893.00/9–2045
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Subject: Occupation of Chinese Cities by American Troops.
A N. Y. Times dispatch of September 14 states: “General Wedemeyer said plans under consideration would include United States occupation of Peking, sections of Manchuria, Shanghai, and possibly such other cities as Tientsin, Foochow …”.62 General Wedemeyer is quoted as saying: “The object of bringing in American troops would be to maintain order and facilitate the control of the Central Chinese Government in areas that have been occupied by the Japanese.”
The September 16 issue of the N. Y. Times states that General Wedemeyer, in explaining his previous statement, said specifically that the American mission was not to “open up cities” but rather to [Page 567] help the Chinese reestablish themselves in cities and ports. In the earlier report of Wedemeyer’s comment, it is stated that American troops might be used until the internal situation is “stabilized”.
A news report of September 20 from Chungking states that “according to a Chinese Government spokesman, U. S. troops will take part in the occupation of certain Chinese cities if present plans materialize.”
I have not been able to obtain any authoritative information on these Army plans. I know that “service troops” of the American Army are to go to Shanghai.
If American troops occupy Chinese cities to maintain order until conditions are “stabilized”, it stands to reason, or at least it must be anticipated, that they would be prepared to put down disorder. There could be civil disorder, or there could be disorder arising from an attempt by non-National Government forces (Communist or otherwise) attempting to assume control of a city or cities. The picture of American troops putting down civil disorder in China is not, of course, a pretty one. More serious is the picture of American troops in the dilemma of choosing between (1) using force to prevent occupation of a city by non-National Government troops (probably Communist) or (2) turning over to non-National Government troops (probably Communist). Even though one grants that the probabilities are that American troops would be able to “maintain order” without any of these eventualities occurring, the possibility of their occurring is to me alarming. It seems to me both reasonable and expedient that, rather than employ American troops “to maintain order” in Chinese cities, Chinese troops, transported to the cities by General Wedemeyer’s planes if necessary, be used for this purpose.
I bring this matter to your attention with the suggestion that you try to obtain from Mr. McCloy63 a precise statement of the Army’s plans and, if they do envisage occupation of Chinese cities other than Shanghai by American troops “to maintain order”, that the matter be placed before the President.