740.00119 PW/10–2545
Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee84
SWNCC 83/6
[Washington, October 22, 1945.]
Policy of the United States Toward China With Special
Reference to U. S. Military Responsibility in
the Training and Equipment of Chinese Armed Forces
Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee
for the Far East
the problem
1. To review general U. S. policy toward China, with particular relation to
military and political considerations.
2. In the light of such review to determine what assistance should be given
by the United States in the training and equipment of Chinese armed
forces.
facts bearing on the problem
3. See Appendix “A”.85
discussion
4. See Appendix “B”.86
[Page 584]
conclusions
5. The objectives of the United States in the Far East are:
-
a.
- To provide for the security of the United States and its territory
and for the maintenance of international peace; and
-
b.
- To create a political atmosphere conducive to the establishment of
mutually beneficial commercial and cultural relations between the
United States and its citizens and Far Eastern Areas and their
nationals.
6. The achievement of these objectives in China requires a friendly, unified,
independent nation with a stable government resting, in so far as
practicable, on the freely expressed support to [of?]
the Chinese people.
7. To the end that the progress and development of China in this direction
may be furthered, the following should be established as policies of the
United States:
-
a.
- To support and assist the national government of China in
development along lines which are compatible with our basic
objectives in the Far East;
-
b.
- To assist and advise China in the development of modern armed
forces, ground, sea and air, for the following purposes only: (1)
maintenance of internal peace and security in China, including the
liberated areas of Manchuria and Formosa, and (2) the fulfillment of
those obligations which may devolve upon China in the occupation of
Korea and Japan;
-
c.
- To discontinue our assistance to the development of Chinese armed
forces, upon due notice to the Chinese Government, if at any time it
is established to the satisfaction of the United States Government
that the Chinese armed forces are being used in support of an
administration not in conformity with the general policies of the
United States, to engage in fratricidal war, or to afford a threat
of aggression.
8. The extent to which political stability is being achieved in China under a
unified, fully representative government is regarded by the United States as
a basic consideration which will at all times govern the furnishing of
economic, military, or other assistance to that nation. The question of
continuing such assistance should be reconsidered periodically in relation
to this basic consideration.
9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested to survey and report upon
the needs of China’s armed forces in the light of the policies outlined
above, and to recommend to the Secretaries of War and the Navy as to the
nature and extent of United States assistance in the development and
maintenance of these armed forces.
10. The Secretary of State should arrange, either through our established
diplomatic and consular representation in China or through representation on
such military and naval missions or other means as may be available to him,
for a continuing survey of, and periodic
[Page 585]
review and report upon, political conditions and
developments in China as they are related to the extension of military aid
to that country. Upon the basis of such survey, review and report, this
government should periodically reconsider the extent to which further
military assistance should be afforded to China, and the conditions upon
which it should be extended.
11. The terms and conditions of all aid rendered to China should be
established under arrangements to be agreed upon between the Governments of
the United States and China. The arrangements should include the methods of
payment, financial and otherwise, by China for the aid rendered by the
United States.
12. It is believed that this paper should not be made public or communicated
to any foreign governments. We should, however, keep other interested
governments adequately informed of steps taken to implement our policy.
recommendations
13. It is recommended that:
-
a.
- This report be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment
from the military point of view; and
-
b.
- Upon approval by the SWNCC of the “Conclusions” in paragraphs 5 to
12 above, this report be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and to the State, War and Navy Departments for their guidance and,
where appropriate, for implementation.
[Annex 1]
Appendix “A”
Facts Bearing on the Problem
1. A memorandum from the Department of State on 3 April 1945,87 Appendix to SWNCC 83/1,88 includes the following
statements concerning United States policies:
“2. Long-range Objectives and Policy of the United States with
respect to China.
“The American Government’s long-range policy with respect to
China is based on the need to have China a principal stabilizing
factor in the Far East as a fundamental condition for peace and
security in that area. In particular, the political aspects of
our policy are directed toward the establishment of a strong,
stable and united China with a government representative of the
wishes of the Chinese people which will effectively discharge
its internal and international responsibilities. While favoring
no political faction we continue to support the existing
government of China. However, we look for the establishment
[Page 586]
within its framework
of the unified and effective type of government that is
needed.…89
“3. Important political and economic considerations, some of
which are mentioned below, are involved in the development of a
strong China capable of contributing effectively ot the
maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. The future
military strength of China is also an important element. A
well-trained and well-equipped Chinese national (non-political)
army, supported by a modern air force, would unquestionably
contribute materially to the maintenance of a strong China.…
“4. Political Considerations.
“Existing political conditions in China are such as to require
the greatest caution and flexibility in the application of
measures designed to implement the objectives set forth in
paragraph 1.
- “a. The American Government
recognizes and supports the National Government of the
Republic of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.
However, the unrepresentative character of the present
government which is strictly controlled by a single party,
namely, the Kuomintang, the inefficiency of its
governmental, administrative and judicial machinery, the
inefficiency and corruption prevalent in the present Chinese
army and air force, the lack of protection accorded to
persons and property, and the absence of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press, constitute factors which have
created widespread dissatisfaction with the present National
Government.
- “b. There are political groups of
varying strength and importance which are opposed to the
present Kuomintang-controlled National Government. These
are:
- “(1) The Chinese Communist Party which, during the
past ten years and in spite of the efforts of the
National Government to liquidate its members, has
developed into a dynamic force controlling
considerable areas in the provinces of Shensi,
Shansi, Hopei, Shantung, Anhwei and Kiangsu. It
exercises political and military control over a
population variously estimated to range from twenty
to fifty million people.
- “(2) The Democratic League which may be described
as a loose federation of minor political parties and
groups opposed to continued control of the
government by a single party, namely, the
Kuomintang.
- “(3) Certain Chinese militarists in Szechuan,
Yunnan and Kwangsi. Mention might also be made of
the semi-independent military rules of Tsinghai,
Sikang and Ninghsia whose allegiance to the National
Government is largely nominal.
“The existence of these dissident elements.… constitutes a
disturbing factor in the present political situation in China.
This political disaffection has, of course, been greatly
aggravated by the severe hardships suffered by the people as a
result of eight years of continuous resistance to the
Japanese.
“It appears … to be of the utmost importance that our support of
the present Kuomintang-controlled National Government should be
realistically alert to these political factors.… Through our
diplomatic and military representatives in China, efforts are
being made
[Page 587]
to induce
the leaders of the present National Government to take rapid and
concrete measures to effect the establishment of constitutional
government and to bring about the internal unity and solidarity
which is essential to the development of China as a strong
nation capable of maintaining peace and security in the Far
East. Whether … a constitutional government based solidly upon
the support of the people will in fact be established in the
near future remains to be seen.”
2. Recent military support rendered the Chinese Government has been
consistent with the United States short-range policy as communicated by
the Department of State to the Secretaries of War and the Navy and by
them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about 1 February 1945.90 The execution of this policy through the medium of
military lend-lease included transfer of equipment for and training of a
Chinese army of thirty-nine divisions and, on a lesser scale, support of
the Chinese air force. It is estimated that of the equipment involved in
the thirty-nine division program approximately one-third has been handed
over in China to the Chinese Government, approximately one-third is in
the Chinese and India–Burma theaters but not yet turned over to the
Chinese, one fifth is enroute between United States and Asia ports and
practically all the remainder is assigned but not yet shipped from the
United States.
3. Generalissimo Chiang and Dr. Soong have at various times requested
that United States military aid be furnished China to the extent of
equipping and training from 90 to 120 Chinese divisions.
4. On 14 September 1945, the President made the following oral statement
to Dr. T. V. Soong concerning assistance to China:
[Here follows statement printed on page
561.]
[Annex 2]
Appendix “B”
discussion
- 1.
- The objective of the United States Government in the Pacific and
the Far East are essentially two-fold:
-
a.
- To provide for the security of the United States and its
territory and for the maintenance of international peace;
and
-
b.
- To create a political atmosphere conducive to the
establishment of mutually beneficial commercial and cultural
relations between the United States and its citizens and Far
Eastern areas and their nationals. Policies and implementing
procedures should be carefully examined to determine whether
and to what degree they are consonant with and contribute
toward the achievement of these objectives.
- 2.
- SWNCC 83/1, as of the date that it was promulgated,91 constituted a clear
statement of our policy of encouraging a united democratic China,
with particular relation to the furnishing of military assistance
and advice as a means to that end. Developments since then, however,
have resulted in changes in the relative importance, as outlined
below, of some of the considerations discussed therein:
-
a.
- Recently resumed Kuomintang–Communist conversations
indicate that efforts are being made to improve the internal
Chinese political situation. The greatly increased fluidity
of the Chinese political situation resulting from the end of
hostilities with Japan and the problems precipitated by this
event make it clear that the means of implementing U. S.
objectives in that country must be considered flexible and
subject to frequent review in the light of changing
circumstances.
- 3.
- In SWNCC 83/2/D92 the statement is made that
“Continued support to China, if it is to be adopted, should be
carried on without hiatus in order best to preserve the present
favorable position of the United States with respect to China.” Our
“present favorable position” in China, cannot, in the context of
SWNCC 83/2/D and in the light of the present situation, be
interpreted otherwise than as referring to our position as military
collaborators with Chiang Kai-shek. The question whether a
continuation or capitalization of this position will contribute
toward the objective of our security in the Pacific and Far East and
the maintenance of international peace requires close examination in
the light of a number of factors. SWNCC 83/2/D states that
“consideration of the World-wide military surplus stocks now
existing makes it appear that the Chinese Government will receive
military support from other sources if the United States position of
support to the Chinese Government is not maintained.” The U. S. S.
R. is admittedly in mind. However, one must keep the U. S. S. R. in
mind, not only as a possible supplier of material and advice to
China in the event that we do not, but also as a competitor in the
event that we do supply materials and advice on a scale which the U.
S. S. R. might interpret as threatening. The Russian intention to
withdraw all Soviet forces from Manchuria and recent informal but
authoritative expressions of Russian opinion indicate that the U. S.
S. R. is for the present at least prepared to deal with us on a
partnership basis in the Far East. It is to our interest to
encourage and support this position on the
[Page 589]
part of the U. S. S. R. It is likewise the
general policy of the United States to consider common problems on a
consultative basis.
- 4.
- In granting any military assistance to China we should therefore
exercise care to give no basis for a suspicion that we are creating
a de facto colonial army in China under our
official aegis. For this reason consideration should be given to
informing other interested governments of steps being taken by the
United States toward the implementation of our policy. The Chinese
Government should be advised informally at the time agreements for
advice and assistance are negotiated that the United States would
expect China not to accept concurrent military assistance or
representatives (other than normal military and naval attachés) from
other nations without prior consultation with the United
States.
- 5.
- In addition to the foregoing considerations which are
predominantly political, our policies toward China must also be
surveyed in relation to economic requirements. This will be the
subject of another paper, but the point must be emphasized at this
time that our over-all policy vis-à-vis China embraces political and
economic as well as military considerations, and that our policies
in relation to military affairs must be integrated with and used in
support of our policies in other fields.
- 6.
- It is consistent with our objectives that internal peace and
security be established and maintained in China, including those
areas now being recovered from the Japanese Subject to the
considerations set forth in paragraphs 1–5 above, it is to our
interest:
-
a.
- To assist and advise China in the development of modern
armed forces, ground, sea and air, for the following
purposes only: (1) maintenance of internal peace and
security in China, including the liberated areas of
Manchuria and Formosa, and (2) the fulfillment of those
obligations which may devolve upon China in the occupation
of Korea and Japan;
-
b.
- To discontinue our assistance to the development of
Chinese armed forces, upon due notice to the Chinese
Government, if at any time it is established to the
satisfaction of the United States Government that the
Chinese armed forces are being used in support of an
administration not in conformity with the general policies
of the United States, to engage in fratricidal war, or to
afford a threat of aggression.
- 7.
- The terms and conditions of all aid rendered to China should be
established under arrangements to be agreed upon between the
Governments of the United States and China. The arrangements should
include the methods of payment, financial and otherwise, by China
for the aid rendered by the United States.
- 8.
- To insure that the proposed military assistance is responsive to
the actual requirements of the Chinese Government, and likewise to
[Page 590]
insure that our
objectives as outlined above will be furthered in the event that
such assistance is extended, pursuant to agreement between the
Governments of the United States and China, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff should be requested to survey and report upon the needs of
China’s armed forces in the light of the considerations outlined
above, and to recommend to the Secretaries of War and Navy as to the
nature and extent of United States assistance in the development and
maintenance of these armed forces over and above present
commitments.
- 9.
- To the same end, the Secretary of State should arrange, either
through our established diplomatic and consular representation in
China or through representation on such military and naval missions
or other means as may be available to him for a continuing survey
of, and periodic review and report upon, political conditions and
developments in China as they are related to the extension of
military aid to that country. Upon the basis of such survey, review
and report, this Government should periodically reconsider the
extent to which further military assistance should be afforded to
China, and the conditions upon which it should be extended.
