893.00/11–445: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

1920. Military Attaché’s report for week ending October 27, delayed in receipt, briefly summarized below:

Hostilities in Shantung between Government and Communists increased; Govt has not enough forces for actual control of province and fluid situation developing; in Shantung and northeast area generally constant small-scale attacks against railways attributed to Communists. No appreciable hostilities in Hopei during week, but Govt troops continued movement into province. Withdrawal of Communist New Fourth Army elements north from Kiangsu and Chekiang is proceeding in accordance with agreement between Generalissimo and Mao; withdrawal is one of convenience as well as agreement: Communist position in Chekiang was growing untenable and danger of isolation from Eighth Route Army in north was increasing; these New Fourth Army Forces will now augment strength of other Communist forces in north.

[Page 602]

Summary of Military Attaché’s report for week ending Nov. 3 follows: Threat of large-scale civil war in China seemed to be growing during past week as fighting was reported in several regions. Communists assert that Central Govt Armies have attacked all Communist “liberated” areas and thus far have succeeded in driving troops of New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies out of 31 cities in 10 different provinces. Yenan also alleges that Central Govt troops by continual attacks are hindering the northward withdrawal of New Fourth Army provided for in recent agreement. Reports from Central Govt state that cities in Shansi, Shantung, Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, and Honan are being attacked in strength by Communists.

Principal factor in crisis now taking shape in North China continues to be disruption of railway communication. That situation is grave is clearly demonstrated by postponement of convocation in Chungking of newly organized Political Consultative Council, in deference to discussions between Central Govt and Communists concerning a military truce. Principal weapon of Communists in their efforts to prevent Central Govt occupation of areas dominated by them has been effectiveness of Communist troops against railroads in these areas. With arrival of Central Govt troops in Shantung and Hopei provinces, position of Communists there is believed to be deteriorating. Obviously, for Communists to desist from exploiting their advantages of position would be military suicide. Consequently, during current discussions they have offered to refrain from attacking lines of communication only if Central Govt promises to stop movement of troops into North China. Central Govt has refused flatly to do this, and no agreement has been arrived at. Indications exist that situation in Suiyuan and Shansi has taken on a new urgency and that that area may become another center of serious internal strife. In a series of contradictory assertions, responsibility for aggressive action in these provinces has been shunted from one side to the other. Because of increasing reluctance of either party to compromise its military position by making concessions in any areas, it appears at present almost hopeless that any permanently satisfactory solution can be reached.

Robertson