political relations to a point that might negate the assumed security advantages of our military position in China.
We have stated on numerous occasions that we desire a free, unified, independent China with a government broadly representative of the Chinese people. It has also been made clear to China on many occasions that we do not intend that military assistance and advice shall be used in support of an administration not in conformity with the general policies of the United States, or in support of fratricidal warfare, or as a threat of aggression. We should have reasonable assurances that an Advisory Group of the size and character proposed would in fact encourage the development of a unified and democratic China. Chiang Kai-shek has in the past shown a decided preference for military methods, rather than political methods, in seeking a solution of internal difficulties in China and his methods have fallen short of success. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that American military assistance on the scale contemplated might encourage Chiang to continue along this line without promise of success, and discourage [Page 617] attempts at unity by peaceful methods. If an American Military Advisory Group could be effective in bringing into being a unified, democratic China and in the process not create international political difficulties with our Allies, there would be no question as to the advisability of setting up the Group. On the other hand if the Group serves simply to encourage Chiang to seek a settlement of his difficulties by means of force and if the maintenance of unity in China were to become dependent upon American military assistance in the form of materiél and advice, we would find ourselves in an unenviable, and perhaps untenable, position.
The President has indicated his approval “in principle” of a military mission for China and I believe that such a mission could serve a useful purpose but I also believe that its character, size, and probable activities, should be carefully and thoughtfully examined in the light of considerations set forth above.
One further thought. Although the contemplated size of this Group would seem to be excessive for the purpose of staff instruction and training, the War Department states that the personnel of the Group would not be employed in field operations. Personnel of the U. S. Army China Theater Command has been engaged in field operations. Such being the case, it might be advisable to postpone setting up the Group until after the Theater Command has been completely deactivated in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding with respect to the operational functions of the Theater Command and the advisory functions of the proposed Group.
Finally, I may express my general conviction that interference in the internal affairs of China would not pay dividends and involvement in civil strife in China would occasion serious difficulties for us without compensatory advantages. I say this, not to discourage giving China military assistance and advice, but as a caution against what I detect as being certain concepts and features of the Group—its character, size, and relation to the Chinese Government—which may, unless restraint and judgment are used, have the effect of carrying the Group, and us, into the field of intervention and involvement in China’s internal political and military affairs.
Certainly the Congress should be informed fully and in detail of the Group in advance of any negotiations the State Department undertakes with the Chinese Government looking toward the creation of the Group, because, upon the expiration of the President’s emergency powers, Congressional authorization will be required to continue the Group in being.